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Preface
This volume in the Texts in Logic and Games series was conceived as a
ramification of the seventh conference on Logic and the Foundations of the
Theory of Games and Decisions (LOFT7), which took place in Liverpool,
in July 2006.1
The LOFT conferences have been a regular biannual event since 1994.
The first conference was hosted by the Centre International de Recherches
Mathematiques in Marseille (France), the next four took place at the Inter-
national Centre for Economic Research in Torino (Italy), the sixth confer-
ence was hosted by the Graduate School of Management in Leipzig (Ger-
many) and the most recent one took place at the University of Liverpool
(United Kingdom).2
The LOFT conferences are interdisciplinary events that bring together
researchers from a variety of fields: computer science, economics, game the-
ory, linguistics, logic, multi-agent systems, psychology, philosophy, social
choice and statistics. In its original conception, LOFT had as its central
theme the application of logic, in particular modal epistemic logic, to foun-
dational issues in the theory of games and individual decision-making. Epis-
temic considerations have been central to game theory for a long time. The
1 The conference was organized by the editors of this volume with the assistance of a
program committee consisting of Thomas Ågotnes, Johan van Benthem, Adam Bran-
denburger, Hans van Ditmarsch, Jelle Gerbrandy, Wojtek Jamroga, Hannes Leitgeb,
Benedikt Löwe, Marc Pauly, Andrés Perea, Gabriella Pigozzi, Wlodek Rabinowicz,
Hans Rott, and Krister Segerberg.
2 Collections of papers from previous LOFT conferences can be found in a special issue of
Theory and Decision (Vol. 37, 1994, edited by M. Bacharach and P. Mongin), the vol-
ume Epistemic logic and the theory of games and decisions (edited by M. Bacharach,
L.-A. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin and H. Shin and published by Kluwer Academic, 1997),
two special issues of Mathematical Social Sciences (Vols. 36 and 38, 1998, edited by
G. Bonanno, M. Kaneko and P. Mongin), two special issues of Bulletin of Economic
Research (Vol. 53, 2001 and Vol. 54, 2002, edited by G. Bonanno and W. van der
Hoek), a special issue of Research in Economics, (Vol. 57, 2003, edited by G. Bo-
nanno and W. van der Hoek), a special issue of Knowledge, Rationality and Action
(part of Synthese, Vol. 147, 2005, edited by G. Bonanno) and the volume Proceedings
of the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory
(edited by G. Bonanno, W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge, University of Liverpool,
2006).
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expression “interactive epistemology” has been used in the game-theory lit-
erature to refer to the analysis of decision making by agents involved in a
strategic interaction, when these agents recognize each other’s intelligence
and rationality. What is relatively new is the realization that the tools and
methodologies that were used in game theory are closely related to those al-
ready used in other fields, notably computer science and philosophy. Modal
logic turned out to be the common language that made it possible to bring
together different professional communities. It became apparent that the
insights gained and the methodologies employed in one field could benefit
researchers in other fields. Indeed, new and active areas of research have
sprung from the interdisciplinary exposure provided by the LOFT confer-
ences.3
Over time the scope of the LOFT conference has broadened to encom-
pass a wider range of topics, while maintaining its focus on the general
issue of rationality and agency. Topics that have fallen within the LOFT
umbrella include epistemic and temporal logic, theories of information pro-
cessing and belief revision, models of bounded rationality, non-monotonic
reasoning, theories of learning and evolution, mental models, etc.
The papers collected in this volume reflect the general interests and
interdisciplinary scope of the LOFT conferences.
The paper by Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets falls within the recent
literature that deals with belief revision and update within the Dynamic
Epistemic Logic paradigm. The authors develop a notion of doxastic action
general enough to cover many examples of multi-agent communication ac-
tions encountered in the literature, but also flexible enough to deal with both
static and dynamic belief revision. They discuss several epistemic notions:
knowledge, belief and conditional belief. For the latter they distinguish
between the statement ‘if informed that P , the agent would believe that
Q was the case (before the learning)’ and the statement ‘if informed that
P , the agent would come to believe that Q is the case (in the world after
the learning)’. They also study a “safe belief” operator meant to express a
weak notion of “defeasible knowledge”: it is belief that is persistent under
revision with any true information. Baltag and Smets provide a complete
axiomatization of the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief.
In the second part of the paper the authors discuss dynamic belief revision
in the context of action models.
The paper by Giacomo Bonanno deals with the question of what choices
are compatible with rationality of the players and common belief of ratio-
nality. He takes a syntactic approach and defines rationality axiomatically.
3 There is substantial overlap between the LOFT community and the community of
researchers who are active in another regular, biannual event, namely the conferences
on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK).
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Furthermore, he does not assume von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs but
merely ordinal payoffs, thus aiming for a more general theory of rationality
in games. The author considers two axioms. The first says that a player is
irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another
strategy of hers is better. He shows that common belief of this weak notion
of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are
strictly dominated by another pure strategy. The second axiom says that a
player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that
a different strategy is at least as good and she considers it possible that
this alternative strategy is actually better than the chosen one. The author
shows that common knowledge of this stronger notion of rationality char-
acterizes the iterated deletion procedure introduced by Stalnaker (1994),
restricted—once again—to pure strategies.
The paper by Hans van Ditmarsch and Barteld Kooi investigates a dy-
namic logic describing “epistemic events” that may change both the agents’
information (or beliefs) and what the authors call “the ontic facts” of the
world (that is, objective, non-epistemic statements about the world). A
sound and complete axiomatization is provided. Some original and inter-
esting semantic results are also proved, in particular the fact that any model
change can be simulated by “epistemic events”, and thus any consistent goal
can be achieved by performing some such event. The authors illustrate their
results in several examples, including card games and logical puzzles.
The paper by Wiebe van der Hoek, Mark Roberts and Michael Wool-
dridge extends the authors’ previous work on Alternating-time Temporal
Logic and its ramifications. They extend it by introducing the notion of
a legally possible strategy, that they oppose to a physically possible strat-
egy, and define social belief as truth in all states that are (1) possible for
the agent, and (2) are obtained from the initial state by a legally possible
strategy. They use this framework to reason about social laws. In a system
with social laws, every agent is supposed to refrain from performing certain
forbidden actions. Rather than assuming that all agents abide by the law,
the authors consider what happens if certain agents act socially, while oth-
ers do not. In particular, they focus on the agents’ strategic abilities under
such mixed conditions.
The paper by Alexander Nittka and Richard Booth deals with the tra-
ditional “static” belief revision setting, but with a different twist: rather
than answering the question of how an agent should rationally change his
beliefs in the light of new information, they address the question of what
one can say about an agent who is observed in a belief change process.
That is, the authors study the problem of how to make inferences about
an agent’s beliefs based on observation of how that agent responded to a
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sequence of revision inputs over time. They start by reviewing some earlier
results for the case where the observation is complete in the sense that (1)
the logical content of all formulas appearing in the observation is known,
and (2) all revision inputs received by the agent during the observed period
are recorded in the observation. They then provide new results for the more
general case where information in the observation might be distorted due to
noise or because some revision inputs are missing altogether. Their analysis
is based on the assumption that the agent employs a specific, but plausible,
belief revision framework when incorporating new information.
The paper by R. Ramanujam and Sunil Simon deals with the most im-
portant notion of non-cooperative game, namely extensive game. Extensive
games provide a richer description of interactive situations than strategic-
form games in that they make the order of moves and the information avail-
able to a player when it is his turn to move explicit. A strategy for a player
in an extensive game associates with every information set of that player a
choice at that information set. The authors observe that the game position
(or information set) may be only partially known, in terms of properties
that the player can test for. Thus—they argue—strategies can be thought
of as programs, built up systematically from atomic decisions like if b then
a where b is a condition checked by the player to hold (at some game po-
sition) and a is a move available to the player at that position. This leads
them to propose a logical structure for strategies, where one can reason
with assertions of the form “(partial) strategy σ ensures the (intermediate)
condition α”. They present an axiomatization for the logic and prove its
completeness.
The paper by Giacomo Sillari contributes to the very recent and fast
growing literature on the notion of (un)awareness. An open problem in
this literature has been how to model the state of mind of an individual
who realizes that he may be unaware of something, that is, the problem of
formalizing the notion of “awareness of unawareness”. Sillari offers a solu-
tion to this problem using a new system of first-order epistemic logic with
awareness. He also offers a philosophical analysis of awareness structures
and proves that a certain fragment of the first-order epistemic language with
awareness operators is decidable.
The papers went through a thorough refereeing and editorial process.
The editors would like to thank the many referees who provided invaluable
help and the authors for their cooperation during the revision stage.
Davis, CA & Liverpool G.B. W.v.d.H. M.W.
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Abstract
We present a logical setting that incorporates a belief-revision mecha-
nism within Dynamic-Epistemic logic. As the “static” basis for belief
revision, we use epistemic plausibility models, together with a modal
language based on two epistemic operators: a “knowledge” modality
K (the standard S5, fully introspective, notion), and a “safe belief”
modality 2 (“weak”, non-negatively-introspective, notion, capturing
a version of Lehrer’s “indefeasible knowledge”). To deal with “dy-
namic” belief revision, we introduce action plausibility models, repre-
senting various types of “doxastic events”. Action models “act” on
state models via a modified update product operation: the “Action-
Priority” Update. This is the natural dynamic generalization of AGM
revision, giving priority to the incoming information (i.e., to “ac-
tions”) over prior beliefs. We completely axiomatize this logic, and
show how our update mechanism can “simulate”, in a uniform man-
ner, many different belief-revision policies.
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the recent and on-going work in the logical com-
munity [2, 14, 24, 8, 10, 9, 7] on dealing with mechanisms for belief re-
vision and update within the Dynamic-Epistemic Logic (DEL) paradigm.
DEL originates in the work of Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [30, 29], an-
ticipated by Plaza in [44], and further developed by numerous authors
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 11–58.
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[6, 31, 22, 4, 23, 39, 5, 15, 16] etc. In its standard incarnation, as pre-
sented e.g., in the recent textbook [25], the DEL approach is particularly
well fit to deal with complex multi-agent learning actions by which groups of
interactive agents update their beliefs (including higher-level beliefs about
the others’ beliefs), as long as the newly received information is consistent
with the agents’ prior beliefs. On the other hand, the classical AGM theory
and its more recent extensions have been very successful in dealing with the
problem of revising one-agent, first-level (factual) beliefs when they are con-
tradicted by new information. So it is natural to look for a way to combine
these approaches.
We develop here a notion of doxastic actions1, general enough to cover
most examples of multi-agent communication actions encountered in the
literature, but also flexible enough to deal with (both static and dynamic)
belief revision, and in particular to implement various “belief-revision poli-
cies” in a unified setting. Our approach can be seen as a natural extension
of the work in [5, 6] on “epistemic actions”, incorporating ideas from the
AGM theory along the lines pioneered in [2] and [24], but using a qualitative
approach based on conditional beliefs, in the line of [50, 20, 19, 14].
Our paper assumes the general distinction, made in [24, 8, 14], between
“dynamic” and “static” belief revision. It is usually acknowledged that
the classical AGM theory in [1, 28] (and embodied in our setting by the
conditional belief operators BPa Q) is indeed “static”, in the sense that it
captures the agent’s changing beliefs about an unchanging world. But in
fact, when we take into account all the higher-level beliefs, the “world”
(that these higher-level beliefs are about) includes all agent’s (real) beliefs.2
Thus, such a world is always changed by our changes of beliefs! So we can
better understand a belief conditional on P as capturing the agent’s beliefs
after revising with P about the state of the world before the revision: the
statement BPa Q says that, if agent a would learn P , then she would come
to believe that Q was the case (before the learning). In contrast, “dynamic”
belief revision uses dynamic modalities to capture the agent’s revised beliefs
about the world as it is after revision: [!P ]BaQ says that after learning P ,
agent a would come to believe that Q is the case (in the world after the
learning). The standard alternative [37] to the AGM theory calls this belief
update, but like the AGM approach, it only deals with “first-level” (factual)
beliefs from a non-modal perspective, neglecting any higher-order “beliefs
about beliefs”. As a result, it completely misses the changes induced (in our
own or the other agents’ epistemic-doxastic states) by the learning actions
themselves (e.g., the learning of a Moore sentence, see Section 3). This
1 Or “doxastic events”, in the terminology of [14].
2 To verify that a higher-level belief about another belief is “true” we need to check the
content of that higher-level belief (i.e., the existence of the second, lower-level belief)
against the “real world”. So the real world has to include the agent’s beliefs.
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is reflected in the acceptance in [37] of the AGM “Success Axiom”: in
dynamic notation, this is the axiom [!P ]BaP (which cannot accommodate
Moore sentences). Instead, the authors of [37] exclusively concentrate on
the possible changes of (ontic) facts that may have occurred during our
learning (but not due to our learning). In contrast, our approach to belief
update (following the DEL tradition) may be thought of as “dual” to the
one in [37]: we completely neglect here the ontic changes3, considering only
the changes induced by “purely doxastic” actions (learning by observation,
communication, etc.).
Our formalism for “static” revision can best be understood as a modal-
logic implementation of the well-known view of belief revision in terms of
conditional reasoning [50, 52]. In [8] and [10], we introduced two equivalent
semantic settings for conditional beliefs in a multi-agent epistemic context
(conditional doxastic models and epistemic plausibility models), taking the
first setting as the basic one. Here, we adopt the second setting, which is
closer to the standard semantic structures used in the literature on modeling
belief revision [34, 49, 52, 27, 19, 14, 17]. We use this setting to define
notions of knowledge KaP , belief BaP and conditional belief B
Q
a P . Our
concept of “knowledge” is the standard S5-notion, partition-based and fully
introspective, that is commonly used in Computer Science and Economics,
and is sometimes known as “Aumann knowledge”, as a reference to [3]. The
conditional belief operator is a way to “internalize”, in a sense, the “static”
(AGM) belief revision within a modal framework: saying that, at state s,
agent a believes P conditional on Q is a way of saying that Q belongs to a’s
revised “theory” (capturing her revised beliefs) after revision with P (of a’s
current theory/beliefs) at state s. Our conditional formulation of “static”
belief revision is close to the one in [50, 47, 19, 20, 45]. As in [19], the
preference relation is assumed to be well-preordered; as a result, the logic
CDL of conditional beliefs is equivalent to the strongest system in [19].
We also consider other modalities, capturing other “doxastic attitudes”
than just knowledge and conditional belief. The most important such no-
tion expresses a form of “weak (non-introspective) knowledge” 2aP , first
introduced by Stalnaker in his modal formalization [50, 52] of Lehrer’s de-
feasibility analysis of knowledge [40, 41]. We call this notion safe belief, to
distinguish it from our (Aumann-type) concept of knowledge. Safe belief
can be understood as belief that is persistent under revision with any true
information. We use this notion to give a new solution to the so-called
“Paradox of the Perfect Believer”. We also solve the open problem posed
in [19], by providing a complete axiomatization of the “static” logic K2 of
conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief. In a forthcoming paper, we
3 But our approach can be easily modified to incorporate ontic changes, along the lines
of [15].
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apply the concept of safe belief to Game Theory, improving on Aumann’s
epistemic analysis of backwards induction in games of perfect information.
Moving thus on to dynamic belief revision, the first thing to note is
that (unlike the case of “static” revision), the doxastic features of the actual
“triggering event” that induced the belief change are essential for under-
standing this change (as a “dynamic revision”, i.e., in terms of the revised
beliefs about the state of the world after revision). For instance, our beliefs
about the current situation after hearing a public announcement (say, of
some factual information, denoted by an atomic sentence p) are different
from our beliefs after receiving a fully private announcement with the same
content p. Indeed, in the public case, we come to believe that p is now
common knowledge (or at least common belief ). While, in the private case,
we come to believe that the content of the announcement forms now our
secret knowledge. So the agent’s beliefs about the learning actions in which
she is currently engaged affect the way she updates her previous beliefs.
This distinction is irrelevant for “static” revision, since e.g., in both cases
above (public as well as private announcement) we learn the same thing
about the situation that existed before the learning: our beliefs about that
past situation will change in the same way in both cases. More generally,
our beliefs about the “triggering action” are irrelevant, as far as our “static”
revision is concerned. This explains a fact observed in [14], namely that
by and large, the standard literature on belief revision (or belief update)
does not usually make explicit the doxastic events that “trigger” the belief
change (dealing instead only with types of abstract operations on beliefs,
such as update, revision and contraction etc). The reason for this lies in the
“static” character of AGM revision, as well as its restriction (shared with
the “updates” of [37]) to one-agent, first-level, factual beliefs.
A “truly dynamic” logic of belief revision has to be able to capture
the doxastic-epistemic features (e.g., publicity, complete privacy etc.) of
specific “learning events”. We need to be able to model the agents’ “dynamic
beliefs”, i.e., their beliefs about the learning action itself : the appearance of
this action (while it is happening) to each of the agents. In [5], it was
argued that a natural way to do this is to use the same type of formalism
that was used to model “static” beliefs : epistemic actions should be modeled
in essentially the same way as epistemic states; and this common setting
was taken there to be given by epistemic Kripke models.
A similar move is made here in the context of our richer doxastic-
plausibility structures, by introducing plausibility pre-orders on actions and
developing a notion of “action plausibility models”, that extends the “epis-
temic action models” from [5], along similar lines to (but without the quan-
titative features of) the work in [2, 24].
Extending to (pre)ordered models the corresponding notion from [5], we
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introduce an operation of product update of such models, based on the anti-
lexicographic order on the product of the state model with the action model.
The simplest and most natural way to define a connected pre-order on a
Cartesian product from connected pre-orders on each of the components is
to use either the lexicographic or the anti-lexicographic order. Our choice is
the second, which we regard as the natural generalization of the AGM theory,
giving priority to incoming information (i.e., to “actions” in our sense). This
can also be thought of as a generalization of the so-called “maximal-Spohn”
revision. We call this type of update rule the “Action-Priority” Update.
The intuition is that the beliefs encoded in the action model express the
“incoming” changes of belief, while the state model only captures that past
beliefs. One could say that the new “beliefs about actions” are acting on
the prior “beliefs about states”, producing the updated (posterior) beliefs.
This is embedded in the Motto of Section 3.1: “beliefs about changes encode
(and induce) changes of beliefs”.
By abstracting away from the quantitative details of the plausibility
maps when considering the associated dynamic logic, our approach to dy-
namic belief revision is in the spirit of the one in [14]: instead of using
“graded belief” operators as in e.g., [2, 24], or probabilistic modal logic as
in [39], both our account and the one in [14] concentrate on the simple, qual-
itative language of conditional beliefs, knowledge and action modalities (to
which we add here the safe belief operator). As a consequence, we obtain
simple, elegant, general logical laws of dynamic belief revision, as natural
generalizations of the ones in [14]. These “reduction laws” give a complete
axiomatization of the logic of doxastic actions, “reducing” it to the “static”
logic K2. Compared both to our older axiomatization in [10] and to the
system in [2], one can easily see that the introduction of the safe belief
operator leads to a major simplification of the reduction laws.
Our qualitative logical setting (in this paper and in [8, 10, 9]), as well
as van Benthem’s closely related setting in [14], are conceptually very dif-
ferent from the more “quantitative” approaches to dynamic belief revision
taken by Aucher, van Ditmarsch and Labuschagne [2, 24, 26], approaches
based on “degrees of belief” given by ordinal plausibility functions. This is
not just a matter of interpretation, but it makes a difference for the choice
of dynamic revision operators. Indeed, the update mechanisms proposed
in [49, 2, 24] are essentially quantitative, using various binary functions in
transfinite ordinal arithmetic, in order to compute the degree of belief of the
output-states in terms of the degrees of the input-states and the degrees of
the actions. This leads to an increase in complexity, both in the computa-
tion of updates and in the corresponding logical systems. Moreover, there
seems to be no canonical choice for the arithmetical formula for updates,
various authors proposing various formulas. No clear intuitive justification
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is provided to any of these formulas, and we see no transparent reason to
prefer one to the others. In contrast, classical (AGM) belief revision the-
ory is a qualitative theory, based on natural, intuitive postulates, of great
generality and simplicity.
Our approach retains this qualitative flavor of the AGM theory, and
aims to build a theory of “dynamic” belief revision of equal simplicity and
naturality as the classical “static” account. Moreover (unlike the AGM
theory), it aims to provide a “canonical” choice for a dynamic revision
operator, given by our “Action Priority” update. This notion is a purely
qualitative one4, based on a simple, natural relational definition. From a
formal point of view, one might see our choice of the anti-lexicographic order
as just one of the many possible options for developing a belief-revision-
friendly notion of update. As already mentioned, it is a generalization
of the “maximal-Spohn” revision, already explored in [24] and [2], among
many other possible formulas for combining the “degrees of belief” of actions
and states. But here we justify our option, arguing that our qualitative
interpretation of the plausibility order makes this the only reasonable choice.
It may seem that by making this choice, we have confined ourselves to
only one of the bewildering multitude of “belief revision policies” proposed in
the literature [49, 45, 48, 2, 24, 17, 14]. But, as argued below, this apparent
limitation is not so limiting after all, but can instead be regarded as an
advantage: the power of the “action model” approach is reflected in the
fact that many different belief revision policies can be recovered as instances
of the same type of update operation. In this sense, our approach can be
seen as a change of perspective: the diversity of possible revision policies is
replaced by the diversity of possible action models; the differences are now
viewed as differences in input, rather than having different “programs”. For
a computer scientist, this resembles “Currying” in lambda-calculus: if every
“operation” is encoded as an input-term, then one operation (functional
application) can simulate all operations .5 In a sense, this is nothing but the
idea of Turing’s universal machine, which underlies universal computation.
The title of our paper is a paraphrase of Oliver Board’s “Dynamic In-
teractive Epistemology” [19], itself a paraphrase of the title (“Interactive
Epistemology”) of a famous paper by Aumann [3]. We interpret the word
“interactive” as referring to the multiplicity of agents and the possibility
4 One could argue that our plausibility pre-order relation is equivalent to a quantitative
notion (of ordinal degrees of plausibility, such as [49]), but unlike in [2, 24] the way be-
lief update is defined in our account does not make any use of the ordinal “arithmetic”
of these degrees.
5 Note that, as in untyped lambda-calculus, the input-term encoding the operation (i.e.,
our “action model”) and the “static” input-term to be operated upon (i.e., the “state
model”) are essentially of the same type: epistemic plausibility models for the same
language (and for the same set of agents).
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of communication. Observe that “interactive” does not necessarily imply
“dynamic”: indeed, Board and Stalnaker consider Aumann’s notion to be
“static” (since it doesn’t accommodate any non-trivial belief revision). But
even Board’s logic, as well as Stalnaker’s [52], are “static” in our sense: they
cannot directly capture the effect of learning actions (but can only express
“static” conditional beliefs). In contrast, our DEL-based approach has all
the “dynamic” features and advantages of DEL: in addition to “simulat-
ing” a range of individual belief-revision policies, it can deal with an even
wider range of complex types of multi-agent learning and communication
actions. We thus think it is realistic to expect that, within its own natural
limits6, our Action-Priority Update Rule could play the role of a “universal
machine” for qualitative dynamic interactive belief-revision.
2 “Static” Belief Revision
Using the terminology in [14, 8, 10, 9, 11], “static” belief revision is about
pre-encoding potential belief revisions as conditional beliefs. A conditional
belief statement BPa Q can be thought of as expressing a “doxastic predis-
position” or a “plan of doxastic action”: the agent is determined to believe
that Q was the case, if he learnt that P was the case. The semantics for con-
ditional beliefs is usually given in terms of plausibility models (or equivalent
notions, e.g., “spheres”, “onions”, ordinal functions etc.) As we shall see,
both (Aumann, S5-like) knowledge and simple (unconditional) belief can be
defined in terms of conditional belief, which itself could be defined in terms
of a unary belief-revision operator : ∗aP captures all the revised beliefs of
agent a after revising (her current beliefs) with P .
In addition, we introduce a safe belief operator 2aP , meant to express a
weak notion of “defeasible knowledge” (obeying the laws of the modal logic
S4.3). This concept was defined in [52, 19] using a higher-order semantics
(quantifying over conditional beliefs). But this is in fact equivalent to a
first-order definition, as the Kripke modality for the (converse) plausibility
relation. This observation greatly simplifies the task of completely axiom-
atizing the logic of safe belief and conditional beliefs: indeed, our proof
system K2 below is a solution to the open problem posed in [19].
2.1 Plausibility models: The single agent case
To warm up, we consider first the case of only one agent, a case which fits
well with the standard models for belief revision.
A single-agent plausibility frame is a structure (S,≤), consisting of a
set S of “states” and a “well-preorder” ≤, i.e., a reflexive, transitive binary
6 E.g., our update cannot deal with “forgetful” agents, since “perfect recall” is in-built.
But finding out what exactly are the “natural limits” of our approach is for now an
open problem.
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relation on S such that every non-empty subset has minimal elements. Using
the notation
Min≤ P := {s ∈ P : s ≤ s
′ for all s′ ∈ P}
for the set of ≤-minimal elements of P , the last condition says that: For
every set P ⊆ S, if P 6= ∅ then Min≤ P 6= ∅.
The usual reading of s ≤ t is that “state s is at least as plausible as
state t”. We keep this reading for now, though we will later get back to it
and clarify its meaning. The “minimal states” in Min≤ P are thus the “most
plausible states” satisfying proposition P . As usual, we write s < t iff s ≤ t
but t 6≤ s, for the “strict” plausibility relation (s is more plausible than t).
Similarly, we write s ∼= t iff both s ≤ t and t ≤ s, for the “equi-plausibility”
(or indifference) relation (s and t are equally plausible).
S-propositions and models. Given an epistemic plausibility frame S,
an S-proposition is any subset P ⊆ S. Intuitively, we say that a state s
satisfies the proposition P if s ∈ P . Observe that a plausibility frame is just
a special case of a relational frame (or Kripke frame). So, as it is standard
for Kripke frames in general, we can define a plausibility model to be a
structure S = (S,≤, ‖·‖), consisting of a plausibility frame (S,≤) together
with a valuation map ‖·‖ : Φ → P(S), mapping every element of a given set
Φ of “atomic sentences” into S-propositions.
Interpretation. The elements of S will represent the possible states (or
“possible worlds”) of a system. The atomic sentences p ∈ Φ represent
“ontic” (non-doxastic) facts, that might hold or not in a given state. The
valuation tells us which facts hold at which worlds. Finally, the plausibility
relations ≤ capture the agent’s (conditional) beliefs about the state of the
system; if e.g., the agent was given the information that the state of the
system is either s or t, she would believe that the system was in the most
plausible of the two. So, if s < t, the agent would believe the real state was
s; if t < s, she would believe it was t; otherwise (if s ∼= t), the agent would
be indifferent between the two alternatives: she will not be able to decide
to believe any one alternative rather than the other.
Propositional operators, Kripke modalities. For every model S, we
have the usual Boolean operations with S-propositions
P ∧Q := P ∩Q, P ∨Q := P ∪Q,
¬P := S \ P, P → Q := ¬P ∨Q,
as well as Boolean constants ⊤S := S and ⊥S := ∅. Obviously, one also
introduces infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. In addition, any binary
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relation R ⊆ S×S on S gives rise to a Kripke modality [R] : P(S) → P(S),
defined by
[R]Q := {s ∈ S : ∀t (sRt⇒ t ∈ Q)}.
Accessibility relations for belief, conditional belief and knowledge.
To talk about beliefs, we introduce a doxastic accessibility relation →, given
by
s→ t iff t ∈ Min≤ S .
We read this as saying that: when the actual state is s, the agent believes
that any of the states t with s → t may be the actual state. This matches
the above interpretation of the preorder: the states believed to be possible
are the minimal (i.e., “most plausible”) ones.
In order to talk about conditional beliefs, we can similarly define a con-
ditional doxastic accessibility relation for each S-proposition P ⊆ S:
s→P t iff t ∈ Min≤ P .
We read this as saying that: when the actual state is s, if the agent is given
the information (that) P (is true at the actual state), then she believes that
any of the states t with s→ t may be the actual state.
Finally, to talk about knowledge, we introduce a relation of epistemic
possibility (or “indistinguishability”)∼. Essentially, this is just the universal
relation:
s ∼ t iff s, t ∈ S .
So, in single-agent models, all the states in S are assumed to be “epistem-
ically possible”: the only thing known with absolute certainty about the
current state is that it belongs to S. This is natural, in the context of a
single agent: the states known to be impossible are irrelevant from the point
of doxastic-epistemic logic, so they can simply be excluded from our model
S. (As seen below, this cannot be done in the case of multiple agents!)
Knowledge and (conditional) belief. We define knowledge and (condi-
tional) belief as the Kripke modalities for the epistemic and (conditional)
doxastic accessibility relations:
KP := [∼]P ,
BP := [→]P ,
BQP := [→Q]P .
We readKP as saying that the (implicit) agent knows P . This is “knowl-
edge” in the strong Leibnizian sense of “truth in all possible worlds”. We
similarly read BP as “P is believed” and BQP as “P is believed given (or
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conditional on) Q”. As for conditional belief statements s ∈ BQP , we inter-
pret them in the following way: if the actual state is s, then after coming
to believe that Q is the case (at this actual state), the agent will believe
that P was the case (at the same actual state, before his change of belief).
In other words, conditional beliefs BQ give descriptions of the agent’s plan
(or commitments) about what he will believe about the current state after
receiving new (believable) information. To quote Johan van Benthem in
[14], conditional beliefs are “static pre-encodings” of the agent’s potential
belief changes in the face of new information.
Discussion on interpretation. Observe that our interpretation of the
plausibility relations is qualitative, in terms of conditional beliefs rather than
“degrees of belief”: there is no scale of beliefs here, allowing for “interme-
diary” stages between believing and not believing. Instead, all these beliefs
are equally “firm” (though conditional): given the condition, something is
either believed or not. To repeat, writing s < t is for us just a way to say
that: if given the information that the state of the system is either s or t,
the agent would believe it to be s. So plausibility relations are special cases
of conditional belief. This interpretation is based on the following (easily
verifiable) equivalence:
s < t iff s ∈ B{s,t}{s} iff t ∈ B{s,t}{s}.
There is nothing quantitative here, no need for us to refer in any way
to the “strength” of this agent’s belief: though she might have beliefs of
unequal strengths, we are not interested here in modeling this quantitative
aspect. Instead, we give the agent some information about a state of a
virtual system (that it is either s or t) and we ask her a yes-or-no question
(“Do you believe that virtual state to be s ?”); we write s < t iff the agent’s
answer is “yes”. This is a firm answer, so it expresses a firm belief. “Firm”
does not imply “un-revisable” though: if later we reveal to the agent that
the state in question was in fact t, she should be able to accept this new
information; after all, the agent should be introspective enough to realize
that her belief, however firm, was just a belief.
One possible objection against this qualitative interpretation is that our
postulate that ≤ is a well-preorder (and so in particular a connected pre-
order) introduces a hidden “quantitative” feature; indeed, any such preorder
can be equivalently described using a plausibility map as in e.g., [49], as-
signing ordinals to states. Our answer is that, first, the specific ordinals
will not play any role in our definition of a dynamic belief update; and
second, all our postulates can be given a justification in purely qualitative
terms, using conditional beliefs. The transitivity condition for ≤ is just a
consistency requirement imposed on a rational agent’s conditional beliefs.
And the existence of minimal elements in any non-empty subset is simply
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the natural extension of the above setting to general conditional beliefs,
not only conditions involving two states: more specifically, for any possible
condition P ⊆ S about a system S, the S-proposition Min≤ P is simply a
way to encode everything that the agent would believe about the current
state of the system, if she was given the information that the state satisfied
condition P .
Note on other models in the literature. Our models are the same as
Board’s “belief revision structures” [19], i.e., nothing but “Spohn models” as
in [49], but with a purely relational description. Spohn models are usually
described in terms of a map assigning ordinals to states. But giving such a
map is equivalent to introducing a well pre-order ≤ on states, and it is easy
to see that all the relevant information is captured by this order.
Our conditions on the preorder≤ can also be seen as a semantic analogue
of Grove’s conditions for the (relational version of) his models in [34]. The
standard formulation of Grove models is in terms of a “system of spheres”
(weakening Lewis’ similar notion), but it is equivalent (as proved in [34]) to
a relational formulation. Grove’s postulates are still syntax-dependent, e.g.,
existence of minimal elements is required only for subsets that are defin-
able in his language: this is the so-called “smoothness” condition, which is
weaker than our “well-preordered” condition. We prefer a purely semantic
condition, independent of the choice of a language, both for reasons of ele-
gance and simplicity and because we want to be able to consider more than
one language for the same structure.7 So, following [19, 52] and others, we
adopt the natural semantic analogue of Grove’s condition, simply requir-
ing that every subset has minimal elements: this will allow our conditional
operators to be well-defined on sentences of any extension of our logical
language.
Note that the minimality condition implies, by itself, that the relation ≤
is both reflexive (i.e., s ≤ s for all s ∈ S) and connected8 (i.e., either s ≤ t or
t ≤ s, for all s, t ∈ S). In fact, a “well-preorder” is the same as a connected,
transitive, well-founded9 relation, which is the setting proposed in [19] for
a logic of conditional beliefs equivalent to our logic CDL below. Note also
that, when the set S is finite, a well-preorder is nothing but a connected
preorder. This shows that our notion of frame subsumes, not only Grove’s
setting, but also some of the other settings proposed for conditionalization.
7 Imposing syntactic-dependent conditions in the very definition of a class of structures
makes the definition meaningful only for one language; or else, the meaning of what,
say, a plausibility model is won’t be robust : it will change whenever one wants to
extend the logic, by adding a few more operators. This is very undesirable, since then
one cannot compare the expressivity of different logics on the same class of models.
8 In the Economics literature, connectedness is called “completeness”, see e.g., [19].
9 I.e., there exists no infinite descending chain s0 > s1 > · · · .
22 A. Baltag, S. Smets
2.2 Multi-agent plausibility models
In the multi-agent case, we cannot exclude from the model the states that
are known to be impossible by some agent a: they may still be considered
possible by a second agent b. Moreover, they might still be relevant for a’s
beliefs/knowledge about what b believes or knows. So, in order to define
an agent’s knowledge, we cannot simply quantify over all states, as we did
above: instead, we need to consider, as usually done in the Kripke-model
semantics of knowledge, only the “possible” states, i.e., the ones that are
indistinguishable from the real state, as far as a given agent is concerned. It
is thus natural, in the multi-agent context, to explicitly specify the agents’
epistemic indistinguishability relations ∼a (labeled with the agents’ names)
as part of the basic structure, in addition to the plausibility relations ≤a.
Taking this natural step, we obtain epistemic plausibility frames (S,∼a,≤a).
As in the case of a single agent, specifying epistemic relations turns out to
be superfluous: the relations ∼a can be recovered from the relations ≤a.
Hence, we will simplify the above structures, obtaining the equivalent setting
of multi-agent plausibility frames (S,≤a).
Before going on to define these notions, observe that it doesn’t make
sense anymore to require the plausibility relations ≤a to be connected (and
even less sense to require them to be well-preordered): if two states s, t are
distinguishable by an agent a, i.e., s 6∼a t, then a will never consider both
of them as epistemically possible in the same time. If she was given the
information that the real state is either s or t, agent a will immediately know
which of the two: if the real state was s, she would be able to distinguish this
state from t, and would thus know the state was s; similarly, if the real state
was t, she would know it to be t. Her beliefs will play no role in this, and it
would be meaningless to ask her which of the two states is more plausible to
her. So only the states in the same ∼a-equivalence class could, and should,
be ≤a-comparable; i.e., s ≤a t implies s ∼a t, and the restriction of ≤a to
each ∼a-equivalence class is connected. Extending the same argument to
arbitrary conditional beliefs, we can see that the restriction of ≤a to each
∼a-equivalence class must be well-preordered.
Epistemic plausibility frames. Let A be a finite set of labels, called
agents. A epistemic plausibility frame over A (EPF, for short) is a struc-
ture S = (S,∼a,≤a)a∈A, consisting of a set S of “states”, endowed with a
family of equivalence relations ∼a, called epistemic indistinguishability re-
lations, and a family of plausibility relations ≤a, both labeled by “agents”
and assumed to satisfy two conditions: (1) ≤a-comparable states are ∼a-
indistinguishable (i.e., s ≤a t implies s ∼a t); (2) the restriction of each
plausibility relation ≤a to each ∼a-equivalence class is a well-preorder. As
before, we use the notation Min≤a P for the set of ≤a-minimal elements
of P . We write s <a t iff s ≤a t but t 6≤a s (the “strict” plausibility rela-
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tion), and write s ∼=a t iff both s ≤a t and t ≤a s (the “equi-plausibility”
relation). The notion of epistemic plausibility models (EPM, for short) is
defined in the same way as the plausibility models in the previous section.
Epistemic plausibility models. We define a (multi-agent) epistemic
plausibility model (EPM, for short) as a multi-agent EPF together with
a valuation over it (the same way that single-agent plausibility models were
defined in the previous section).
It is easy to see that our definition of EPFs includes superfluous infor-
mation: in an EPF, the knowledge relation ∼a can be recovered from the
plausibility relation ≤a, via the following rule:
s ∼a t iff either s ≤a t or t ≤a s .
In other words, two states are indistinguishable for a iff they are comparable
(with respect to ≤a).
So, in fact, one could present epistemic plausibility frames simply as
multi-agent plausibility frames. To give this alternative presentation, we use,
for any preorder relation ≤, the notation ∼ for the associated comparability
relation
∼ := ≤ ∪≥
(where ≥ is the converse of ≤). A comparability class is a set of the form
{t : s ≤ t or t ≤ s}, for some state s. A relation ≤ is called locally well-
preordered if it is a preorder such that its restriction to each comparability
class is well-preordered. Note that, when the underlying set S is finite, a
locally well-preordered relation is nothing but a locally connected preorder : a
preorder whose restrictions to any comparability class are connected. More
generally, a locally well-preordered relation is the same as a locally connected
and well-founded preorder.
Multi-agent plausibility frames. A multi-agent plausibility frame
(MPF, for short) is a structure (S,≤a)a∈A, consisting of a set of states
S together with a family of locally well-preordered relations ≤a, one for
each agent a ∈ A. Oliver Board [19] calls multi-agent plausibility frames
“belief revision structures”. A multi-agent plausibility model (MPM, for
short) is an MPF together with a valuation map.
Bijective correspondence between EPFs and MPFs. Every MPF
can be canonically mapped into an EPF, obtained by defining epistemic in-
distinguishability via the above rule (∼a := ≤a ∪ ≥a). Conversely, every
EPF gives rise to an MPF, via the map that “forgets” the indistinguisha-
bility structure. It is easy to see that these two maps are the inverse of
each other. Consequently, from now on we identify MPFs and EPFs, and
similarly identify MPMs and EPMs; e.g., we can talk about “knowledge”,
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“(conditional) belief” etc. in an MPM, defined in terms of the associated
EPM.
So from now on we identify the two classes of models, via the above
canonical bijection, and talk about “plausibility models” in general. One
can also see how this approach relates to another widely adopted definition
for conditional beliefs; in [19, 24, 14], this definition involves the assumption
of a “local plausibility” relation at a given state s ≤wa t, to be read as: “at
state w, agent a considers state s at least as plausible as state t ”. Given
such a relation, the conditional belief operator is usually defined in terms
that are equivalent to putting s →Pa t iff t ∈ Min≤sa P . One could easily
restate our above definition in this form, by taking:
s ≤wa t iff either w 6∼a t or s ≤a t.
The converse problem is studied in [19], where it is shown that, if full intro-
spection is assumed, then one can recover “uniform” plausibility relations
≤a from the relations ≤
w
a .
Information cell. The equivalence relation ∼a induces a partition of the
state space S, called agent a’s information partition. We denote by s(a) the
information cell of s in a’s partition, i.e., the ∼a-equivalence class of s:
s(a) := {t ∈ S : s ∼a t} .
The information cell s(a) captures all the knowledge possessed by the agent
at state s: when the actual state of the system is s, then agent a knows
only the state’s equivalence class s(a).
Example 2.1. Alice and Bob play a game, in which an anonymous referee
puts a coin on the table, lying face up but in such a way that the face is
covered (so Alice and Bob cannot see it). Based on previous experience, (it
is common knowledge that) Alice and Bob believe that the upper face is
Heads (since e.g., they noticed that the referee had a strong preference for
Heads). And in fact, they’re right: the coin lies Heads up. Neglecting the
anonymous referee, the EPM for this example is the following model S:










_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
H
•
ss d b _ \ Z T
•kk
Here, the arrows represent converse plausibility relations ≥ between distinct
states only (going from less plausible to more plausible states): since these
are always reflexive, we choose to skip all the loops for convenience. The
squares represent the information cells for the two agents. Instead of labels,
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we use dashed arrows and squares for Alice, while using continuous arrows
and squares for Bob. In this picture, the actual state of the system is the
state s on the left (in which H is true). Henceforth, in our other examples,
we will refer to this particular plausibility model as S.
By deleting the squares, we obtain a representation of the corresponding
MPM, also denoted by S (where we now use labels for agents instead of






Example 2.2. In front of Alice, the referee shows the face of the coin to
Bob, but Alice cannot see the face. The EPM is now the following model W:
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Since Bob now knows the state of the coin, his local plausibility relation
consists only of loops, and hence we have no arrows for Bob in this dia-
grammatic representation.
(Conditional) doxastic appearance and (conditional) doxastic ac-
cessibility. As in the previous section, we can define a doxastic and epis-
temic accessibility relations, except that now we have to select, for each
state s, the most plausible states in its information cell s(a) (instead of the
most plausible in S). For this, it is convenient to introduce some notation
and terminology: the doxastic appearance of state s to agent a is the set
sa := Min≤a s(a)
of the “most plausible” states that are consistent with the agent’s knowledge
at state s. The doxastic appearance of s captures the way state s appears to
the agent, or (in the language of Belief Revision) the agent’s current “theory”
about the world s. We can extend this to capture conditional beliefs (in full
generality), by associating to each S -proposition P ⊆ S and each state
s ∈ S the conditional doxastic appearance sPa of state s to agent a, given
(information) P . This can be defined as the S-proposition
sPa := Min≤a s(a) ∩ P
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given by the set of all ≤a-minimal states of s(a) ∩ P : these are the “most
plausible” states satisfying P that are consistent with the agent’s knowledge
at state s. The conditional appearance SPa gives the agent’s revised theory
(after learning P ) about the world s. We can put these in a relational form,
by defining doxastic accessibility relations →a, →
P
a , as follows:
s→a t iff t ∈ sa ,
s→Pa t iff t ∈ s
P
a .
Knowledge and (conditional) belief. As before, we define the knowl-
edge and (conditional) belief operators for an agent a as the Kripke modal-
ities for a’s epistemic and (conditional) doxastic accessibility relations:
KaP := [∼a]P = {s ∈ S : s(a) ⊆ P} ,
BaP := [→a]P = {s ∈ S : sa ⊆ P} ,
BQa P := [→
Q
a ]P = {s ∈ S : s
Q
a ⊆ P}.
We also need a notation for the dual of the K modality (“epistemic possi-
bility”):
K̃aP := ¬Ka¬P.
Doxastic propositions. Until now, our notion of proposition is “local”,
being specific to a given model: we only have “S-propositions” for each
model S. As long as the model is fixed, this notion is enough for interpreting
sentences over the given model. But, since later we will proceed to study
systematic changes of models (when dealing with dynamic belief revision),
we need a notion of proposition that is not confined to one model, but makes
sense on all models:
A doxastic proposition is a map P assigning to each plausibility model S
some S-proposition PS ⊆ S. We write s |=S P, and say that the proposition
P is true at s ∈ S, iff s ∈ (P)S. We skip the subscript and write s |= P
when the model is understood.
We denote by Prop the family of all doxastic propositions. All the
Boolean operations on S-propositions as sets can be lifted pointwise to op-
erations on Prop: in particular, we have the “always true” ⊤ and “always
false” ⊥ propositions, given by (⊥)S := ∅, (⊤)S := S, negation (¬P)S :=
S \PS, conjunction (P∧Q)S := PS∩QS, disjunction (P∨Q)S := PS∪QS
and all the other standard Boolean operators, including infinitary conjunc-
tions and disjunctions. Similarly, we can define pointwise the epistemic and
(conditional) doxastic modalities : (KaP)S := KaPS, (BaP)S := BaPS,
(BQa P)S := B
QS
a PS. It is easy to check that we have: BaP = B
⊤
a P. Fi-
nally, the relation of entailment P |= Q between doxastic propositions is
given pointwise by inclusion: P |= Q iff PS ⊆ QS for all S.
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2.3 Safe belief and the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge
Ever since Plato’s identification of knowledge with “true justified (or justi-
fiable) belief” was shattered by Gettier’s celebrated counterexamples [32],
philosophers have been looking for the “missing ingredient” in the Platonic
equation. Various authors identify this missing ingredient as “robustness”
(Hintikka [35]), “indefeasibility” (Klein [38], Lehrer [40], Lehrer and Paxson
[41], Stalnaker [52]) or “stability” (Rott [46]). According to this defeasibility
theory of knowledge (or “stability theory”, as formulated by Rott), a belief
counts as “knowledge” if it is stable under belief revision with any new evi-
dence: “if a person has knowledge, than that person’s justification must be
sufficiently strong that it is not capable of being defeated by evidence that
he does not possess” (Pappas and Swain [43]).
One of the problems is interpreting what “evidence” means in this con-
text. There are at least two natural interpretations, each giving us a concept
of “knowledge”. The first, and the most common10, interpretation is to take
it as meaning “any true information”. The resulting notion of “knowledge”
was formalized by Stalnaker in [52], and defined there as follows: “an agent
knows that ϕ if and only if ϕ is true, she believes that ϕ, and she continues
to believe ϕ if any true information is received”. This concept differs from
the usual notion of knowledge (“Aumann knowledge”) in Computer Science
and Economics, by the fact that it does not satisfy the laws of the modal
system S5 (in fact, negative introspection fails); Stalnaker shows that the
complete modal logic of this modality is the modal system S4.3. As we’ll
see, this notion (“Stalnaker knowledge”) corresponds to what we call “safe
belief” 2P . On the other hand, another natural interpretation, considered
by at least one author [46], takes “evidence” to mean “any proposition”,
i.e., to include possible misinformation: “real knowledge” should be robust
even in the face of false evidence. As shown below, this corresponds to our
“knowledge” modality KP , which could be called “absolutely unrevisable
belief”. This is a partition-based concept of knowledge, identifiable with
“Aumann knowledge” and satisfying all the laws of S5. In other words, this
last interpretation provides a perfectly decent “defeasibility” defense of S5
and of negative introspection!
In this paper, we adopt the pragmatic point of view of the formal lo-
gician: instead of debating which of the two types of “knowledge” is the
real one, we simply formalize both notions in a common setting, compare
them, axiomatize the logic obtained by combining them and use their joint
strength to express interesting properties. Indeed, as shown below, condi-
tional beliefs can be defined in terms of knowledge only if we combine both
the above-mentioned types of “knowledge”.
10 This interpretation is the one virtually adopted by all the proponents of the defeasi-
bility theory, from Lehrer to Stalnaker.
28 A. Baltag, S. Smets






(where the conjunction ranges over all doxastic propositions), or equiva-
lently, we have for every state s in every model S:
s |= KaQ iff s |= B
P
a Q for all P. (2.1)
This gives a characterization of knowledge as “absolute” belief, invariant
under any belief revision: a given belief is “known” iff it cannot be revised,
i.e., it would be still believed in any condition.11 Observe that this resem-
bles the defeasibility analysis of knowledge, but only if we adopt the second
interpretation mentioned above (taking “evidence” to include misinforma-
tion). Thus, our “knowledge” is more robust than Stalnaker’s: it resists
any belief revision, not capable of being defeated by any evidence (includ-
ing false evidence). This is a very “strong” notion of knowledge (implying
“absolute certainty” and full introspection), which seems to us to fit better
with the standard usage of the term in Computer Science literature. Also,
unlike the one in [52], our notion of knowledge is negatively introspective.
Another identity12 that can be easily checked is:
KaQ = B
¬Q
a Q = B
¬Q
a ⊥ (2.2)
(where ⊥ is the “always false” proposition). This captures in a different
way the “absolute un-revisability” of knowledge: something is “known” if
it is believed even if conditionalizing our belief with its negation. In other
words, this simply expresses the impossibility of accepting its negation as
evidence (since such a revision would lead to an inconsistent belief).
Safe belief. To capture “Stalnaker knowledge”, we introduce the Kripke
modality 2a associated to the converse ≥a of the plausibility relation, going
from any state s to all the states that are “at least as plausible” as s. For
S-propositions P ⊆ S over any given model S, we put
2aP := [≥a]P = {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t ≤a s},
and this induces pointwise an operator 2aP on doxastic propositions. We
read s |= 2aP as saying that: at state s, agent a’s belief in P is safe; or at
11 This of course assumes agents to be “rational” in a sense that excludes “fundamen-
talist” or “dogmatic” beliefs, i.e., beliefs in unknown propositions but refusing any
revision, even when contradicted by facts. But this “rationality” assumption is al-
ready built in our plausibility models, which satisfy an epistemically friendly version
of the standard AGM postulates of rational belief revision. See [8] for details.
12 This identity corresponds to the definition of “necessity” in [50] in terms of doxastic
conditionals.
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state s, a safely believes that P. We will explain this reading below, but first
observe that: 2a is an S4-modality (since ≥a is reflexive and transitive), but
not necessarily S5; i.e., safe beliefs are truthful (2aP |= P) and positively
introspective (2aP |= 2a2aP), but not necessarily negatively introspective:
in general, ¬2aP 6|= 2a¬2aP.
Relations between knowledge, safe belief and conditional belief.
First, knowledge entails safe belief
KaP |= 2aP ,
and safe belief entails belief
2aP |= BaP.
The last observation can be strengthened to characterize safe belief in a sim-
ilar way to the above characterization (2.1) of knowledge (as belief invariant
under any revision): safe beliefs are precisely the beliefs which are persistent
under revision with any true information. Formally, this says that, for every
state s in every model S, we have
s |= 2aQ iff: s |= B
P
a Q for every P such that s |= P (2.3)
We can thus see that safe belief coincides indeed with Stalnaker’s notion
of “knowledge”, given by the first interpretation (“evidence as true informa-
tion”) of the defeasibility theory. As mentioned above, we prefer to keep the
name “knowledge” for the strong notion (which gives absolute certainty),
and call this weaker notion “safe belief”: indeed, these are beliefs that are
“safe” to hold, in the sense that no future learning of truthful information
will force us to revise them.
Example 2.3 (Dangerous Knowledge). This starts with the situation in
Example 2.1 (when none of the two agents has yet seen the face of the
coin). Alice has to get out of the room for a minute, which creates an
opportunity for Bob to quickly raise the cover in her absence and take a
peek at the coin. He does that, and so he sees that the coin is Heads up.
After Alice returns, she obviously doesn’t know whether or not Bob took a
peek at the coin, but she believes he didn’t do it: taking a peek is against
the rules of the game, and so she trusts Bob not to do that. The model is
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Let us call this model S′. The actual state s′1 is the one in the upper left
corner, in which Bob took a peek and saw the coin Heads up, while the
state t′1 in the upper right corner represents the other possibility, in which
Bob saw the coin lying Tails up. The two lower states s′2 and t
′
2 represent
the case in which Bob didn’t take a peek. Observe that the above drawing
includes the (natural) assumption that Alice keeps her previous belief that
the coin lies Heads up (since there is no reason for her to change her mind).
Moreover, we assumed that she will keep this belief even if she’d be told
that Bob took a peek: this is captured by the a-arrow from t′1 to s
′
1. This
seems natural: Bob’s taking a peek doesn’t change the upper face of the
coin, so it shouldn’t affect Alice’s prior belief about the coin.
In both Examples 2.1 and 2.3 above, Alice holds a true belief (at the
real state) that the coin lies Heads up: the actual state satisfies BaH. In
both cases, this true belief is not knowledge (since Alice doesn’t know the
upper face), but nevertheless in Example 2.1, this belief is safe (although
it is not known by the agent to be safe): no additional truthful information
(about the real state s) can force her to revise this belief. (To see this,
observe that any new truthful information would reveal to Alice the real
state s, thus confirming her belief that Heads is up.) So in the model S
from Example 2.1, we have s |= 2aH (where s is the actual state). In
contrast, in Example 2.2, Alice’s belief (that the coin is Heads up), though
true, is not safe. There is some piece of correct information (about the real
state s′1) which, if learned by Alice, would make her change this belief: we
can represent this piece of correct information as the doxastic proposition
H → KbH. It is easy to see that the actual state s
′
1 of the model S
′






















satisfies T.) So, if given this information, Alice would come to wrongly
believe that the coin is Tails up! This is an example of a dangerous truth:
a true information whose learning can lead to wrong beliefs.
Observe that an agent’s belief can be safe without him necessarily know-
ing this (in the “strong” sense of knowledge given by K): “safety” (similarly
to “truth”) is an external property of the agent’s beliefs, that can be as-
certained only by comparing his belief-revision system with reality. Indeed,
the only way for an agent to know a belief to be safe is to actually know it
to be truthful, i.e., to have actual knowledge (not just a belief) of its truth.
This is captured by the valid identity
Ka2aP = KaP. (2.4)
In other words: knowing that something is safe to believe is the same as just
knowing it to be true. In fact, all beliefs held by an agent “appear safe” to
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him: in order to believe them, he has to believe that they are safe. This is
expressed by the valid identity
Ba2aP = BaP (2.5)
saying that: believing that something is safe to believe is the same as just
believing it. Contrast this with the situation concerning “knowledge”: in our
logic (as in most standard doxastic-epistemic logics), we have the identity
BaKaP = KaP. (2.6)
So believing that something is known is the same as knowing it !
The Puzzle of the Perfect Believer. The last identity is well-known
and has been considered “paradoxical” by many authors. In fact, the so-
called “Paradox of the Perfect Believer” in [33, 53, 36, 42, 54, 27] is based
on it. For a “strong” notion of belief as the one we have here (“belief” =
belief with certainty), it seems reasonable to assume the following “axiom”:
Baϕ→ BaKaϕ. (?)
Putting this together with (2.6) above, we get a paradoxical conclusion:
Baϕ→ Kaϕ. (?!)
So this leads to a triviality result: knowledge and belief collapse to the same
thing, and all beliefs are always true! One solution to the “paradox” is to
reject (?), as an (intuitive but) wrong “axiom”. In contrast, various authors
[53, 36, 27, 54] accept (?) and propose other solutions, e.g., giving up the
principle of “negative introspection” for knowledge.
Our solution to the paradox, as embodied in the contrasting identities
(2.5) and (2.6), combines the advantages of both solutions above: the “ax-
iom” (?) is correct if we interpret “knowledge” as safe belief 2a, since then
(?) becomes equivalent to identity (2.5) above; but then negative introspec-
tion fails for this interpretation! On the other hand, if we interpret “knowl-
edge” as our Ka-modality then negative introspection holds; but then the
above “axiom” (?) fails, and on the contrary we have the identity (2.6).
So, in our view, the paradox of the perfect believer arises from the confla-
tion of two different notions of “knowledge”: “Aumann” (partition-based)
knowledge and “Stalnaker” knowledge (i.e., safe belief).
(Conditional) beliefs in terms of “knowledge” notions. An impor-
tant observation is that one can characterize/define (conditional) beliefs
only in terms of our two “knowledge” concepts (K and 2): For simple
beliefs, we have
BaP = K̃a2aP = 3a2aP ,
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recalling that K̃aP = ¬Ka¬P is the Diamond modality for Ka, and 3aP =
¬2a¬P is the Diamond for 2a.
The equivalence BaP = 3a2aP has recently been observed by Stalnaker
in [52], who took it as the basis of a philosophical analysis of “belief” in terms
of “defeasible knowledge” (i.e., safe belief). Unfortunately, this analysis does
not apply to conditional belief: one can easily see that conditional belief
cannot be defined in terms of safe belief only! However, one can generalize
the identity BaP = K̃a2aP above, defining conditional belief in terms of
both our “knowledge” concepts :
BPa Q = K̃aP → K̃a(P ∧2a(P → Q)) . (2.7)
2.4 Other modalities and doxastic attitudes
From a modal logic perspective, it is natural to introduce the Kripke modal-
ities [>a] and [∼=a] for the other important relations (strict plausibility and
equiplausibility): For S-propositions P ⊆ S over a given model S, we put
[>a]P := {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t <a s},
[∼=a]P := {s ∈ S : t ∈ P for all t ∼=a s},
and as before these pointwise induce corresponding operators on Prop. The
intuitive meaning of these operators is not very clear, but they can be used to
define other interesting modalities, capturing various “doxastic attitudes”.
Weakly safe belief. We can define a weakly safe belief operator 2weakP
in terms of the strict order by putting:
2
weak
a P = P ∧ [>a]P .
Clearly, this gives us the following truth clause:
s |= 2weaka P iff: s |= P and t |= P for all t < s .
But a more useful characterization is the following:
s |= 2weaka Q iff: s |= ¬B
P
a ¬Q for every P such that s |= P .
So “weakly safe beliefs” are beliefs which (might be lost but) are never re-
versed (into believing the opposite) when revising with any true information.
The unary revision operator. Using the strict plausibility modality, we
can also define a unary “belief revision” modality ∗a, which in some sense
internalizes the standard (binary) belief revision operator, by putting:
∗aP = P ∧ [>a]¬P .
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This gives us the following truth clause:
s |= ∗aP iff s ∈ s
P
a .
It is easy to see that ∗aP selects from any given information cell s(a) pre-
cisely those states that satisfy agent a’s revised theory sPa :
∗aP ∩ s(a) = s
P
a .
Recall that sPa = Min≤a s(a) ∩ P is the conditional appearance of s to a
given P , representing the agent’s “revised theory” (after revision with P )
about s. This explains our interpretation: the proposition ∗aP is a complete
description of the agent’s P -revised “theory” about the current state.
Another interesting identity is the following:
BPa Q = Ka(∗aP → Q) . (2.8)
In other words: Q is a conditional belief (given a condition P) iff it is a
known consequence of the agent’s revised theory (after revision with P).
Degrees of belief. Spohn’s “degrees of belief” [49] were captured by
Aucher [2] and van Ditmarsch [24] using logical operators BnaP. Intuitively,
0-belief B0aP is the same as simple belief BaP; 1-belief B
1
aP means that
P is believed conditional on learning that not all the 0-beliefs are true etc.
Formally, this can be introduced e.g., by defining by induction a sequence
of appearance maps sna for all states s and natural numbers n:










s |= BnaP iff t |= P for all t ∈ s
n
a .
A state s has degree of belief n if we have s ∈ sna . An interesting observation
is that the finite degrees of belief BnaP can be defined using the unary revision
operator ∗aP and the knowledge operator Ka (and, as a consequence, they
can be defined using the plausibility operator [>a]P and the knowledge
operator). To do this, first put inductively:















a → P) ∧Ka(b
n
a → P) .
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“Strong belief”. Another important doxastic attitude can be defined in
terms of knowledge and safe belief as:
SbaP = BaP ∧Ka(P → 2aP) .
In terms of the plausibility order, it means that all the P-states in the
information cell s(a) of s are bellow (more plausible than) all the non-P
states in s(a) (and that, moreover, there are such P-states in s(a)). This
notion is called “strong belief” by Battigalli and Siniscalchi [13], while Stal-
naker [51] calls it “robust belief”. Another characterization of strong belief
is the following
s |= SbaQ iff:
s |= BaQ and s |= B
P
a Q for every P such that s |= ¬Ka(P → ¬Q).
In other words: something is strong belief if it is believed and if this belief
can only be defeated by evidence (truthful or not) that is known to contradict
it. An example is the “presumption of innocence” in a trial: requiring the
members of the jury to hold the accused as “innocent until proven guilty”
means asking them to start the trial with a “strong belief” in innocence.
2.5 The logic of conditional beliefs
The logic CDL (“conditional doxastic logic”) introduced in [8] is a logic of
conditional beliefs, equivalent to the strongest logic considered in [19]. The
syntax of CDL (without common knowledge and common belief operators13)
is:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Bϕaϕ
while the semantics is given by an interpretation map associating to each
sentence ϕ of CDL a doxastic proposition ‖ϕ‖. The definition is by in-
duction, in terms of the obvious compositional clauses (using the doxastic
operators BPa Q defined above).
In this logic, knowledge and simple (unconditional) belief are derived
operators, defined as abbreviations by putting Kaϕ := B
¬ϕ
a ϕ, Baϕ := B
⊤
a ϕ
(where ⊤ := ¬(p ∧ ¬p) is some tautological sentence).
Proof system. In addition to the rules and axioms of propositional logic,
the proof system of CDL includes the following:
Necessitation Rule: From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ Bψa ϕ.





13 The logic in [8] has these operators, but for simplicity we decided to leave them aside
in this presentation.
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Truthfulness of Knowledge: ⊢ Kaϕ→ ϕ
Persistence of Knowledge: ⊢ Kaϕ→ B
ϑ
aϕ






Success of Belief Revision: ⊢ Bϕaϕ




a (ψ → ϑ))
Proposition 2.4 (Completeness and Decidability). The above system is
complete for MPMs (and so also for EPMs). Moreover, it is decidable and
has the finite model property.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as in [19]. It is easy to see that
the proof system above is equivalent to Board’s strongest logic in [19] (the
one that includes axiom for full introspection), and that our models are
equivalent to the “full introspective” version of the semantics in [19]. q.e.d.
2.6 The logic of knowledge and safe belief
The problem of finding a complete axiomatization of the logic of “defeasible
knowledge” (safe belief) and conditional belief was posed as an open question
in [19]. We answer this question here, by extending the logic CDL above to
a complete logic K2 of knowledge and safe belief. Since this logic can define
conditional belief, it is in fact equivalent to the logic whose axiomatization
was required in [19]. Solving the question posed there becomes in fact trivial,
once we observe that the higher-order definition of “defeasible knowledge”
in [52, 19] (corresponding to our identity (1.3) above) is in fact equivalent
to our simpler, first-order definition of “safe belief” as a Kripke modality.
Syntax and semantics. The syntax of the logic K2 is:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 2aϕ | Kaϕ
while the semantics over plausibility models is given as for CDL, by induc-
tively defining an interpretation map from sentences to doxastic proposi-
tions, using the obvious compositional clauses. Belief and conditional belief
are derived operators here, defined as abbreviations :




where K̃aϕ := ¬Ka¬ϕ is the Diamond modality for K, and ⊤ = ¬(p∧¬p) is
some tautological sentence. So the logic K2 is more expressive than CDL.
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Proof system. In addition to the rules and axioms of propositional logic,
the proof system for the logic K2 includes the following:
• the Necessitation Rules for both Ka and 2a;
• the S5-axioms for Ka;
• the S4-axioms for 2a;
• KaP → 2aP ;
• Ka(P ∨ 2aQ) ∧Ka(Q ∨ 2aP ) → KaP ∨KaQ.
Theorem 2.5 (Completeness and Decidability). The logic K2 is (weakly)
complete with respect to MPMs (and so also with respect to EPMs). More-
over, it is decidable and has the finite model property.
Proof. A non-standard frame (model) is a structure (S,≥a,∼a)a (together
with a valuation, in the case of models) such that ∼a are equivalence re-
lations, ≥a are preorders, ≥a ⊆ ∼a and the restriction of ≥a to each ∼a-
equivalence class is connected. For a logic with two modalities, 2a for ≥a
and Ka for the relation ∼a, we can use well-known results in Modal Corre-
spondence Theory to see that each of these semantic conditions corresponds
to one of our modal axioms above. By general classical results on canon-
icity and modal correspondence14, we immediately obtain completeness for
non-standard models. Finite model property for these non-standard models
follows from the same general results. But every finite strict preorder rela-
tion > is well-founded, and an MPM is nothing but a non-standard model
whose strict preorders >a are well-founded. So completeness for (“stan-
dard”) MPMs immediately follows. Then we can use Proposition 2.4 above
to obtain completeness for EPMs. Finally, decidability follows, in the usual
way, from finite model property together with completeness (with respect
to a finitary proof system) and with the decidability of model-checking on
finite models. (This last property is obvious, given the semantics.) q.e.d.
3 “Dynamic” Belief Revision
The revision captured by conditional beliefs is of a static, purely hypotheti-
cal, nature. We cannot interpretBϕa as referring to the agent’s revised beliefs
about the situation after revision; if we did, then the “Success” axiom
⊢ Bϕaϕ
would fail for higher-level beliefs. To see this, consider a “Moore sentence”
ϕ := p ∧ ¬Bap ,
14 See e.g., [18] for the general theory of modal correspondence and canonicity.
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saying that some fact p holds but that agent a doesn’t believe it. The sen-
tence ϕ is consistent, so it may very well happen to be true. But agent a’s
beliefs about the situation after learning that ϕ was true cannot possibly
include the sentence ϕ itself: after learning this sentence, agent a knows p,
and so he believes p, contrary to what ϕ asserts. Thus, after learning ϕ,
agent a knows that ϕ is false now (after the learning). This directly contra-
dicts the Success axiom: far from believing the sentence after learning it to
be true, the agent (knows, and so he correctly) believes that it has become
false. There is nothing paradoxical about this: sentences may obviously
change their truth values, due to our actions. Since learning the truth of a
sentence is itself an action, it is perfectly consistent to have a case in which
learning changes the truth value of the very sentence that is being learnt.
Indeed, this is always the case with Moore sentences. Though not paradox-
ical, the existence of Moore sentences shows that the “Success” axiom does
not correctly describe a rational agent’s (higher-level) beliefs about what is
the case after a new truth is being learnt.
The only way to understand the “Success” axiom in the context of
higher-level beliefs is to insist on the above-mentioned “static” interpre-
tation of conditional belief operators Bϕa , as expressing the agent’s revised
belief about how the state of the world was before the revision.
In contrast, a belief update is a dynamic form of belief revision, meant
to capture the actual change of beliefs induced by learning: the updated
belief is about the state of the world as it is after the update. As noticed
in [29, 6, 5], the original model does not usually include enough states to
capture all the epistemic possibilities that arise in this way. While in the
previous section the models were kept unchanged during the revision, all
the possibilities being already there (so that both the unconditional and
the conditional beliefs referred to the same model), we now have to allow
for belief updates that change the original model.
In [5], it was argued that epistemic events should be modeled in essen-
tially the same way as epistemic states, and this common setting was taken
to be given by epistemic Kripke models. Since in this paper we enriched our
state models with doxastic plausibility relations to deal with (conditional)
beliefs, it is natural to follow [5] into extending the similarity between ac-
tions and states to this setting, thus obtaining (epistemic) action plausibility
models. The idea of such an extension was first developed in [2] (for a differ-
ent notion of plausibility model and a different notion of update product),
then generalized in [24], where many types of action plausibility models and
notions of update product, that extend the so-called Baltag-Moss-Solecki
(BMS) update product from [6, 5], are explored. But both these works are
based on a quantitative interpretation of plausibility ordinals (as “degrees of
belief”), and thus they define the various types of products using complex
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formulas of transfinite ordinal arithmetic, for which no intuitive justification
is provided.
In contrast, our notion of update product is a purely qualitative one,
based on a simple and intuitive relational definition: the simplest way to de-
fine a total pre-order on a Cartesian product, given total pre-orders on each
of the components, is to use either the lexicographic or the anti-lexicographic
order. We choose the second option, as the closest in spirit to the classi-
cal AGM theory: it gives priority to the new, incoming information (i.e.,
to “actions” in our sense).15 We justify this choice by interpreting the ac-
tion plausibility model as representing the agent’s “incoming” belief, i.e.,
the belief-updating event, which “performs” the update, by “acting” on the
“prior” beliefs (as given in the state plausibility model).
3.1 Action models
An action plausibility model16 (APM, for short) is a plausibility frame
(Σ,≤a)a∈A together with a precondition map pre : Σ → Prop, associating
to each element of Σ some doxastic proposition preσ. We call the elements
of Σ (basic) doxastic actions (or “events”), and we call preσ the precondition
of action σ. The basic actions σ ∈ Σ are taken to represent deterministic
belief-revising actions of a particularly simple nature. Intuitively, the pre-
condition defines the domain of applicability of action σ: it can be executed
on a state s iff s satisfies its precondition. The relations ≤a give the agents’
beliefs about which actions are more plausible than others.
To model non-determinism, we introduce the notion of epistemic pro-
gram. A doxastic program over a given action model Σ (or Σ-program, for
short) is simply a set Γ ⊆ Σ of doxastic actions. We can think of doxastic
programs as non-deterministic actions: each of the basic actions γ ∈ Γ is a
possible “deterministic resolution” of Γ. For simplicity, when Γ = {γ} is a
singleton, we ambiguously identify the program Γ with the action γ.
Observe that Σ-programs Γ ⊆ Σ are formally the “dynamic analogues”
of S-propositions P ⊆ S. So the dynamic analogue of the conditional dox-
astic appearance sPa (representing agent a’s revised theory about state s,
after revision with proposition P ) is the set σΓa .
Interpretation: beliefs about changes encode changes of beliefs.
The name “doxastic actions” might be a bit misleading, and from a philo-
sophical perspective Johan van Benthem’s term “doxastic events” seems
more appropriate. The elements of a plausibility model do not carry infor-
mation about agency or intentionality and cannot represent “real” actions
in all their complexity, but only the doxastic changes induced by these ac-
tions: each of the nodes of the graph represents a specific kind of change
15 This choice can be seen as a generalization of the so-called “maximal-Spohn” revision.
16 Van Benthem calls this an “event model”.
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of beliefs (of all the agents). As in [5], we only deal here with pure “belief
changes”, i.e., actions that do not change the “ontic” facts of the world,
but only the agents’ beliefs.17 Moreover, we think of these as deterministic
changes: there is at most one output of applying an action to a state.18
Intuitively, the precondition defines the domain of applicability of σ: this
action can be executed on a state s iff s satisfies its precondition. The
plausibility pre-orderings ≤a give the agents’ conditional beliefs about the
current action. But this should be interpreted as beliefs about changes, that
encode changes of beliefs. In this sense, we use such “beliefs about actions”
as a way to represent doxastic changes: the information about how the
agent changes her beliefs is captured by our action plausibility relations. So
we read σ <a σ
′ as saying that: if agent a is informed that either σ or σ′
is currently happening, then she cannot distinguish between the two, but
she believes that σ is in fact happening. As already mentioned, doxastic
programs Γ ⊆ Σ represent non-deterministic changes of belief. Finally, for
an action σ and a program Γ, the program σΓa represents the agent’s revised
theory (belief) about the current action σ after “learning” that (one of the
deterministic resolutions γ in) Γ is currently happening.
Example 3.1 (Private “Fair-Game” Announcements). Let us consider the
action that produced the situation represented in Example 2.2 above. In
front of Alice, Bob looked at the coin, in such a way that (it was common
knowledge that) only he saw the face. In the DEL literature, this is some-
times known as a “fair game” announcement: everybody is commonly aware
that an insider (or a group of insiders) privately learns some information.
It is “fair” since the outsiders are not “deceived” in any way: e.g., in our
example, Alice knows that Bob looks at the coin (and he knows that she
knows etc.). In other words, Bob’s looking at the coin is not an “illegal”
action, but one that obeys the (commonly agreed) “rules of the game”. To
make this precise, let us assume that this is happening in such a way that
Alice has no strong beliefs about which of the two possible actions (Bob-
seeing-Heads-up and Bob-seeing-Tails-up) is actually happening. Of course,
we assumed that before this, she already believed that the coin lies Heads
up, but apart from this we now assume that the way the action (of “Bob
looking”) is happening gives her no indication of what face he is seeing.
We represent these actions using a two-node plausibility model Σ2 (where
as in the case of state models we draw arrows for the converse plausibility
17 We stress this is a minor restriction, and it is very easy to extend this setting to
“ontic” actions. The only reason we stick with this restriction is that it simplifies the
definitions, and that it is general enough to apply to all the actions we are interested
here, and in particular to all communication actions.
18 As in [5], we will be able to represent non-deterministic actions as sums (unions) of
deterministic ones.
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Example 3.2 (Fully Private Announcements). Let us consider the action
that produced the situation represented in Example 2.3 above. This was the
action of Bob taking a peek at the coin, while Alice was away. Recall that we
assumed that Alice believed that nothing was really happening in her absence
(since she assumed Bob was playing by the rules), though obviously she
didn’t know this (that nothing was happening). In the DEL literature, this
action is usually called a fully private announcement : Bob learns which face
is up, while the outsider Alice believes nothing of the kind is happening. To
represent this, we consider an action model Σ3 consisting of three “actions”:
the actual action σ in which Bob takes a peek and sees the coin lying Heads
up; the alternative possible action ρ is the one in which Bob sees the coin
lying Tails up; finally, the action τ is the one in which “nothing is really


















Here, the action σ is the one in the upper left corner, having precondition
H: indeed, this can happen iff the coin is really lying Heads up; similarly,
the action ρ in the upper right corner has precondition T, since it can only
happen iff the coin is Tails up. Finally, the action τ is the lower one, having
as precondition the “universally true” proposition ⊤: indeed, this action can
always happen (since in it, nothing is really happening!). The plausibility
relations reflect the agents’ beliefs: in each case, both Bob and Charles
know exactly what is happening, so their local plausibility relations are the
identity (and thus we draw no arrows for them). Alice believes nothing is
happening, so τ is the most plausible action for her (to which all her arrows
are pointing); so she keeps her belief that H is the case, thus considering σ
as more plausible than ρ.
Examples of doxastic programs. Consider the program Γ = {σ, ρ} ⊆
Σ3 over the action model Σ3 from Example 3.2. The program Γ represents
the action of “Bob taking a peek at the coin”, without any specification of
which face he is seeing. Although expressed in a non-deterministic manner
(as a collection of two possible actions, σ and ρ), this program corresponds
is in fact deterministic, since in each possible state only one of the actions
σ or ρ can happen: there is no state satisfying both H and T. The whole
set Σ gives another doxastic program, one that is really non-deterministic:
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it represents the non-deterministic choice of Bob between taking a peek and
not taking it.
Appearance of actions and their revision: Examples. As an example
of an agent’s “theory” about an action, consider the appearance of action ρ
to Alice: ρa = {τ}. Indeed, if ρ happens (Bob taking a peek and sees the
coin is Tails up), Alice believes that τ (i.e., nothing) is happening: this is
the “apparent action”, as far as Alice is concerned. As an example of a
“revised theory” about an action, consider the conditional appearance ρΓa
of ρ to Alice given the program Γ = {σ, ρ} introduced above. It is easy
to see that we have ρΓa = {σ}. This captures our intuitions about Alice’s
revised theory: if, while ρ was happening, she were told that Bob took a
peek (i.e., she’d revise with Γ), then she would believe that he saw the coin
lying Heads up (i.e., that σ happened).
Example 3.3 (Successful Lying). Suppose now that, after the previous
action, i.e., after we arrived in the situation described in Example 2.3, Bob
sneakily announces: “I took a peek and saw the coin was lying Tails up”.
We formalize the content of this announcement as KbT, i.e., saying that
“Bob knows the coin is lying Tails up”. This is a public announcement, but
not a truthful one (though it does convey some truthful information): it is
a lie! We assume it is in fact a successful lie: it is common knowledge that,
even after Bob admitted having taken a peek, Alice still believes him. This





3.2 The action-priority update
We are ready to define our update operation, representing the way an action
from a (action) plausibility model Σ = (Σ,≤a, pre)a∈A “acts” on an input-
state from a given (state) plausibility model S = (S,≤a, ‖·‖)a∈A. We denote
the updated state model by S⊗Σ, and call it the update product of the two
models. The construction is similar to a point to the one in [6, 5], and thus
also somewhat similar to the ones in [2, 24]. In fact, the set of updated
states, the updated valuation and the updated indistinguishability relation
are the same in these constructions. The main difference lies in our definition
of the updated plausibility relation, via the Action Priority Rule.
3.2.1 Updating single-agent models: the anti-lexicographic
order
To warm up, let us first define the update product for the single-agent
case. Let S = (S,≤, ‖·‖) be a single-agent plausibility state model and let
Σ = (Σ,≤, pre) be a single-agent plausibility action model.
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We represent the states of the updated model S ⊗ Σ as pairs (s, σ) of
input-states and actions, i.e., as elements of the Cartesian product S × Σ.
This reflects that the basic actions in our action models are assumed to be
deterministic: For a given input-state and a given action, there can only be
at most one output-state. More specifically, we select the pairs which are
consistent, in the sense that the input-state satisfies the precondition of the
action. This is natural: the precondition of an action is a specification of
its domain of applicability. So the set of states of S⊗Σ is taken to be
S ⊗ Σ := {(s, σ) : s |=S pre(σ)} .
The updated valuation is essentially given by the original valuation from the
input-state model: For all (s, σ) ∈ S ⊗ Σ, we put (s, σ) |= p iff s |= p. This
“conservative” way to update the valuation expresses the fact that we only
consider here actions that are “purely doxastic”, i.e., pure “belief changes”,
that do not affect the ontic “facts” of the world (captured here by atomic
sentences).
We still need to define the updated plausibility relation. To motivate
our definition, we first consider two examples:
Example 3.4 (A Sample Case). Suppose that we have two states s, s′ ∈
S such that s < s′, s |= ¬P, s′ |= P. This means that, if given the







Suppose then an event happens, in whose model there are two actions σ, σ′
such that σ > σ′, preσ = ¬P, preσ′ = P. In other words, if given the
information that either σ or σ′ is happening, the agent believes that σ′ is
happening, i.e., she believes that P is learnt. This part of the model behaves





Naturally, we expect the agent to change her belief accordingly, i.e., her





Example 3.5 (A Second Sample Case). Suppose the initial situation was
the same as above, but now the two actions σ, σ′ are assumed to be equi-
plausible: σ ∼= σ′. This is a completely unreliable announcement of P, in
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In the AGM paradigm, it is natural to expect the agents to keep their






The anti-lexicographic order. Putting the above two sample cases to-
gether, we conclude that the updated plausibility relation should be the
anti-lexicographic preorder relation induced on pairs (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ by the
preorders on S and on Σ, i.e.:
(s, σ) ≤ (s′, σ′) iff: either σ < σ′, or else σ ∼= σ′ and s ≤ s′.
In other words, the updated plausibility order gives “priority” to the action
plausibility relation, and apart from this it keeps as much as possible the old
order. This reflects our commitment to an AGM-type of revision, in which
the new information has priority over old beliefs. The “actions” represent
here the “new information”, although (unlike in AGM) this information
comes in dynamic form (as action plausibility order), and so it is not fully
reducible to its propositional content (the action’s precondition). In fact,
this is a generalization of one of the belief-revision policies encountered in
the literature (the so-called “maximal-Spohn revision”). But, in the context
of our qualitative (conditional) interpretation of plausibility models, we will
argue below that this is essentially the only reasonable option.
3.2.2 Updating multi-agent models: the general case
In the multi-agent case, the construction of the updated state space and
updated valuation is the same as above. But for the updated plausibility
relation we need to take into account a third possibility: the case when either
the initial states or the actions are distinguishable, belonging to different
information cells.
Example 3.6 (A Third Sample Case). Suppose that we have two states
s, s′ ∈ S such that s |= ¬P, s′ |= P, but s 6∼a s






This means that, if given the supplementary information that the real
state is either s or s′, the agent immediately knows which of the two is
the real states, and thus she knows whether P holds or not. It is obvious
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that, after any of the actions considered in the previous two examples, a
perfect-recall agent will continue to know whether P held or not, and so the
output-states after σ and σ′ will still be distinguishable (non-comparable).
The “Action-Priority” Rule. Putting this together with the other sam-
ple cases, we obtain our update rule, in full generality:
(s, σ) ≤a (s
′, σ′) iff either σ <a σ
′ and s ∼a s
′, or else σ ∼=a σ
′ and s ≤a s
′
We regard this construction as the most natural analogue in a belief-
revision context of the similar notion in [5, 6]. Following a suggestion of
Johan van Benthem, we call this the Action-Priority Update Rule.
Sanity check: Examples 2.2 and 2.3 revisited. To check the correct-
ness of our update operation, take first the update product S ⊗Σ2 of the
model S in Example 2.1 from the previous section with the action model
Σ2 in Example 3.1 from the previous section. As predicted, the resulting
state model is isomorphic to the model W from Example 2.2. Similarly, if
Σ3 is the action model from Example 3.2, then we can see that the product
S⊗Σ3 is isomorphic to the state model S
′ from Example 2.3.
“In-sanity check”: Successful lying. Applying the action model Σ4 in
Example 3.3, representing the “successful lying” action, to the state model
S′ from Example 2.3, we obtain indeed the intuitively correct output of
























Interpretation. As its name makes explicit, the Action-Priority Rule gives
“priority” to the action plausibility relation. This is not an arbitrary choice,
but it is motivated by our specific interpretation of action models, as embod-
ied in our Motto above: beliefs about changes (i.e., the action plausibility
relations) are nothing but ways to encode changes of belief (i.e., reversals
of the original plausibility order). So the (strict) order on actions encodes
changes of order on states. The Action-Priority Rule is a consequence of
this interpretation: it just says that a strong plausibility order σ <a σ
′
on actions corresponds indeed to a change of ordering, (from whatever the
ordering was) between the original (indistinguishable) input-states s ∼a s
′,
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to the order (s, σ) <a (s
′, σ′) between output-states; while equally plausible
actions σ ∼=a σ
′ will leave the initial ordering unchanged: (s, σ) ≤a (s
′, σ′)
iff s ≤a s
′. Giving priority to action plausibility does not in any way mean
that the agent’s belief in actions is stronger than her belief in states; it just
captures the fact that, at the time of updating with a given action, the belief
about the action is what is actual, it is the current belief about what is going
on, while the beliefs about the input-states are in the past.19
In a nutshell: the doxastic action is the one that changes the initial
doxastic state, and not vice-versa. The belief update induced by a given
action is nothing but an update with the (presently) believed action. If the
believed action σ requires the agent to revise some past beliefs, then so be
it: this is the whole point of believing σ, namely to use it to revise one’s past
beliefs. For example, in a successful lying, the action plausibility relation
makes the hearer believe that the speaker is telling the truth; so she’ll accept
this message (unless contradicted by her knowledge), and change her past
beliefs appropriately: this is what makes the lying successful.
Action-priority update generalizes product update. Recall the def-
inition of the epistemic indistinguishability relation ∼a in a plausibility
model: s ∼a s
′ iff either s ≤a s
′ or s′ ≤a s. It is easy to see that the
Action Priority Update implies the familiar update rule from [6, 5], known
in Dynamic Epistemic Logic as the “product update”:
(s, σ) ∼a (s
′, σ′) iff s ∼a s
′ and σ ∼a σ
′.
Program transitions. For every state model S, every program Γ ⊆ Σ
over an action model Σ induces a transition relation
Γ
→S⊆ S× (S⊗Σ) from




′, γ) iff s = s′, (s, γ) ∈ S ⊗ Σ and γ ∈ Γ .
3.3 Simulating various belief-revision policies
We give here three examples of multi-agent belief-revision policies that can
be simulated by our product update: truthful public announcements of “hard
facts”, “lexicographic update” and “conservative upgrade”. They were all
introduced by van Benthem in [14], as multi-agent versions of revision op-
erators previously considered by Rott [45] and others.
Public announcements of “hard facts”. A truthful public announce-
ment !P of some “hard fact” P is not really about belief revision, but about
the learning of certified true information: it establishes common knowledge
19 Of course, at a later moment, the above-mentioned belief about action (now belonging
to the past) might be itself revised. But this is another, future update.
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that P was the case. This is the action described in [14] as (public) “belief
change under hard facts”. As an operation on models, this is described in
[14] as taking any state model S and deleting all the non-P states, while
keeping the same indistinguishability and plausibility relations between the
surviving states. In our setting, the corresponding action model consists of
only one node, labeled with P. It is easy to see that the above operation on
models can be exactly “simulated” by taking the anti-lexicographic product
update with this one-node action model.
Public announcements of “soft facts”: The “lexicographic up-
grade”. To allow for “soft” belief revision, an operation ⇑P was introduced
in [14], essentially adapting to public announcements the ‘lexicographic’ pol-
icy for belief revision described in [45]. This operation, called “lexicographic
update” consists of changing the current plausibility order on any given state
model as follows: every P-world becomes “better” (more plausible) than all
¬P-worlds in the same information cell, and within the two zones (P and
¬P), the old ordering remains. In our setting, this action corresponds to





Taking the anti-lexicographic update product with this action will give an
exact “simulation” of the lexicographic upgrade operation.
“Conservative upgrade”. The operation ↑P of “conservative upgrade”,
also defined in [14], changes any model as follows: in every information cell,
the best P-worlds become better than all the worlds in that cell (i.e., in every
cell the most plausible P-states become the most plausible overall in that
cell), and apart from that, the old order remains. In the case of a system
with only one agent, it is easy to see that we have ↑P = ⇑(∗aP), where ∗a
is the unary “revision modality” introduced in the previous section. In the
case of a set A = {1, · · · , n} with n > 1 agents, we can simulate ↑P using








↑IP ≤k ↑JP iff J ∩ {k} ⊆ I.
3.4 Operations on doxastic programs
First, we introduce dynamic modalities, capturing the “weakest precondi-
tion” of a program Γ. These are the natural analogues of the PDL modalities
for our program transition relations
Γ
→ between models.
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Dynamic modalities. Let Σ be some action plausibility model and Γ ⊆ Σ
be a doxastic model over Σ. For every doxastic proposition P, we define a
doxastic proposition [Γ]P given by
([Γ]P)S := [
Γ
→S]PS = {s ∈ S : ∀t ∈ S ⊗ Σ (s
Γ
→S t ⇒ t |=S⊗Σ P) }.
For basic doxastic actions σ ∈ Σ, we define the dynamic modality [σ] via the
above-mentioned identification of actions σ with singleton programs {σ}:
([σ]P)S : = ([{σ}]P)S = {s ∈ S : if (s, σ) ∈ S⊗Σ then (s, σ) ∈ PS⊗Σ}.
The dual (Diamond) modalities are defined as usually: 〈Γ〉P := ¬[Γ]¬P.
We can now introduce operators on doxastic programs that are the ana-
logues of the regular operations of PDL.
Sequential composition. The sequential composition Σ;∆ of two action
plausibility models Σ = (Σ,≤a, pre), ∆ = (∆,≤a, pre) is defined as follows:
• the set of basic actions is the Cartesian product Σ×∆
• the preconditions are given by pre(σ,δ) := 〈σ〉preδ
• the plausibility order is given by putting (σ, δ) ≤a (σ
′, δ′) iff:
either σ <a σ
′ and δ ∼a δ
′, or else σ ∼=a σ
′ and δ ≤a δ
′ .
We think of (σ, δ) as the action of performing first σ then δ, and thus
use the notation
σ; δ := (σ, δ).
We can extend this notation to doxastic programs, by defining the sequential
composition of programs Γ ⊆ Σ and Λ ⊆ ∆ to be a program Γ; Λ ⊆ Σ; ∆
over the action model Σ;∆, given by:
Γ; Λ := {(γ, λ) : γ ∈ Γ, λ ∈ Λ} .
It is easy to see that this behaves indeed like a sequential composition:
Proposition 3.7. For every state plausibility model S, action plausibility
models Σ and ∆, and programs Γ ⊆ Σ, Λ ⊆ ∆, we have the following:
1. The state plausibility models (S ⊗ Σ) ⊗ ∆ and S ⊗ (Σ;∆) are iso-
morphic, via the canonical map F : (S ⊗ Σ)⊗∆ → S ⊗ (Σ; ∆) given
by
F ( ((s, σ), δ) ) := (s, (σ, δ)).
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2. The transition relation for the program Γ; ∆ is the relational composi-










→S⊗Σ t and F (t) = s
′.
Union (non-deterministic choice). If Σ = (Σ,≤a, pre) and ∆ =
(∆,≤′a, pre
′) are two action plausibility models, their disjoint union Σ ⊔∆
is simply given by taking as set of states the disjoint union Σ⊔∆ of the two
sets of states, taking as plausibility order the disjoint union ≤a ⊔ ≤
′
a and
as precondition map the disjoint union pre⊔pre′ of the two precondition
maps. If Γ ⊆ Σ and Λ ⊆ ∆ are doxastic programs over the two models, we
define their union to be the program over the model Σ ⊔ ∆ given by the
disjoint union Γ ⊔ Λ of the the sets of actions of the two programs.
Again, it is easy to see that this behaves indeed like a non-deterministic
choice operator :
Proposition 3.8. Let i1 : Σ → Σ ⊔ ∆ and i2 : ∆ → Σ ⊔ ∆ be the two





• there exists t such that:
either s
Γ
→S t and i1(t) = s
′, or else s
∆
→S t and i2(t) = s
′.
Other operators. Arbitrary unions
⊔
i Γi can be similarly defined, and
then one can define iteration Γ∗ :=
⊔
i Γ
i (where Γ0 =!⊤ and Γi+1 = Γ; Γi).
3.5 The laws of dynamic belief revision
The “laws of dynamic belief revision” are the fundamental equations of
Belief Dynamics, allowing us to compute future doxastic attitudes from past
ones, given the doxastic events that happen in the meantime. In modal
terms, these can be stated as “reduction laws” for inductively computing
dynamic modalities [Γ]P, by reducing them to modalities [Γ′]P′ in which
either the propositions P′ or the programs Γ′ have lower complexity.
The following immediate consequence of the definition of [Γ]P allows us
to reduce modalities for non-deterministic programs Γ to the ones for their
deterministic resolutions γ ∈ Γ:
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So, for our other laws, we can restrict ourselves to basic actions in Σ.
The Action-Knowledge Law. For every action σ ∈ Σ, we have:





This Action-Knowledge Law is essentially the same as in [6, 5]: a proposition
P will be known after a doxastic event iff, whenever the event can take place,
it is known that P will become true after all events that are indistinguishable
from the given one.
The Action-Safe-Belief Law. For every action σ ∈ Σ, we have:









This law embodies the essence of the Action-Priority Rule: a proposition P
will be safely believed after a doxastic event iff, whenever the event can take
place, it is known that P will become true after all more plausible events
and in the same time it is safely believed that P will become true after all
equi-plausible events.
Since we took knowledge and safe belief as the basis of our static logic
K2, the above two laws are the “fundamental equations” of our theory of
dynamic belief revision. But note that, as a consequence, one can obtain de-
rived laws for (conditional) belief as well. Indeed, using the above-mentioned
characterization of conditional belief in terms of K and 2, we obtain the
following:
The Derived Law of Action-Conditional-Belief. For every action
σ ∈ Σ, we have:



















This derived law, a version of which was first introduced in [10] (where it
was considered a fundamental law), allows us to predict future conditional
beliefs from current conditional beliefs.
To explain the meaning of this law, we re-state it as follows: For every
s ∈ S and σ ∈ Σ, we have:







where Γ = {γ ∈ Σ : s |=S K̃a〈γ〉P} .
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It is easy to see that this “local” (state-dependent) version of the reduc-
tion law is equivalent to the previous (state-independent) one. The set Γ
encodes the extra information about the current action that is given to the
agent by the context s and by the post-condition P; while σΓa is the ac-
tion’s post-conditional contextual appearance, i.e., the way it appears to the
agent in the view of this extra-information Γ. Indeed, a given action might
“appear” differently in a given context (i.e., at a state s) than it does in
general: the information possessed by the agent at the state s might imply
the negation of certain actions, hence their impossibility; this information
will then be used to revise the agent’s beliefs about the actions, obtaining
her contextual beliefs. Moreover, in the presence of further information (a
“post-condition” P), this appearance might again be revised. The “post-
conditional contextual appearance” is the result of this double revision: the
agent’s belief about action σ is revised with the information given to her
by the context s and the post-condition P. This information is encoded in
a set Γ = {γ ∈ Σ : s |=S K̃a〈γ〉P} of “admissible” actions: the actions for
which the agent considers epistemically possible (at s) that they can be per-
formed and they can achieve the post-condition P. The “post-conditional
contextual appearance” σΓa of action σ captures the agent’s revised theory
about σ after revision with the relevant information Γ.
So the above law says that: the agent’s future conditional beliefs [σ]BPa





a [σΓa ] about what will be true after the apparent action σ
Γ
a (as
it appears in the given context and in the view of the given post-condition
P), beliefs conditioned on the information (〈σΓa 〉P) that the apparent action
σΓa actually can lead to the fulfillment of the post-condition P.
Special cases. As special cases of the Action-Conditional-Belief Law, we
can derive all the reduction laws in [14] for (conditional) belief after the
events !P, ⇑P and ↑P:
[!P]BQ
a




























































Laws for other doxastic attitudes. The equi-plausibility modality be-
haves dynamically “almost” like knowledge, while the strict plausibility
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modality behaves like safe belief, as witnessed by the following laws:














From these, we can derive laws for all the other doxastic attitudes above.
3.6 The logic of doxastic actions
The problem of finding a general syntax for action models has been tack-
led in various ways by different authors. Here we use the action-signature
approach from [5].
Signature. A doxastic action signature is a finite plausibility frame Σ,
together with an ordered list without repetitions (σ1, . . . , σn) of some of the
elements of Σ. The elements of Σ are called action types. A type σ is called
trivial if it is not in the above list.
Example 3.9. The “hard” public announcement signature HardPub is a
singleton frame, consisting of one action type !, identity as the order relation,
and the list (!).
The “soft” public announcement signature SoftPub is a two-point frame,
consisting of types ⇑ and ⇓, with ⇓ <a ⇑ for all agents a, and the list (⇑,⇓).
Similarly, one can define the signatures of fully private announcements
with n alternatives, private “fair-game” announcements, conservative up-
grades etc. As we will see below, there is no signature of “successful (public)
lying”: public lying actions fall under the type of “soft” public announce-
ments, so they are generated by that signature.
Languages. For each action signature (Σ, (σ1, . . . , σn)), the language
L(Σ) consists of a set of sentences ϕ and a set of program terms π, de-
fined by simultaneous recursion:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | 2aϕ | [π]ϕ
π ::= σϕ1 . . . ϕn | π ⊔ π | π;π
where p ∈ Φ, a ∈ A, σ ∈ Σ, and σϕ1 . . . ϕn is an expression consisting of σ
and a string of n sentences, where n is the length of the list (σ1, . . . , σn).
Syntactic action model. The expressions of the form σ~ϕ are called basic
programs. The preorders on Σ induce in a natural way preorders on the
basic programs in L(Σ):
σ~ϕ ≤a σ ~ψ iff σ ≤a σ
′ and ~ϕ = ~ψ.
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The given listing can be used to assign syntactic preconditions for basic
programs, by putting: preσi~ϕ := ϕi, and preσ~ϕ := ⊤ (the trivially true
sentence) if σ is not in the listing. Thus, the basic programs of the form
σ~ϕ form a “syntactic plausibility model” Σ~ϕ; i.e., every given interpretation
‖·‖ : L(Σ) → Prop of sentences as doxastic propositions will convert this
syntactic model into a “real” (semantic) plausibility model, called Σ ~‖ϕ‖.
Action models induced by a signature. For a given signature Σ, let
(σ1, . . . , σn) be its list of non-trivial types, and let ~P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) be a
matching list of doxastic propositions. The action model generated by the
signature Σ and the list of propositions ~P is the model Σ~P, having Σ as its
underlying action frame and having a precondition map given by: preσi =
Pi, for non-trivial types σi; and preσ = ⊤ (the trivially true proposition),
for trivial types σ. When referring to σ as an action in Σ~P, we will denote
it by σ~P, to distinguish it from the action type σ ∈ Σ.
We can obviously extend this construction to sets of action types : given
a signature Σ and a list ~P = (P1, . . . ,Pn), every set Γ ⊆ Σ gives rise to a
doxastic program Γ~P := {σ~P : σ ∈ Σ} ⊆ Σ~P.
Example 3.10. The action model of a hard public announcement !P is
generated as !(P) by the hard public announcement signature HardPub = {!}
and the list (P). Similarly, the action model SoftPub(P) generated by the
soft public announcement signature SoftPub and a list (P,Q) of two proposi-
tions consists of two actions ⇑(P,Q) and ⇓(P,Q), with ⇑(P,Q) <a ⇓(P,Q),





This represents an event during which all agents share a common belief that
P is announced; but they might be wrong and maybe Q was announced in-
stead. However, it is common knowledge that either P or Q was announced.
Successful (public) lying LieP (by an anonymous agent, falsely announc-
ing P) can now be expressed as LieP := ⇓(P,¬P). The truthful soft an-
nouncement is TrueP := ⇑(P,¬P). Finally, the soft public announce-
ment (lexicographic update) ⇑P, as previously defined, is given by the non-
deterministic union ⇑P := TrueP ⊔ LieP.
Semantics. We define by simultaneous induction two interpretation maps,
one taking sentences ϕ into doxastic propositions ‖ϕ‖ ∈ Prop, the second
taking program terms π into doxastic programs ‖π‖ over some plausibility
frames. The inductive definition uses the obvious semantic clauses. For
programs: ‖σ~ϕ‖ is the action σ ~‖ϕ‖ (or, more exactly, the singleton program
{σ ~‖ϕ‖} over the frame Σ ~‖ϕ‖), ‖π ⊔ π′‖ := ‖π‖ ⊔ ‖π′‖, ‖π;π′‖ := ‖π‖; ‖π′‖.
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For sentences: ‖p‖ is as given by the valuation, ‖¬ϕ‖ := ¬‖ϕ‖, ‖ϕ ∧ ψ‖ :=
‖ϕ‖ ∧ ‖ψ‖, ‖Kaϕ‖ := Ka‖ϕ‖, ‖2aϕ‖ := 2a‖ϕ‖, ‖[π]ϕ‖ := [ ‖π‖ ] ‖ϕ‖.
Proof system. In addition to the axioms and rules of the logic K2, the
logic L(Σ) includes the following Reduction Axioms:
[α]p ↔ preα → p
[α]¬ϕ ↔ preα → ¬[α]ϕ
[α](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ preα → [α]ϕ ∧ [α]ψ














[π ⊔ π′]ϕ ↔ [π]ϕ ∧ [π′]ϕ
[π;π′]ϕ ↔ [π] [π′]ϕ
where p is any atomic sentence, π, π′ are program terms, α is a basic pro-
gram term in L(Σ), pre is the syntactic precondition map defined above,
and ∼a, <a,∼=a are respectively the (syntactic) epistemic indistinguishabil-
ity, the strict plausibility order and the equi-plausibility relation on basic
programs.
Theorem 3.11. For every signature Σ, the above proof system for the
dynamic logic L(Σ) is complete, decidable and has the finite model property.
In fact, this dynamic logic has the same expressive power as the “static”
logic K2 of knowledge and safe belief.
Proof (Sketch). The proof is similar to the ones in [5, 6, 25]. We use the
reduction laws to inductively simplify any formula until it is reduced to a
formula of the K2-logic, then use the completeness of the K2 logic. Note
that this is not an induction on subformulas, but (as in [6]) on an appropriate
notion of “complexity” ordering of formulas. q.e.d.
4 Current and Future Work, Some Open Questions
In our papers [11, 12], we present a probabilistic version of the theory devel-
oped here, based on discrete (finite) Popper-Renyi conditional probability
spaces (allowing for conditionalization on events of non-zero probability,
in order to cope with non-trivial belief revisions). We consider subjective
probability to be the proper notion of “degree of belief”, and we investigate
its relationship with the qualitative concepts developed here. We develop a
probabilistic generalization of the Action Priority Rule, and show that the
logics presented above are complete for the (discrete) conditional probabilis-
tic semantics.
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We mention here a number of open questions: (1) Axiomatize the full
(static) logic of doxastic attitudes introduced in this paper. It can be easily
shown that they can all be reduced to the modalities Ka, [>a] and [∼=a].
There are a number of obvious axioms for the resulting logic K[>][∼=] (note
in particular that [>] satisfies the Gödel-Löb formula!), but the completeness
problem is still open. (2) Axiomatize the logic of common safe belief and
common knowledge, and their dynamic versions. More generally, explore the
logics obtained by adding fixed points, or at least “epistemic regular (PDL-
like) operations” as in [15], on top of our doxastic modalities. (3) Investigate
the expressive limits of this approach with respect to belief-revision policies:
what policies can be simulated by our update? (4) Extend the work in [11,
12], by investigating and axiomatizing doxastic logics on infinite conditional
probability models. (5) Extend the logics with quantitative (probabilistic)
modal operators BPa,xQ (or 2a,xQ) expressing that the degree of conditional
belief in Q given P (or the degree of safety of the belief in Q) is at least x.
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Abstract
We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a
syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which
we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says
that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while
believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief
of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion
of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The
second axiom says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular
strategy while believing that a different strategy is at least as good
and she considers it possible that this alternative strategy is actually
better than the chosen one. We show that common knowledge of this
stronger notion of rationality characterizes the restriction to pure
strategies of the iterated deletion procedure introduced by Stalnaker
(1994). Frame characterization results are also provided.
1 Introduction
The notion of rationalizability in games was introduced independently by
Bernheim [2] and Pearce [16]. A strategy of player i is said to be ratio-
nal if it maximizes player i’s expected payoff, given her probabilistic beliefs
about the strategies used by her opponents; that is, if it can be justified
by some beliefs about her opponents’ strategies. If player i, besides being
rational, also attributes rationality to her opponents, then she must only
consider as possible strategies of her opponents that are themselves justi-
fiable. If, furthermore, player i believes that her opponents believe that
she is rational, then she must believe that her opponents justify their own
choices by only considering those strategies of player i that are justifiable,
and so on. The strategies of player i that can be justified in this way are
called rationalizable. Rationalizability was intended to capture the notion
of common belief of rationality. Bernheim and Pearce showed that a strat-
egy is rationalizable if and only if it survives the iterated deletion of strictly
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dominated strategies.1 They captured the notion of common belief of ratio-
nality only informally, that is, without making use of an epistemic frame-
work. The first epistemic characterization of rationalizability was provided
by Tan and Werlang [18] using a universal type space, rather than Kripke
structures (Kripke [13]). A characterization of common belief of rationality
using probabilistic Kripke structures was first provided by Stalnaker [17],
although it was implicit in Brandenburger and Dekel [8]. Stalnaker also in-
troduced a new, stronger, notion of rationalizability—which he called strong
rationalizability—and showed that it corresponds to an iterated deletion
procedure which is stronger than the iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. Stalnaker’s approach is entirely semantic and uses the same no-
tion of Bayesian rationality as Bernheim and Pearce, namely expected pay-
off maximization. This notion presupposes that the players’ payoffs are von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs. In contrast, in this paper we consider the
larger class of strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs. Furthermore, we
take a syntactic approach and define rationality axiomatically. We consider
two axioms.
The first axiom says that a player is irrational if she chooses a partic-
ular strategy while believing that another strategy of hers is better. We
show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes
the iterated deletion of strictly dominated pure strategies. Note that, in
the Bayesian approach based on von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs, it can
be shown (see Pearce [16] and Brandenburger and Dekel [8]) that a pure
strategy si of player i is a best reply to some (possibly correlated) beliefs
about the strategies of her opponents if and only if there is no mixed strat-
egy of player i that strictly dominates si. The iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies in the Bayesian approach thus allows the deletion of
a pure strategy that is dominated by a mixed strategy, even though it may
not be dominated by another pure strategy. Since we take a purely ordinal
approach, the iterated deletion procedure that we consider only allows the
removal of strategies that are dominated by pure strategies.
The second axiom that we consider says that a player is irrational if she
chooses a particular strategy while believing that a different strategy is at
least as good and she considers it possible that this alternative strategy is ac-
tually better than the chosen one. We show that common knowledge of this
stronger notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion procedure
introduced by Stalnaker [17], restricted—once again—to pure strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the
KD45 multi-agent logic for belief and common belief and the S5 logic for
knowledge and common knowledge. In Section 3 we review the definition
1 This characterization of rationalizability is true for two-player games and extends to
n-player games only if correlated beliefs are allowed (see Brandenburger and Dekel [8]).
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of strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs and the iterated deletion proce-
dures mentioned above. In Section 4 we define game logics and introduce
two axioms of rationality. In Section 5 we characterize common belief of
rationality in the weaker sense and common knowledge of rationality in the
stronger sense. The characterization results proved in Section 5 (Propo-
sitions 5.4 and 5.8) are not characterizations in the sense in which this
expression is used in modal logic, namely characterization of axioms in
terms of classes of frames (see [3, p. 125]). Thus in Section 6 we provide
a reformulation of our results in terms of frame characterization. In Sec-
tion 7 we discuss related literature, while Section 8 contains a summary and
concluding remarks.
2 Multi-agent logics of belief and knowledge
We consider a multi-modal logic with n + 1 operators B1, B2, . . . , Bn, B∗
where, for i = 1, . . . , n, the intended interpretation of Biϕ is “player i
believes that ϕ”, while B∗ϕ is interpreted as “it is common belief that ϕ”.
The formal language is built in the usual way (see [3] and [10]) from a
countable set A of atomic propositions, the connectives ¬ and ∨ (from
which the connectives ∧, → and ↔ are defined as usual) and the modal
operators.
We denote by KD45∗n the logic defined by the following axioms and
rules of inference.
Axioms:
1. All propositional tautologies.
2. Axiom K for every modal operator: for  ∈ {B1, . . . , Bn, B∗},
ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) → ψ. (K)




4. Axioms for common belief: for i = 1, . . . , n,
B∗ϕ→ Biϕ, (CB1)
B∗ϕ→ BiB∗ϕ, (CB2)




From ϕ and (ϕ→ ψ) infer ψ. (MP)
2. Necessitation for every modal operator: for  ∈ {B1, . . . , Bn, B∗},
From ϕ infer ϕ. (Nec)




5. Axiom T for individual beliefs: for i = 1, . . . , n,
Biϕ→ ϕ. (Ti)
While KD45∗n is a logic for individual and common beliefs, S5
∗
n is the
logic for (individual and common) knowledge. To stress the difference be-
tween the two, when we deal with S5∗n we shall denote the modal operators
by Ki and K∗ rather than Bi and B∗, respectively.
Note that the common belief operator does not inherit all the properties
of the individual belief operators. In particular, the negative introspection
axiom for common belief, ¬B∗ϕ → B∗¬B∗ϕ, is not a theorem of KD45
∗
n.
In order to obtain it as a theorem, one needs to strengthen the logic by
adding the axiom that individuals are correct in their beliefs about what is
commonly believed: BiB∗ϕ → B∗ϕ. Indeed, the logic KD45
∗
n augmented
with the axiom BiB∗ϕ→ B∗ϕ coincides with the logic KD45
∗
n augmented
with the axiom ¬B∗ϕ→ B∗¬B∗ϕ (see [6]).
On the semantic side we consider Kripke structures 〈Ω,B1, . . . ,Bn,B∗〉
where Ω is a set of states or possible worlds and, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n, ∗},
Bj is a binary relation on Ω.
2 For every ω ∈ Ω and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n, ∗},
let Bj(ω) = {ω
′ ∈ Ω : ωBjω
′}.
Definition 2.1. A D45∗n frame is a Kripke structure 〈Ω,B1, . . . ,Bn,B∗〉
that satisfies the following properties: for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and i = 1, . . . , n
1. Seriality: Bi(ω) 6= ∅;
2. Transitivity: if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) then Bi(ω
′) ⊆ Bi(ω);
3. Euclideanness: if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) then Bi(ω) ⊆ Bi(ω
′);
2 Throughout the paper we shall use the Roman font for syntactic operators (e.g., Bi
and Ki) and the Calligraphic font for the corresponding semantic relations (e.g., Bi
and Ki).
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Figure 1. Illustration of a D45∗n frame.
4. B∗ is the transitive closure of B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bn, that is, ω
′ ∈ B∗(ω) if and
only if there is a sequence 〈ω1, . . . , ωm〉 in Ω such that (1) ω1 = ω, (2)
ωm = ω
′ and (3) for every k = 1, . . . ,m− 1 there is an ik ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that ωk+1 ∈ Bik(ωk).
An S5∗n frame is a D45
∗
n frame that satisfies the following additional
property: for all ω ∈ Ω and i = 1, . . . , n,
5. Reflexivity: ω ∈ Bi(ω).
Figure 1 illustrates the following D45∗n frame: n = 2, Ω = {α, β, γ},
B1(α) = B1(β) = {α}, B1(γ) = {γ}, B2(α) = {α} and B2(β) = B2(γ) =
{β, γ}. Thus B∗(α) = {α} and B∗(β) = B∗(γ) = {α, β, γ}. We shall use
the following convention when representing frames graphically: states are
represented by points and for every two states ω and ω′ and for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , n, ∗}, ω′ ∈ Bj(ω) if and only if either (i) ω and ω
′ are enclosed
in the same cell (denoted by a rounded rectangle), or (ii) there is an arrow
from ω to the cell containing ω′, or (iii) there is an arrow from the cell
containing ω to the cell containing ω′.
The link between syntax and semantics is given by the notions of valu-
ation and model. A D45∗n model (respectively, S5
∗
n model) is obtained by
adding to a D45∗n frame (respectively, S5
∗
n frame) a valuation V : A → 2
Ω,
where A is the set of atomic propositions and 2Ω denotes the set of subsets
of Ω. Thus a valuation assigns to every atomic proposition p the set of
states where p is true. Given a model and a formula ϕ, we denote by ω |= ϕ
the fact that ϕ is true at state ω. The truth set of ϕ is denoted by ‖ϕ‖,
that is, ‖ϕ‖ = {ω ∈ Ω : ω |= ϕ}. Truth of a formula at a state is defined
recursively as follows:
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if p ∈ A, ω |= p if and only if ω ∈ V (p),
ω |= ¬ϕ if and only if ω 2 ϕ,
ω |= ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if either ω |= ϕ or ω |= ψ (or both),
ω |= Biϕ if and only if Bi(ω) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖, that is,
(i = 1, . . . , n) if ω′ |= ϕ for all ω′ ∈ Bi(ω),
ω |= B∗ϕ if and only if B∗(ω) ⊆ ‖ϕ‖.
A formula ϕ is valid in a model if it is true at every state, that is, if
‖ϕ‖ = Ω. It is valid in a frame if it is valid in every model based on that
frame.
The following result is well-known:3
Proposition 2.2. The logic KD45∗n is sound and complete with respect
to the class of D45∗n frames, that is, a formula is a theorem of KD45
∗
n if
and only if it is valid in every D45∗n frame. Similarly, S5
∗
n is sound and
complete with respect to the class of S5∗n frames.
3 Ordinal games and dominance
In this paper we restrict attention to finite strategic-form (or normal-form)
games with ordinal payoffs, which are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. A finite strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs is a quin-
tuple G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉, where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players,
• Si is a finite set of strategies of player i ∈ N ,
• O is a finite set of outcomes,
• i is player i’s ordering of O,
4
• z : S → O (where S = S1×· · ·×Sn) is a function that associates with
every strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) an outcome z(s) ∈ O.
Given a player i we denote by S−i the set of strategy profiles of the
players other than i, that is, S−i = S1× · · · ×Si−1×Si+1× · · · ×Sn. When
we want to focus on player i we shall denote the strategy profile s ∈ S by
(si, s−i) where si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i.
3 See [4]. The same result has been provided for somewhat different axiomatizations of
common belief by a number of authors (for example [14], [15] and [12]).
4 That is, 
i
is a binary relation on O that satisfies the following properties: for all
o, o′, o′′ ∈ O, (1) either o i o
′ or o′ i o (completeness or connectedness) and (2)
if o i o′ and o′ i o′′ then o i o′′ (transitivity). The interpretation of o i o′ is
that, according to player i, outcome o is at least as good as outcome o′. The strict
ordering ≻i is defined as usual: o ≻i o′ if and only if o i o′ and not o′ i o. The
interpretation of o ≻i o′ is that player i strictly prefers outcome o to outcome o′.
























































































































































































Definition 3.2. Given a game G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉 and si ∈
Si, we say that, for player i, si is strictly dominated in G if there is an-
other strategy ti ∈ Si of player i such that—no matter what strategies the
other players choose—player i prefers the outcome associated with ti to
the outcome associated with si, that is, if z(ti, s−i) ≻i z(si, s−i), for all
s−i ∈ S−i.
Let G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉 and G
′ be two games, where G′ =
〈N ′, {S′i}i∈N ′ , O
′, {′i}i∈N ′ , z
′〉. We say that G′ is a subgame of G if N ′ =
N , O′ = O, for every i ∈ N : ′i = i and S
′
i ⊆ Si (so that S
′ ⊆ S)
and z′ coincides with the restriction of z to S′ (that is, for every s′ ∈ S′,
z′(s′) = z(s′)).
Definition 3.3 (IDSDS procedure). The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dom-
inated Strategies is the following procedure. Given a game G =
〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉 let 〈G
0, G1, . . . , Gm, . . . 〉 be the sequence of sub-
games of G defined recursively as follows. For all i ∈ N ,




i be the set of strategies of player i that
are strictly dominated in G0 = G;




i and let G
m be the subgame of G




i be the set of strategies of player





i (where N denotes the set of non-negative integers)
and let G∞ be the subgame of G with strategy sets S∞i . Let S
∞ = S∞1 ×
· · · × S∞n .
5
The IDSDS procedure is illustrated in Figure 2, where:
S01 = {A,B,C,D} D
0
1 = {D} S
0
2 = {e, f, g} D
0
2 = ∅
S11 = {A,B,C} D
1
1 = ∅, S
1
2 = {e, f, g} D
1
2 = {g}
S21 = {A,B,C} D
2
1 = {C} S
2
2 = {e, f} D
2
2 = ∅
S31 = {A,B} D
3
1 = ∅ S
3
2 = {e, f} D
3
2 = {f}
S41 = {A,B} D
4










Thus S∞ = {(A, e)}.
In Figure 2 we have represented the ranking i by a utility (or payoff)
function ui : S → R satisfying the following property: ui(s) ≥ ui(s
′) if and
5 Note that, since the strategy sets are finite, there exists an integer r such that G∞ =
Gr = Gr+k for every k ∈ N.
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only if z(s) i z(s
′) (in each cell, the first number is the payoff of player 1
while the second number is the payoff of player 2).6
The next iterated deletion procedure differs from IDSDS in that at every
round we delete strategy profiles rather than individual strategies. This
procedure is the restriction to pure strategies of the algorithm introduced
by Stalnaker [17].
Definition 3.4 (IDIP procedure). Let G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉, be
a game, together with a subset of strategy profiles X ⊆ S and a strategy
profile x ∈ X . We say that x is inferior relative to X if there exists a player
i and a strategy si ∈ Si of player i (thus si need not belong to the projection
of X onto Si) such that:
1. z(si, x−i) ≻i z(xi, x−i), and
2. for all s−i ∈ S−i, if (xi, s−i) ∈ X then z(si, s−i) i z(xi, s−i).
The Iterated Deletion of Inferior Profiles (IDIP) is defined as follows. For
m ∈ N define Tm ⊆ S recursively as follows: T 0 = S and, for m ≥ 1,
Tm = Tm−1\Im−1, where Im−1 ⊆ Tm−1 is the set of strategy profiles that




The IDIP procedure is illustrated in Figure 3, where
S = T 0 = {(A, d), (A, e), (A, f), (B, d), (B, e), (B, f), (C, d), (C, e), (C, f)},
I0 = {(B, e), (C, f)}
(the elimination of (B, e) is done through player 2 and strategy f , while the
elimination of (C, f) is done through player 1 and strategy B);
T 1 = {(A, d), (A, e), (A, f), (B, d), (B, f), (C, d), (C, e)},
I1 = {(B, d), (B, f), (C, e)}
(the elimination of (B, d) and (B, f) is done through player 1 and strategy
A, while the elimination of (C, e) is done through player 2 and strategy d);
T 2 = {(A, d), (A, e), (A, f), (C, d)},
I2 = {(C, d)}
6 Note that the payoff function ui : S → R used in Figure 2 to represent the ranking i
of player i is an ordinal function in the sense that it could be replaced by any other
function vi obtained by composing ui with a strictly increasing function on the reals.
That is, if fi : R → R is such that fi(x) > fi(y) whenever x > y, then vi : S → R
defined by vi(s) = fi(ui(s)) could be used as an alternative representation of i and
the outcome of the IDSDS algorithm would be the same.
7 Since the strategy sets are finite, there exists an integer r such that T∞ = T r = T r+k
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Figure 3. Illustration of the iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles.
(the elimination of (C, d) is done through player 1 and strategy A);
T 3 = {(A, d), (A, e), (A, f)},
I3 = ∅,
and thus T∞ = T 3.
4 Game logics
A logic is called a game logic if the set of atomic propositions upon which
it is built contains atomic propositions of the following form:
• Strategy symbols si, ti, . . . The intended interpretation of si is “player
i chooses strategy si”.
• The symbols ri whose intended interpretation is “player i is rational”.
• Atomic propositions of the form ti i si, whose intended interpreta-
tion is “strategy ti of player i is at least as good, for player i, as his
strategy si”, and atomic propositions of the form ti ≻i si, whose in-
tended interpretation is “for player i strategy ti is better than strategy
si”.
From now on we shall restrict attention to game logics.
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Definition 4.1. Fix a game G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉 with Si =
{s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
mi
i } (thus the cardinality of Si is mi). A game logic is called
a G-logic if its set of strategy symbols is {ski }i=1,...,n;k=1,...,mi (with slight
abuse of notation we use the symbol ski to denote both an element of Si, that
is, a strategy of player i, and an element of A, that is, an atomic proposition
whose intended interpretation is “player i chooses strategy ski ”).




i , . . . , s
mi
i }, we denote by L
D45
G (re-




n) G-logic that satisfies the
following additional axioms: for all i = 1, . . . , n and for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,mi,
with k 6= ℓ,
(s1i ∨ s
2



























Axiom G1 says that player i chooses at least one strategy, while axiom G2
says that player i cannot choose more than one strategy. Thus G1 and
G2 together imply that each player chooses exactly one strategy. Axiom
G3, on the other hand, says that player i is aware of his own choice: if
he chooses strategy ski then he believes that he chooses s
k
i . The remaining
axioms state that the ordering of strategies is complete (G4) and that the
corresponding strict ordering is defined as usual (G5).
Proposition 4.2. Fix an arbitrary game G. The following is a theorem of




i . That is, every player has correct beliefs about her
own choice of strategy.8
Proof. In the following PL stands for Propositional Logic. Fix a player i
and k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} with k 6= ℓ. Let ϕ denote the formula
(s1i ∨ · · · ∨ s
mi
i ) ∧ ¬s
1




i ∧ · · · ∧ ¬s
mi
i .
1. ϕ→ ski tautology
2. ¬(ski ∧ s
ℓ
i) axiom G2 (for ℓ 6= k)
3. ski → ¬s
ℓ
i 2, PL
8 Note that, in general, logic LD45
G
allows for incorrect beliefs. In particular, a player
might have incorrect beliefs about the choices made by other players. By Proposition

























i 4, 5, 7, PL (for ℓ 6= k)







i ∨ · · · ∨ s
mi
i ) 9, PL
11. Bis
k





i 1, 11, PL
q.e.d.
On the semantic side we consider models of games, which are defined as
follows.
Definition 4.3. Given a game G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , O, {i}i∈N , z〉 and a
Kripke frame F = 〈Ω, {Bi}i∈N ,B∗〉, a frame for G, or G-frame, is ob-
tained by adding to F n functions σi : Ω → Si (i ∈ N) satisfying the
following property: if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) then σi(ω
′) = σi(ω).
Thus a G-frame adds to a Kripke frame a function that associates with
every state ω a strategy profile σ(ω) = (σ1(ω), . . . , σn(ω)) ∈ S. The restric-
tion that if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) then σi(ω
′) = σi(ω) is the semantic counterpart to ax-
iom G3. Given a player i, as before we will denote σ(ω) by (σi(ω), σ−i(ω)),
where σ−i(ω) ∈ S−i is the profile of strategies of the players other than i.
We say that the G-frame 〈Ω, {Bi}i∈N ,B∗, {σi}i∈N}〉 is a D45
∗
n G-frame
(respectively, S5∗n G-frame) if the underlying Kripke frame 〈Ω, {Bi}i∈N ,B∗〉
is a D45∗n frame (respectively, S5
∗
n frame: see Definition 2.1).




i , . . . , s
mi
i }, and aG-frame
FG = 〈Ω, {Bi}i∈N ,B∗, {σi}i∈N}〉, a model of G, or G-model, is obtained by
adding to FG the following valuation:
• ω |= shi if and only if σi(ω) = s
h
i ,
• ω |= (ski i s
ℓ
i) if and only if z(s
k
i , σ−i(ω)) i z(s
ℓ
i , σ−i(ω)).
Thus at state ω in a G-model it is true that player i chooses strategy shi
if and only if the strategy of player i associated with ω is shi (σi(ω) = s
h
i )
and it is true that strategy ski is at least as good as strategy s
ℓ
i if and only
if ski in combination with σ−i(ω) (the profile of strategies of players other
than i associated with ω) yields an outcome which player i considers at least
as good as the outcome yielded by sℓi in combination with σ−i(ω).
9 RK denotes the inference rule “from ψ → χ infer ψ → χ ”, which is a derived rule
of inference that applies to every modal operator  that satisfies axiom K and the
rule of Necessitation.
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d e f
a 2,1 0,1 2,1
b 1,0 1,0 1,1
c 1,4 1,3 0,3
Figure 4. A game: player 1 controls the rows (i.e., has strategies a, b
and c), and player 2 the columns.
Figure 5. D45∗n frame for the game of Figure 4.
Let FD45G (respectively, F
S5





G-frames and MD45G (respectively, M
S5
G ) the corresponding set of G-models.
Figure 4 illustrates a two-player game with strategy sets S1 = {a, b, c}
and S2 = {d, e, f} and Figure 5 a D45
∗
n frame for it. The corresponding
model is given by the following valuation:
α |= b ∧ e ∧ (b ≻1 a) ∧ (c ≻1 a) ∧ (b 1 c) ∧ (c 1 b)
∧ (f ≻2 d) ∧ (f ≻2 e) ∧ (e 2 d) ∧ (d 2 e),
β |= b ∧ d ∧ (a ≻1 b) ∧ (a ≻1 c) ∧ (b 1 c) ∧ (c 1 b)
∧ (f ≻2 d) ∧ (f ≻2 e) ∧ (e 2 d) ∧ (d 2 e),
γ |= a ∧ d ∧ (a ≻1 b) ∧ (a ≻1 c) ∧ (b 1 c) ∧ (c 1 b) ∧ (d 2 e)
∧ (e 2 d) ∧ (d 2 f) ∧ (f 2 d) ∧ (e 2 f) ∧ (f 2 e).
Proposition 4.5. Logic LD45G (respectively, L
S5
G ) is sound with respect to




Proof. It follows from Proposition 2.2 and the following observations: (1)
axioms G1 and G2 are valid in every model because, for every state ω there
is a unique strategy ski ∈ Si such that σi(ω) = s
k
i and, by the validation
rules (see Definition 4.4), ω |= ski if and only if σi(ω) = s
k
i ; (2) axiom G3 is
an immediate consequence of the fact (see Definition 4.3) that if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω)
then σi(ω
′) = σi(ω); (3) axioms G4 and G5 are valid because, for every
state ω, there is a unique profile of strategies σ−i(ω) of the players other
than i and the ordering i on O restricted to z(Si × σ−i(ω)) induces an
ordering of Si. q.e.d.
5 Rationality and common belief of rationality
So far we have not specified what it means for a player to be rational.
The first extension of LD45G that we consider captures a very weak notion
of rationality. The following axiom—called WR for ‘Weak Rationality’—
says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while
believing that a different strategy is better for her (recall that ri is an





i ) → ¬ri. (WR)
Given a game G, let LD45G +WR (respectively, L
S5
G +WR) be the exten-
sion of LD45G (respectively, L
S5
G ) obtained by adding axiom WR to it.
The next axiom—called SR for ‘Strong Rationality’—expresses a slightly
stronger notion of rationality: it says that a player is irrational if she chooses
a strategy while believing that a different strategy is at least as good and










i ) → ¬ri. (SR)
Given a game G, let LD45G +SR (respectively, L
S5
G +SR) be the extension
of LD45G (respectively, L
S5
G ) obtained by adding axiom SR to it.
The following shows that LD45G +SR is an extension of L
D45
G +WR.
Proposition 5.1. WR is a theorem of LD45G +SR.
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i ) → ¬ri 9, PL
q.e.d.









be the class of D45∗n (respectively, S5
∗
n) G-models (see Definition 4.4) where
the valuation function satisfies the following additional condition:
• ω |= ri if and only if, for every si ∈ Si there exists an ω
′ ∈ Bi(ω) such
that z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′)) i z(si, σ−i(ω
′)).10
Thus at state ω player i is rational if and only if, for every strategy
si of hers, there is a state ω
′ that she considers possible at ω (ω′ ∈ Bi(ω))
where the strategy that she actually uses at ω (σi(ω)) is at least as good as si
against the strategies used by the other players at ω′ (σ−i(ω
′)). For instance,
in the model based on the frame of Figure 5 we have that α |= (r1 ∧ ¬r2),
β |= (r1 ∧ r2) and γ |= (r1 ∧ r2). To see, for example, that β |= r2 note
that σ2(β) = d and for strategy f we have that γ ∈ B2(β), σ1(γ) = a and
z(a, d) 2 z(a, f), while for strategy e we have that β ∈ B2(β), σ1(β) = b
and z(b, d) 2 z(b, e). Thus, in the model based on the frame of Figure 5, we
have that at state β both players are rational, player 2 believes that player
1 is rational, but player 1 mistakenly believes that player 2 is irrational:
β |= r1 ∧ r2 ∧B2r1 ∧B1¬r2.
Proposition 5.3. Logic LD45G +WR (respectively, L
S5
G +WR) is sound with





Proof. By Proposition 4.5 it is sufficient to show that axiom WR is valid in




i ). Then σi(ω) =









′)), for every ω′ ∈ Bi(ω). It follows from Definition 5.2 that
ω |= ¬ri. q.e.d.
The following proposition says that common belief of the weak notion
of rationality expressed by axiom WR characterizes the Iterated Deletion
of Strictly Dominated Strategies (see Definition 3.3).11
10 This could alternatively be written as z(σi(ω′), σ−i(ω′)) i z(si, σ−i(ω′)), since, by
definition of G-frame (see Definition 4.3), if ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) then σi(ω′) = σi(ω).
11 Proposition 5.4 is the syntactic-based, ordinal version of a semantic, probabilistic-
based result of Stalnaker [17]. As noted in the Introduction, Stalnaker’s result was,
in turn, a reformulation of earlier results due to Bernheim [2], Pearce [16], Tan and
Werlang [18] and Brandenburger and Dekel [8].
The characterization results given in Propositions 5.4 and 5.8 are not characteriza-
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Proposition 5.4. Fix a finite strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs G.
Then both (A) and (B) below hold.
(A) Fix an arbitrary model in M
D45|WR
G and an arbitrary state ω.
If ω |= B∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn) then σ(ω) ∈ S
∞.
(B) For every s ∈ S∞ there exists a model in M
S5|WR
G and a state ω such
that (1) σ(ω) = s and (2) ω |= K∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn).
12
Proof. (A) Fix a model in M
D45|WR
G and a state α and suppose that α |=
B∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn). The proof is by induction. First we show that, for every
player i = 1, . . . , n and for every ω ∈ B∗(α), σi(ω) /∈ D
0
i (see Definition
3.3). Suppose not. Then there exist a player i and a β ∈ B∗(α) such that
σi(β) ∈ D
0
i , that is, strategy σi(β) of player i is strictly dominated in G by
some other strategy ŝi ∈ Si: for every s−i ∈ S−i, z(ŝi, s−i) ≻i z(σi(β), s−i).
Then, for every ω ∈ Bi(β), z(ŝi, σ−i(ω)) ≻i z(σi(β), σ−i(ω)). It follows from
Definition 5.2 that β |= ¬ri, contradicting the hypothesis that β ∈ B∗(α)
and α |= B∗ri. Since, for every ω ∈ Ω, σi(ω) ∈ S
0
i = Si, it follows that,






i . Next we prove the inductive
step. Fix an integer m ≥ 1 and suppose that, for every player j = 1, . . . , n
and for every ω ∈ B∗(α), σj(ω) ∈ S
m
j . We want to show that, for every
player i = 1, . . . , n and for every ω ∈ B∗(α), σi(ω) /∈ D
m
i . Suppose not.
Then there exist a player i and a β ∈ B∗(α) such that σi(β) ∈ D
m
i , that is,
strategy σi(β) is strictly dominated in G
m by some other strategy s̃i ∈ S
m
i .
Since, by hypothesis, for every player j and for every ω ∈ B∗(α), σj(ω) ∈
Smj , it follows—since Bi(β) ⊆ B∗(β) ⊆ B∗(α) (see Definition 2.1)—that for
every ω ∈ Bi(β), z(s̃i, σ−i(ω)) ≻i z(σi(β), σ−i(ω)). Thus, by Definition 5.2,
β |= ¬ri, contradicting the fact that β ∈ B∗(α) and α |= B∗ri. Thus, for







It only remains to show that σi(α) ∈ S
∞
i . Fix an arbitrary β ∈ Bi(α).
Since Bi(α) ⊆ B∗(α), β ∈ B∗(α). Thus σi(β) ∈ S
∞
i . By Definition 4.3,
σi(β) = σi(α). Thus σi(α) ∈ S
∞
i .
(B) Let m be the cardinality of S∞ = S∞1 × · · · × S
∞
n and let Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωm}. Let σ : Ω → S
∞ be a one-to-one function. For every player i,
tions in the sense in which this expression is used in modal logic, namely characteri-
zation of axioms in terms of classes of frames (see [3, p. 125]). In Section 6 we provide
a reformulation of Propositions 5.4 and 5.8 in terms of frame characterization.
12 Recall that, in order to emphasize the distinction between belief and knowledge, when
dealing with the latter we denote the modal operators by Ki and K∗ rather than Bi
and B∗, respectively. Similarly, we shall denote the accessibility relations by Ki and
K∗ rather than Bi and B∗, respectively.
Thus while part (A) says that if at a state there is common belief of rationality then
the strategy profile played at that state belongs to the set of strategy profiles that are
obtained by applying the IDSDS algorithm, part (B) says that any such strategy profile
is realized at a state of some model where there is common knowledge of rationality
(that is, common belief with the added property that individual beliefs satisfy the
Truth Axiom Ti).
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define the following equivalence relation on Ω: ωKiω
′ if and only if σi(ω) =
σi(ω
′), where σi(ω) is the ith coordinate of σ(ω). Let K∗ be the transitive
closure of
⋃
i∈N Ki (then, for every ω ∈ Ω, K∗(ω) = Ω). The structure so
defined is clearly an S5∗n G-frame. Consider the model corresponding to this
frame (see Definition 4.4). Fix an arbitrary state ω and an arbitrary player
i. By definition of S∞, for every si ∈ Si there exists an ω
′ ∈ Ki(ω) such
that z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′)) i z(si, σ−i(ω
′)). Thus ω |= ri (see Definition 5.2).
Hence, for every ω ∈ Ω, ω |= (r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn) and, therefore, for every ω ∈ Ω,
ω |= K∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn). q.e.d.




G it follows from part (B) of Propo-
sition 5.4 that the implications of common belief of rationality—as implic-
itly defined by axiom WR—are the same as the implications of common
knowledge of rationality.
The above observation is not true for the stronger notion of rationality
expressed by axiom SR, to which we now turn.









respectively) be the class of D45 (respectively, S5) G-models where the
valuation function satisfies the following condition:
• ω |= ri if and only if, for every si ∈ Si, whenever there exists an
ω′ ∈ Bi(ω) such that z(si, σ−i(ω
′)) ≻i z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′)) then there
exists an ω′′ ∈ Bi(ω) such that z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′′)) ≻i z(si, σ−i(ω
′′)).
Thus, at state ω, player i is rational if, whenever there is a strategy si
of hers which is better than σi(ω) (the strategy she is actually using at ω)
at some state ω′ that she considers possible at ω, then σi(ω) is better than
si at some other state ω
′′ that she considers possible at ω. For example, in
the model based on the frame of Figure 5 we have that ω |= (r1 ∧ ¬r2) for
every ω ∈ {α, β, γ}. At state β, for instance, player 2 is choosing strategy
d when there is another strategy of hers, namely f , which is better than
d at β and as good as d at γ, and B2(β) = {β, γ}. Thus she is irrational
according to Definition 5.6.










Proposition 5.7. Logic LD45G +SR (respectively, L
S5
G +SR) is sound with





Proof. By Proposition 4.5 it is sufficient to show that axiom SR is valid in an









Then σi(ω) = s
k









′)), for every ω′ ∈ Bi(ω)] and there is an ω
′′ ∈
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Bi(ω) such that ω
′′ |= sℓi ≻i s
k







follows from Definition 5.6 that ω |= ¬ri. q.e.d.
The following proposition says that common knowledge of the stronger
notion of rationality expressed by axiom SR characterizes the Iterated Dele-
tion of Inferior Profiles (see Definition 3.4).13
Proposition 5.8. Fix a finite strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs G.
Then both (A) and (B) below hold.
(A) Fix an arbitrary model in M
S5|SR
G and an arbitrary state ω. If
ω |= K∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn) then σ(ω) ∈ T
∞.
(B) For every s ∈ T∞ there exists a model in M
S5|SR
G and a state ω such
that (1) σ(ω) = s and (2) ω |= K∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn).
Proof. (A) As in the case of Proposition 5.4, the proof is by induction. Fix a
model in M
S5|SR
G and a state α and suppose that α |= K∗(r1∧· · ·∧rn). First
we show that, for every ω ∈ K∗(α), σ(ω) /∈ I
0 (see Definition 3.4). Suppose,
by contradiction, that there exists a β ∈ K∗(α) such that σ(β) ∈ I
0, that
is, σ(β) is inferior relative to the entire set of strategy profiles S. Then
there exists a player i and a strategy ŝi ∈ Si such that z(ŝi, σ−i(β)) ≻i
z(σi(β), σ−i(β)), and, for every s−i ∈ S−i, z(ŝi, s−i) i z(σi(β), s−i). Thus
z(ŝi, σ−i(ω)) i z(σi(β), σ−i(ω)), for every ω ∈ Ki(β); furthermore, by
reflexivity of Ki (see Definition 2.1), β ∈ Ki(β). It follows from Definition
5.6 that β |= ¬ri. Since β ∈ K∗(α), this contradicts the hypothesis that
α |= K∗ri. Thus, since, for every ω ∈ Ω, σ(ω) ∈ S = T
0 we have shown
that, for every ω ∈ K∗(α), σ(ω) ∈ T
0\I0 = T 1.
Now we prove the inductive step. Fix an integer m ≥ 1 and suppose
that, for every ω ∈ K∗(α), σ(ω) ∈ T
m. We want to show that, for ev-
ery ω ∈ K∗(α), σ(ω) /∈ I
m. Suppose, by contradiction, that there ex-
ists a β ∈ K∗(α) such that σ(β) ∈ I
m, that is, σ(β) is inferior relative
to Tm. Then there exists a player i and a strategy s̃i ∈ Si such that
z(s̃i, σ−i(β)) ≻i z(σi(β), σ−i(β)), and, for every s−i ∈ S−i, if (s̃i, s−i) ∈ T
m
then z(s̃i, s−i) i z(σi(β), s−i). By Definition 4.3, for every ω ∈ Ki(β),
σi(ω) = σi(β) and by the induction hypothesis, for every ω ∈ K∗(α),
(σi(ω), σ−i(ω)) ∈ T
m. Thus, since Ki(β) ⊆ K∗(β) ⊆ K∗(α), we have
that, for every ω ∈ Ki(β), (σi(β), σ−i(ω)) ∈ T
m. By reflexivity of Ki,
β ∈ Ki(β). It follows from Definition 5.6 that β |= ¬ri. Since β ∈ K∗(α),
this contradicts the hypothesis that α |= K∗ri.
Thus, we have shown by induction that, for every ω ∈ K∗(α), σ(ω) ∈
⋂
m∈N T
m = T∞. It only remains to establish that σ(α) ∈ T∞, but this
follows from reflexivity of K∗.
13 Proposition 5.8 is the syntactic-based, ordinal version of a semantic, probabilistic-
based result due to Stalnaker [17]. For a correction of that result see Bonanno and
Nehring [5].




Figure 6. A game where player 1 has strategies a and b, and player 2 has
c and d.
(B) Let m be the cardinality of T∞ and let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωm}. Let
σ : Ω → T∞ be a one-to-one function. For every player i, define the
following equivalence relation on Ω: ωKiω
′ if and only if σi(ω) = σi(ω
′),
where σi(ω) is the ith coordinate of σ(ω). Let K∗ be the transitive closure
of
⋃
i∈N Ki (then, for every ω ∈ Ω, K∗(ω) = Ω). The structure so defined
is clearly an S5∗n G-frame. Consider the model corresponding to this frame
(see Definition 4.4). Fix an arbitrary state ω and an arbitrary player i.
By definition of T∞, for every player i and every si ∈ Si if there exists
an ω′ ∈ Ki(ω) such that if z(si, σ−i(ω
′)) ≻i z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′)) then there
exists an ω′′ ∈ Ki(ω) such that z(σi(ω), σ−i(ω
′′)) ≻i z(si, σ−i(ω
′′)). Thus
ω |= ri (see Definition 5.6). Hence, for every ω ∈ Ω, ω |= (r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn) and,
therefore, for every ω ∈ Ω, ω |= K∗(r1 ∧ · · · ∧ rn). q.e.d.
Note that Proposition 5.8 is not true if one replaces knowledge with be-
lief, as illustrated in the game of Figure 6 and corresponding frame in Fig-
ure 7. In the corresponding model we have that, according to the stronger
notion of rationality expressed by Definition 5.6, α |= r1∧r2 and β |= r1∧r2,
so that α |= B∗(r1 ∧ r2), despite the fact that σ(α) = (b, d), which is an
inferior strategy profile (relative to the entire game).14 In other words, com-
mon belief of rationality, as expressed by axiom SR, is compatible with the
players collectively choosing an inferior strategy profile. Thus, unlike the
weaker notion expressed by axiom WR (see Remark 5.5), with axiom SR
there is a crucial difference between the implications of common belief of
rationality and those of common knowledge of rationality.
6 Frame characterization
The characterization results proved in the previous section (Propositions
5.4 and 5.8) are not characterizations in the sense in which this expression
is used in modal logic, namely characterization of axioms in terms of classes
of frames (see [3, p. 125]). In this section we provide a reformulation of our
results in terms of frame characterizations.
Definition 6.1. An axiom characterizes (or is characterized by) a class F
14 In the game of Figure 6 we have that S∞ = S = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)} while








Figure 7. A frame for the game of Figure 6.
of Kripke frames if the axiom is valid in every model based on a frame that
belongs to F and, conversely, if a frame does not belong to F then there is a
model based on that frame and a state in that model at which an instance
of the axiom is falsified.15
We now modify the previous analysis as follows. First of all, we drop
the symbols ri from the set of atomic propositions and correspondingly



























One can derive axioms WR′ and SR′ from the logics considered previ-
ously by adding the axiom that players are rational. In fact, from ri and
WR one obtains WR′ (using Modus Ponens) and similarly for SR′.
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 5.4.
Proposition 6.2. Subject to the valuation rules specified in Definition 4.4




i ), axiom WR
′ is character-
ized by the class of D45∗n game frames (see Definition 4.3) that satisfy the
following property: for all i ∈ N and for all ω ∈ Ω, σi(ω) ∈ S
∞
i .
Proof. Fix a model based on a frame in this class, a state α, a player i
and two strategies ski and s
ℓ
i of player i. Suppose that α |= s
k
i , that is,
15 For example, as is well known, the axiom Biϕ→ BiBiϕ is characterized by the class
of frames where the relation Bi is transitive.
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σi(α) = s
k









i ‖, that is,
for every ω ∈ Bi(α), z(s
ℓ
i , σ−i(ω)) ≻i z(s
k
i , σ−i(ω)). (6.1)
By hypothesis, for every player j 6= i and for every ω ∈ Ω, σj(ω) ∈ S
∞
j .
Thus it follows from this and (6.1) that ski /∈ S
∞
i , contradicting the hy-
potheses that σi(α) = s
k
i and σi(ω) ∈ S
∞
i for all ω ∈ Ω.
Conversely, fix a D45∗n frame not in the class, that is, there is a state
ω ∈ Ω and a player i ∈ N such that σi(ω) /∈ S
∞
i . For every state ω and
every player j let
m(ω, j) =
{
∞ if σj(ω) ∈ S
∞
j ,
m if σj(ω) ∈ D
m
j .
Let m̂ = min{m(ω, j) : j ∈ N,ω ∈ Ω}. By our hypothesis about the frame,










for every j ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, σj(ω) ∈ S
m̂
j . (6.3)
Let ski = σi(α). By (6.2) and (6.3) , there exists a s
ℓ
i ∈ Si such that, for
every ω ∈ Ω, z(sℓi , σ−i(ω)) ≻i z(s
k









i ), so that axiom WR
′ is falsified at α. q.e.d.
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 5.8.
Proposition 6.3. Subject to the valuation rules specified in Definition 4.4




i ), axiom SR
′ is characterized by
the class of S5∗n game frames (see Definition 4.3) that satisfy the following
property: for all ω ∈ Ω, σ(ω) ∈ T∞.
Proof. Fix a model based on a frame in this class, a state α, a player i and
two strategies ski and s
ℓ







Then σi(α) = s
k




i ‖, that is,
for all ω ∈ Ki(α), z(s
ℓ
i , σ−i(ω)) i z(s
k
i , σ−i(ω)). (6.4)




i ). Suppose not. Then there exists




i ), that is,
z(sℓi , σ−i(β)) ≻i z(s
k
i , σ−i(β)). (6.5)
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It follows from (6.4) and (6.5) that (ski , σ−i(β)) = (σi(β), σ−i(β)) is inferior
relative to the set {s ∈ S : s = σ(ω) for some ω ∈ Ki(α)}, contradicting the
hypothesis that σ(ω) ∈ T∞ for all ω ∈ Ω.
Conversely, fix an S5∗n frame not in the class, that is, there is a state
ω ∈ Ω such that σ(ω) /∈ T∞. For every ω ∈ Ω, let
m(ω) =
{
∞ if σ(ω) ∈ T∞,
m if σ(ω) ∈ Im = Tm \ Tm+1.
Let m0 = min{m(ω) : ω ∈ Ω}. By our hypothesis about the frame, m0 ∈ N.
Let α ∈ Ω be such that m0 = m(α). Then σ(α) ∈ I
m0 , that is, there is a
player i and a strategy sℓi ∈ Si such that
z(sℓi , σ−i(α)) ≻i z(σi(α), σ−i(α)) (6.6)
and
∀ω ∈ Ω, if (σi(α), σ−i(ω)) ∈ T
m0
then z(sℓi , σ−i(ω)) i z(σi(α), σ−i(ω)). (6.7)
By definition of m0, since (see Definition 3.4) for every p, q ∈ N ∪ {∞},
T p+q ⊆ T p, for every ω ∈ Ω, σ(ω) ∈ Tm0 . Thus, letting ski = σi(α), it









the frame is an S5 frame, Ki is reflexive and, therefore, α ∈ Ki(α). It follows













i ), so that axiom SR
′ is falsified at α. q.e.d.
There appears to be an important difference between the results of Sec-
tion 5 and those of this section, namely that, while Propositions 5.4 and
5.8 give a local result, Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 provide a global one. For
example, Proposition 5.4 says that if at a state there is common belief of ra-
tionality, then the strategy profile played at that state belongs to S∞, while
its counterpart in this section, namely Proposition 6.2, says that the strategy
profile played at every state belongs to S∞. As a matter of fact, the results
of Section 5 are also global in nature. Consider, for example, Proposition
5.4. Fix a model and a state α and suppose that α |= B∗(r1∧· · ·∧rn). Since,
for every formula ϕ, B∗ϕ→ B∗B∗ϕ is a theorem of KD45
∗
n, it follows that
α |= B∗B∗(r1 ∧· · · ∧ rn), that is, for every ω ∈ B∗(α), ω |= B∗(r1 ∧· · · ∧ rn).
Thus, it follows from Proposition 5.4 that σ(ω) ∈ S∞, for every ω ∈ B∗(α).
16
That is, if at a state there is common belief of rationality, then at that state,
as well as at all states reachable from it by the common belief relation B∗,
it is true that the strategy profile played belongs to S∞. This is essentially
16 This fact was proved directly in the proof of Proposition 5.4.
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a global result, since from the point of view of a state α, the “global” space
is precisely the set B∗(α).
Thus the only difference between the results of Section 5 and those of
this section lies in the fact that Propositions 5.4 and 5.8 bring out the
role of common belief by mimicking the informal argument that if player
1 is rational then she won’t choose a strategy s1 ∈ D
0
1 and if player 2
believes that player 1 is rational then he believes that s1 /∈ D
0
1 and therefore
will not choose a strategy s2 ∈ D
1
2, and if player 1 believes that player 2
believes that player 1 is rational, then player 1 believes that s2 /∈ D
1
2 and
will, therefore, not choose a strategy s1 ∈ D
2
1 , and so on. Beliefs about
beliefs about beliefs. . . are explicitly modeled through the common belief
operator. In contrast, Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 do not make use of the
common belief operator. However, the logic is essentially the same. In
particular, common belief of rationality is generated by the axiom WR′
















sk1)) and thus, whatever is implied by WR
′ is believed by both players.
Further iterations of the Necessitation rule yields beliefs about beliefs about
beliefs. . . about the rationality of every player.
7 Related literature
As noted in the introduction, the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies as a solution concept for strategic-form games goes back to Bern-
heim [2] and Pearce [16] and has been further studied and characterized by
a number of authors. From the point of view of this paper, the most im-
portant contribution in this area is due to Stalnaker [17], who put forward
the novel proposal of characterizing solution concepts for games in terms
of classes of models. Stalnaker carried out his analysis within the standard
framework of von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs and defined dominance in
terms of mixed strategies. Furthermore his analysis was semantic rather
than syntactic. Our approach differs from Stalnaker’s in that we formulate
rationality syntactically within an axiomatic system and provide character-
ization results in line with the notion of frame characterization in modal
logic. Furthermore, we do this in a purely ordinal framework that does not
require probabilistic beliefs and von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs. How-
ever, our intellectual debt towards Stalnaker is clear. In particular, the
IDIP algorithm (see Definition 3.4) is the adaptation to ordinal games of
the algorithm he introduced in [17].
A syntactic epistemic analysis of iterated strict dominance was also pro-
posed by de Bruin [9, p. 86]. However his approach is substantially dif-
ferent from ours. First of all, his analysis is explicitly carried out only for
two-person games, while we allowed for any number of players. Secondly,
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de Bruin assumes von Neumann Morgenstern payoffs and his definition of
strict dominance involves domination by mixed strategies [9, p. 51], while we
considered ordinal payoffs and defined dominance in terms of pure strategies
only (see Definition 3.2). Thirdly, de Bruin restricts attention to knowledge
(that is, in his axiom system he imposes the Truth Axiom Ti on individual
beliefs: [9, p. 51]) and thus does not investigate the difference between the
implications of common belief of rationality and those of common knowledge
of rationality (hence in his analysis there is no counterpart to the difference
highlighted in Propositions 5.4 and 5.8 of Section 5). More importantly,
however, de Bruin introduces the notion of strict dominance directly into
the syntax by using atomic propositions of the form nsdi(Ai, Aj) whose in-
tended interpretation is “player i uses a pure strategy in Ai which is not
strictly dominated by a mixed strategy over Ai given that player j plays a
pure strategy in Aj”. Furthermore, his definition of rationality incorporates
the notion of strict dominance. De Bruin’s definition of rationality [9, p. 86]
consists of two parts: a basis step without knowledge, ri → nsdi(Ai, Aj),
and an inductive step with knowledge: (ri∧KiXi∧KiXj) → nsdi(Xi, Xj).
According to de Bruin the advantage of his two-part definition of rationality
is that
Drawing a line between a basis case without beliefs, and an induc-
tive step with beliefs makes it possible to mimic every single round
of elimination of the solution concept by a step in the hierarchy of
common belief in rationality. This becomes highly explicit in the
inductive character of the proof. [9, p. 100]
However, as pointed out at the end of the previous section, this mim-
icking of the elimination steps occurs also in the proof of Proposition 5.4
without the need for a two-part definition of rationality and, more impor-
tantly, without incorporating the notion of dominance in the syntax.
The disadvantage of de Bruin’s approach is that one loses the distinction
between syntax and semantics and the ability to link the two by means of
frame characterization results. In our analysis, the notion of strict domi-
nance is purely a semantic notion, which has no syntactic counterpart. On
the other hand the definition of rationality is expressed syntactically and it
is epistemically based, in that it evaluates a player’s rationality by compar-
ing her action with her beliefs about the desirability of alternative actions.
The characterization results then establish a correspondence between the
output of an algorithm (such as the iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies) and common belief of an independently formulated notion of
rationality.
Börgers [7] provides a characterization of pure-strategy dominance that
differs from ours. Like us, Börgers assumes that only the ordinal rankings of
the players are commonly known; however—unlike us—he also assumes that








Figure 8. Two games in which player 2 has strategies d and e, whereas
player 1 has either three strategies (left) or two (right).
each player has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on the set of
outcomes, forms probabilistic beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices
and chooses a pure strategy that maximizes her expected utility, given those
beliefs. He thus asks the question: what pure-strategy profiles are consistent
with common belief of rationality, where the latter is defined as expected
utility maximization with respect to some von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function and some beliefs about the opponents’ strategies? Börgers
shows that a pure strategy is rational in this sense if and only if it is not
dominated by another pure strategy. Thus there is no need to consider dom-
inance by a mixed strategy. However, he shows that the relevant notion of
dominance in this case is not strict dominance but the following stronger
notion: a strategy si ∈ Si of player i is dominated if and only if, for every
subset of strategy profiles X−i ⊆ S−i of the players other than i, there ex-
ists a strategy ti ∈ Si (which can vary with X−i) that weakly dominates si
relative to X−i.
17 For example, in the game illustrated in Figure 8 (left),
strategy a of player 1 is dominated (by b relative to {d, e} and also relative
to {d} and by c relative to {e}). Thus in the corresponding model shown
in Figure 9, at state α, while player 1 is rational according to our axiom
WR (since no strategy is strictly dominated; indeed at state α there is
common knowledge of rationality), she is not rational according to Börgers’
definition.18
On the other hand, while stronger than the notion expressed by our
axiom WR, Börgers’ notion of rationality is weaker than our axiom SR, as
can be seen in the game of Figure 8 (right). Here strategy a of player 1 is
dominated by b relative to {d, e} and also relative to {d} but not relative to
{e}. Thus a is a rational strategy according to Börgers’ definition. On the
other hand, in the model of Figure 9 (viewed now as a model for the game
of Figure 8 (right)) player 1 is not rational at state α (where her choice is
17 We say that ti weakly dominates si relative to X−i if (1) z(ti, x−i) i z(si, x−i), for
all x−i ∈ X−i, and (2) there exists an x̂−i ∈ X−i such that z(ti, x̂−i) ≻i z(si, x̂−i).
18 The reason for this is as follows: if player 1 assigns positive probability to both α and
β, then she would get a higher expected utility by switching to strategy b. The same
is true if she assigns probability 1 to α. On the other hand, if she assigns probability








Figure 9. A model for the games of Figure 8.
a) according to the notion of rationality expressed by axiom SR (indeed, in
this game, T∞ = {(a, e), (b, d)} and thus (a, d) /∈ T∞).
8 Conclusion
We have examined the implications of common belief and common knowl-
edge of two, rather weak, notions of rationality. Most of the literature
on the epistemic foundations of game theory have dealt with the Bayesian
approach, which identifies rationality with expected payoff maximization,
given probabilistic beliefs (for surveys of this literature see [1] and [11]).
Our focus has been on strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and non-
probabilistic beliefs. While most of the literature has been developed within
the semantic approach, we have used a syntactic framework and expressed
rationality in terms of syntactic axioms. We showed that the first, weaker,
axiom of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies, while the stronger axiom characterizes the pure-strategy version
of the algorithm introduced by Stalnaker [17].
The two notions of rationality used in this paper can, of course, be
used also in the subclass of games with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs
and the results would be the same. Furthermore, the standard notion of
Bayesian rationality as expected payoff maximization is stronger than (that
is, implies) both notions of rationality considered in this paper. Thus our
results apply also to Bayesian rationality.19
We have provided two versions of our characterization results. The
first (Propositions 5.4 and 5.8), which comes closer to the previous game-
theoretic literature, is based on an explicit account of the role of common
19 In the sense that whatever is incompatible with our notion of rationality is also in-
compatible with the stronger notion of Bayesian rationality.
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belief of rationality and thus requires a syntax that contains atomic propo-
sitions that are interpreted as “player i is rational”. The second charac-
terization (Propositions 6.2 and 6.3) is closer to the modal logic literature,
where axioms are characterized in terms of properties of frames. However,
we argued that the two characterizations are essentially identical.
We have restricted attention to strategic-form games. In future work
we intend to extend this qualitative (that is, non probabilistic) analysis to
extensive-form games with perfect information and the notion of backward
induction.
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Abstract
We present an epistemic logic incorporating dynamic operators to
describe information changing events. Such events include epistemic
changes, where agents become more informed about the non-changing
state of the world, and ontic changes, wherein the world changes. The
events are executed in information states that are modelled as pointed
Kripke models. Our contribution consists of three semantic results.
(i) Every consistent formula can be made true in every information
state by the execution of an event. (ii) Every event corresponds to
an event with assignments to true and false only. (iii) Every event
corresponds to a sequence of events with assignments of a single atom
only. We apply the logic to model dynamics in a multi-agent setting
involving card players.
1 Introduction
In dynamic epistemic logics [32, 23, 9, 4, 17] one does not merely describe
the static (knowledge and) beliefs of agents but also dynamic features: how
does belief change as a result of events taking place. The main focus of such
logics has been change of only belief, whereas the facts describing the world
remain the same. Change of belief is known as epistemic change. One can
also model change of facts, and the resulting consequences of such factual
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 87–117.
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changes for the beliefs of the agents. Change of facts is also known as ontic
change (change of the real world, so to speak).1 In this contribution we use
‘event’ to denote any sort of information change, both epistemic and ontic.
Let us begin by a simple example involving various events.
Example 1.1. Given are two players Anne and Bill. Anne shakes a cup
containing a single coin and deposits the cup upside down on the table
(there are no opportunities for cheating). Heads or tails? Initially, we have
a situation wherein both Anne (a) and Bill (b) are uncertain about the
truth of that proposition. A player may observe whether the coin is heads
or tails, and/or flip the coin, and with or without the other player noticing
that. Four example events are as follows.
1. Anne lifts the cup and looks at the coin. Bill observes this but is not
able to see the coin. All the previous is common knowledge to Anne
and Bill.
2. Anne lifts the cup and looks at the coin without Bill noticing that.
3. Anne lifts the cup, looks at the coin, and ensures that it is tails (by
some sleight of hand). Bill observes Anne looking but is not able to
see the coin, and he considers it possible that Anne has flipped the
coin to tails (and this is common knowledge).
4. Bill flips the coin (without seeing it). Anne considers that possible
(and this is common knowledge).
Events 1, 3, and 4 are all public in the sense that the actual event is con-
sidered possible by both agents, and that both agents know that, and know
that they know that, etc.; whereas event 2 is private: Bill is unaware of the
event; the event is private to Anne. Events 3 and 4 involve ontic change,
whereas events 1 and 2 only involve epistemic change. Flipping a coin is
ontic change: the value of the atomic proposition ‘the coin is heads’ changes
from false to true, or from true to false, because of that. But in the case of
events 1 and 2 that value, whether true or false, remains unchanged. What
changes instead, is how informed the agents are about that value, or about
how informed the other agent is. In 1 and 2, Anne still learns whether the
coin is heads or tails. In 1, Bill ‘only’ learns that Anne has learnt whether
the coin is heads or tails: he has not gained factual information at all. In
Example 2.5, later, we will formalize these descriptions.
1 In the areas known as ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘belief revision’, epistemic and ontic
change are called, respectively, belief revision [1] and belief update [27]. We will not
use that terminology.
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Various logics have been proposed to model such events. A well-known
setting is that of interpreted systems by Fagin et al. [21]. Each agent has
a local state; the local states of all agents together with a state of the
environment form a global state; belief of an agent is modelled as uncertainty
to distinguish between global states wherein the agent has the same local
state, and change of belief is modelled as a transition from one global state
to another one, i.e., as a next step in a run through the system. In an
interpreted system the treatment of epistemic and ontic change is similar—
either way it is just a next step in a run, and how the valuation between
different points changes is not essential to define or describe the transition.
There is a long tradition in such research [30, 21].
The shorter history of dynamic epistemic logic started by focusing on
epistemic change [32, 23, 9, 4, 17]. In that community, how to model ontic
change was first mentioned by Baltag, Moss, and Solecki as a possible ex-
tension to their action model logic for epistemic change [5]. More detailed
proposals for ontic change are far more recent [20, 16, 15, 10, 28, 33, 25, 26].
The literature will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.
Section 2 contains logical preliminaries, including detailed examples.
Section 3 contains the semantic results that we have achieved for the logic.
This is our original contribution to the area. These results are that: (i) for
all finite models and for all consistent formulas we can construct an event
that ‘realizes’ the formula, i.e., the formula becomes true after execution of
the event; that: (ii) every event (with assignments of form p := ϕ, for ϕ in
the language) corresponds to an event with assignments to true and false
only; and also that: (iii) every event corresponds to a sequence of events
with assignments for a single atom only. Section 4 applies the logic to model
the dynamics of card players. Section 5 discusses related work in detail.
2 A logic of ontic and epistemic change
We separately introduce the logical language, the relevant structures, and
the semantics of the language on those structures. The syntax and semantics
appear to overlap: updates are structures that come with preconditions that
are formulas. In fact it is properly covered by the double induction used
in the language definition, as explained after Definition 2.4 below. For a
detailed treatment of the logic without ontic change, and many examples,
we recommend [17]; for more examples of the logic involving ontic change,
see [15, 16, 20].
2.1 Language
We use the style of notation from propositional dynamic logic (PDL) for
modal operators which is also used in [10].
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Definition 2.1 (Language). Let a finite set of agents A and a countable
set of propositional variables P be given. The language L is given by the
following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [α]ϕ
α ::= a | B∗ | (U, e)
where p ∈ P , a ∈ A, B ⊆ A (the dynamic operator [B∗] is associated with
‘common knowledge among the agents in B’), and where (U, e) is an update
as (simultaneously) defined below.
We use the usual abbreviations, and conventions for deleting parenthe-
ses. In particular, [B]ϕ stands for
∧
a∈B[a]ϕ, and (the diamond form) 〈α〉ϕ
is equivalent to ¬[α]¬ϕ. Non-deterministic updates are introduced by ab-
breviation: [(U, e) ∪ (U′, f)]ϕ is by definition [U, e]ϕ ∧ [U′, f]ϕ.
2.2 Structures
Epistemic model. The models which adequately present an information
state in a multi-agent environment are Kripke models from epistemic logic.
The set of states together with the accessibility relations represent the in-
formation the agents have. If one state s has access to another state t for
an agent a, this means that, if the actual situation is s, then according to
a’s information it is possible that t is the actual situation.
Definition 2.2 (Epistemic model). Let a finite set of agents A and a count-
able set of propositional variables P be given. An epistemic model is a triple
M = (S,R, V ) such that
• domain S is a non-empty set of possible states,
• R : A→ ℘(S × S) assigns an accessibility relation to each agent a,
• V : P → ℘(S) assigns a set of states to each propositional variable;
this is the valuation of that variable.
A pair (S,R) is called an epistemic frame. A pair (M, s), with s ∈ S, is
called an epistemic state.
A well-known notion of sameness of epistemic models is ‘bisimulation’.
Several of our results produce models that are bisimilar: they correspond
in the sense that even when not identical (isomorphic), they still cannot be
distinguished in the language.
Definition 2.3 (Bisimulation). Let two models M = (S,R, V ) and M ′ =
(S′, R′, V ′) be given. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′ is a bisimulation iff
for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ with (s, s′) ∈ R:
atoms for all p ∈ P : s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
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forth for all a ∈ A and all t ∈ S: if (s, t) ∈ R(a), then there is a t′ ∈ S′
such that (s′, t′) ∈ R′(a) and (t, t′) ∈ R;
back for all a ∈ A and all t′ ∈ S′: if (s′, t′) ∈ R′(a), then there is a t ∈ S
such that (s, t) ∈ R(a) and (t, t′) ∈ R.
We write (M, s) ↔ (M ′, s′), iff there is a bisimulation between M and
M ′ linking s and s′, and we then call (M, s) and (M ′, s′) bisimilar. A model
such that all bisimilar states are identical is called a bisimulation contraction
(also known as a strongly extensional model).
Update model. An epistemic model represents the information of the
agents. Information change is modelled as changes of such a model. There
are three variables. One can change the set of states, the accessibility rela-
tions and the valuation. It may be difficult to find the exact change of these
variables that matches a certain description of an information changing
event. It is often easier to think of such an event separately. One can model
an information changing event in the same way as an information state,
namely as some kind of Kripke model: there are various possible events,
which the agents may not be able to distinguish. This is the domain of
the model. Rather than a valuation, a precondition captures the conditions
under which such events may occur, and postconditions also determine what
epistemic models may evolve into. Such a Kripke model for events is called
an update model, which were first studied by Baltag, Moss and Solecki, and
extended with simultaneous substitutions by van Eijck [5, 20].2 Here we use
van Eijck’s definition.
Definition 2.4 (Update model). An update model for a finite set of agents
A and a language L is a quadruple U = (E,R, pre, post) where
• domain E is a finite non-empty set of events,
• R : A→ ℘(E× E) assigns an accessibility relation to each agent,
• pre : E → L assigns to each event a precondition,
• post : E → (P → L ) assigns to each event a postcondition for each
atom. Each post(e) is required to be only finitely different from the
identity id; the finite difference is called its domain dom(post(e)).
A pair (U, e) with a distinguished actual event e ∈ E is called an update.
A pair (U,E) with E′ ⊆ E and |E′| > 1 is a multi-pointed update, first in-
troduced in [19]. The event e with pre(e) = ⊤ and post(e) = id we name
2 In the literature update models are also called action models. Here we follow [10] and
call them update models, since no agency seems to be involved.
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skip. An update with a singleton domain, accessible to all agents, and pre-
condition ⊤, is a public assignment. An update with a singleton domain,
accessible to all agents, and identity postcondition, is a public announce-
ment.
Instead of
pre(e) = ϕ and post(e)(p1) = ψ1, . . . , and post(e)(pn) = ψn
we also write3
for event e: if ϕ, then p1 := ψ1, . . . , and pn := ψn
The event skip stands for: nothing happens except a tick of the clock.
To see an update as part of the language we observe that: an update
(U, e) is an inductive construct of type α that is built the frame underlying U
(we can assume a set enumerating such frames) and from simpler constructs
of type ϕ, namely the preconditions and postconditions for the events of
which the update consists. This means that there should be a finite number
of preconditions and a finite number of postconditions only, otherwise the
update would be an infinitary construct. A finite number of preconditions is
guaranteed by restricting ourselves in the language to finite update models.
A finite number of postconditions is guaranteed by (as well) restricting
ourselves to finite domain for postconditions. This situation is similar to
the case of automata-PDL [24, Chapter 10, Section 3].
If in case of nondeterministic updates the underlying models are the
same, we can also see this as executing a multi-pointed update. For example,
(U, e) ∪ (U, f) can be equated with (U, {e, f}).
Example 2.5. Consider again the scenario of Example 1.1 on page 88. Let
atomic proposition p stand for ‘the coin lands heads’. The initial information
state is represented by a two-state epistemic model with domain {1, 0}, with
universal access for a and b, and with V (p) = {1}. We further assume that
the actual state is 1. This epistemic state is depicted in the top-left corner
of Figure 1. The events in Example 1.1 can be visualized as the following
updates. The actual state is underlined.
1. Anne lifts the cup and looks at the coin. Bill observes this but is not
able to see the coin. All the previous is common knowledge to Anne
and Bill.
p npba, b a, b
3 The notation is reminiscent of that for a knowledge-based program in the interpreted
systems tradition. We discuss the correspondence in Section 5.
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Here, pre(p) = p, post(p) = id, pre(np) = ¬p, post(np) = id. The
update model consists of two events. The event p corresponds to
Anne seeing heads, and the event np to Anne seeing tails; Anne is
aware of that: thus the reflexive arrows (identity relation). Bill cannot
distinguish them from one another: thus the universal relation. The
aspect of common knowledge, or common awareness, is also present
in this dynamic structure: the reflexive arrow for Anne also encodes
that Anne knows that she lifts the cup and that Bill observes that;
similarly for Bill, and for iterations of either awareness.
2. Anne lifts the cup and looks at the coin without Bill noticing that.
p skipba a, b
Event p is as in the previous item and skip is as above. In this update,
there is no common awareness of what is going on: Anne observes
heads knowing that Bill is unaware of that, whereas Bill does not
consider the actual event; the b-arrow points to the other event only.
3. Anne lifts the cup, looks at the coin, and ensures that it is tails (by
some sleight of hand). Bill observes Anne looking but is not able to
see the coin, and he considers it possible that Anne has flipped the





a, b a, b
a, b
Events p and np are as before, whereas pre(p′) = ⊤, post(p′)(p) = ⊥.
The event p′ may take place both when the coin is heads and when
the coin is tails, in the first case atom p is set to false (tails), and in
the second it remains false.
4. Bill flips the coin (without seeing it). Anne considers that possible
(and this is common knowledge).
n skipaa, b a, b
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Here, pre(n) = ⊤, post(n)(p) = ¬p, and skip is as before. For models
where all accessibility relations are equivalence relations we will also
use a simplified visualization that merely links states in the same
equivalence class. E.g., this final event is also depicted as:
n skipa
2.3 Semantics
The semantics of this language is standard for epistemic logic and based
on the product construction for the execution of update models from the
previous section. Below, R(B)∗ is the transitive and reflexive closure of the
union of all accessibility relations R(a) for agents a ∈ B. Definitions 2.6
and 2.7 are supposed to be defined simultaneously.
Definition 2.6 (Semantics). Let a model (M, s) with M = (S,R, V ) be
given. Let a ∈ A, B ⊆ A, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L .
(M, s) |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
(M, s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, s) 6|= ϕ
(M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ
(M, s) |= [a]ϕ iff (M, t) |= ϕ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ R(a)
(M, s) |= [B∗]ϕ iff (M, t) |= ϕ for all t such that (s, t) ∈ R(B)∗
(M, s) |= [U, e]ϕ iff (M, s) |= pre(e) implies (M ⊗ U, (s, e)) |= ϕ
We now define the effect of an update on an epistemic state—Figure 1
gives an example of such update execution.
Definition 2.7 (Execution). Given are an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ),
a state s ∈ S, an update model U = (E,R, pre, post), and an event e ∈ E
with (M, s) |= pre(e). The result of executing (U, e) in (M, s) is the model
(M ⊗ U, (s, e)) = ((S′, R′, V ′), (s, e)) where
• S′ = {(t, f) | (M, t) |= pre(f)},
• R′(a) = {((t, f), (u, g)) | (t, f), (u, g) ∈ S′ and (t, u) ∈ R(a) and
(f, g) ∈ R(a)},
• V ′(p) = {(t, f) | (M, t) |= post(f)(p)}.
Definition 2.8 (Composition of update models). Let update models U =
(E,R, pre, post) and U′ = (E′,R′, pre′, post′) and events e ∈ E and e′ ∈ E′ be
given. The composition (U, e) ; (U′, e′) of these update models is (U′′, e′′)
where U′′ = (E′′,R′′, pre′′, post′′) is defined as
• E′′ = E× E′,
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1 0a, ba, b a, b
×
p skipba a, b
(1, p)




a, b a, b
Figure 1. In an epistemic state where Anne and Bill are uncertain about
the truth of p (heads or tails), and wherein p is true, Anne looks at the coin
without Bill noticing it. The actual states and events are underlined.
• R′′(a) = {((f, f′), (g, g′)) | (f, g) ∈ R(a) and (f′, g′) ∈ R′(a)},
• pre′′(f, f′) = pre(f) ∧ [U, f]pre′(f′),
• dom(post′′(f, f′)) = dom(post(f)) ∪ dom(post′(f′)) and
if p ∈ dom(post′′(f, f′)), then
post′′(f, f′)(p) =
{
post(f)(p) if p 6∈ dom(post′(f′)),
[U, f]post′(f′)(p) otherwise.
The reason for [U, f]post′(f′)(p) in the final clause will become clear from
the proof detail shown for Proposition 2.9.
Proposition 2.9. |= [U, e][U′, e′]ϕ↔ [(U, e) ; (U′, e′)]ϕ
Proof. Let (M, t) be arbitrary. To show that (M, t) |= [(U, e) ; (U′, e′)]ϕ if
and only if (M, t) |= [U, e][U′, e′]ϕ, it suffices to show that M ⊗ (U ; U′) is
isomorphic to (M⊗U)⊗U′. A detailed proof (for purely epistemic updates)
is found in [17]. The postconditions (only) play a part in the proof that the
valuations correspond:
For the valuation of facts p in the domain of post′′ we distinguish the
cases (p ∈ dom(post(e)) but p 6∈ dom(post′(e′))) (i), and otherwise (ii).
The valuation of a i-atom in a triple (t, (e, e′)) is post(e)(p) according to
the definition of updates composition; and the valuation of a ii-atom is
[U, e]post′(e′)(p). Consider the corresponding triple ((t, e), e′). The valu-
ation of an i-atom in (t, e) is post(e)(p), and because p does not occur
in dom(post′(e′)) its value in the triple ((t, e), e′) will remain the same.
For a ii-atom, its final value will be determined by evaluating post′(e′)(p)
in ((M ⊗ U), (t, e)). This corresponds to evaluating [U, e]post′(e′)(p) in
(M, t). q.e.d.
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2.4 Proof system
A proof system UM for the logic is given in Table 1. The proof system
is a lot like the proof system for the logic of epistemic actions (i.e., for
the logic without postconditions to model valuation change) in [5]. There
are two differences that makes it worthwhile to present this system. The
axiom ‘atomic permanence’ in [5]—[U, e]p ↔ (pre(e) → p)—is now instead
an axiom expressing when atoms are not permanent, namely how the value
of an atom can change, according to the postcondition for that atom:
[U, e]p↔ (pre(e) → post(e)(p)) update and atoms
The second difference is not apparent from Table 1. The axiom
[U, e][U′, e′]ϕ↔ [(U, e) ; (U′, e′)]ϕ update composition
also occurs in [5]. But Definition 2.8 to compute that composition is in our
case a more complex construction than the composition of update models
with only preconditions, because it also involves resetting the postcondi-
tions. We find it remarkable that these are the only differences: the inter-
action between postconditions for an atom and the logical operators, only
occurs in the axiom where that atom is mentioned, or implicitly, whereas
the interaction between preconditions and the logical operators appears in
several axioms and rules.
The proof system is sound and complete. The soundness of the ‘update
and atoms’ axiom is evident. The soundness of the ‘update composition’
axiom was established in Proposition 2.9. We proved completeness of the
logic as a modification of the completeness proof for the logic without ontic
change—action model logic—as found in [17], which in turn is a simplified
version of the original proof for that logic as found in [5]. We do not consider
the modified proof of sufficient original interest to report on in detail.
3 Semantic results
We now present some semantic peculiarities of the logic. These we deem
our contribution to the area. The results help to relate different approaches
combining ontic and epistemic change (see Section 5). The various ‘normal
forms’ for update models that we define are also intended to facilitate future
tool development. Finally, they are relevant when modelling AGM belief
revision [1] in a dynamic epistemic setting.
3.1 Arbitrary belief change
Let (M, s) and (M ′, s′) be arbitrary finite epistemic states for the same set of
atoms and agents, with M = (S,R, V ) and M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′). Surprisingly
enough, there is almost always an update transforming the former into the
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All instantiations of propositional tautologies
[α](ϕ→ ψ) → ([α]ϕ→ [α]ψ) distribution
From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ, infer ψ modus ponens
From ϕ, infer [α]ϕ necessitation
[U, e]p↔ (pre(e) → post(e)(p)) update and atoms
[U, e]¬ϕ↔ (pre(e) → ¬[U, e]ϕ) update and negation
[U, e](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([U, e]ϕ ∧ [U, e]ψ) update and conjunction
[U, e][a]ϕ↔ (pre(e) →
∧
(e,f)∈R(a)[a][U, f]ϕ) update and knowledge
[U, e][U′, e′]ϕ↔ [(U, e); (U′, e′)]ϕ update composition
[B∗]ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ [B][B∗]ϕ) mix
[B∗](ϕ→ [B]ϕ) → (ϕ→ [B∗]ϕ) induction axiom
Let (U, e) be an update model and let a set
of formulas χf for every f such that (e, f) ∈
R(B)∗ be given. From χf → [U, f]ϕ and
(χf ∧ pre(f)) → [a]χg for every f ∈ E such
that (e, f) ∈ R(B)∗, a ∈ B and (f, g) ∈




Table 1. The proof system UM.
latter. There are two restrictions. Both restrictions are technical and not
conceptual. Firstly, for the set of agents with non-empty access in M ′ there
must be a submodel of M containing actual state s that is serial for those
agents. In other words, if an agent initially has empty access and therefore
believes everything (‘is crazy’) you cannot change his beliefs, but otherwise
you can. This seems reasonable. Secondly, models M and M ′ should only
differ in the value of a finite number of atoms; more precisely, if we define
that
an atom is relevant in a model iff its valuation is neither empty nor
the entire domain,
then the requirement is that only a finite number of atoms is relevant in
M ∪M ′. This is required, because we can only change the value of a finite
number of atoms in the postconditions. This also seems reasonable: as both
models are finite, the agents can only be uncertain about the value of a finite
number of atoms (in the combined models M and M ′); in other words, they
are ‘not interested’ in the value of the remaining atoms.
For expository purposes we initially assume that all agents consider the
actual state s of M a possibility (as in all S5 models, such as Kripke models
representing interpreted systems), thus satisfying the first of the two re-
strictions above: the serial submodel required is then the singleton model
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consisting of s, accessible to all agents. The update transforming (M, s) into
(M ′, s′) can be seen as the composition of two intuitively more appealing
updates. That will make clear how we can also describe the required update
in one stroke.
In the first step we get rid of the structure of M . As the epistemic state
(M, s) is finite, it has a characteristic formula δ(M,s) [6, 8].
4 We let the
agents publicly learn that characteristic formula. This event is represented
by the singleton update (U, e) defined as
(({e},R, pre, post), e) with pre(e) = δ(M,s),
for all a : (e, e) ∈ R(a),
and post(e) = id
In other words, the structure of the current epistemic state is being publicly
announced. The resulting epistemic state is, of course, also singleton, or
bisimilar to a singleton epistemic state, as δ(M,s) holds in all states in M
bisimilar to s. Without loss of generality assume that it is singleton. Its
domain is {(s, e)}. This pair (s, e) is accessible to itself because for all
agents, (s, s) ∈ R(a) (all agents consider the actual state s a possibility), and
(e, e) ∈ R(a). The valuation of propositional variables in this intermediate
state are those of state s in M . What the value is does not matter: we will
not use that valuation.
Now proceed to the second step. In the epistemic state wherein the
agents have common knowledge of the facts in s, the agents learn the struc-
ture of the resulting epistemic state M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′) and their part in it
by executing update (U′, s′) defined as
((S′, R′, pre′, post′), s′) with for all t′ ∈ S′ : pre′(t′) = ⊤ and
for relevant p : post′(t′)(p) = ⊤ iff t′ ∈ V ′(p)
Note that the domain S′ and the accessibility relation R′ of U′ are precisely
those of M ′, the resulting final epistemic model. The postcondition post′
is well-defined, as only a finite number of atoms (the relevant atoms) is
considered. Because we execute this update in a singleton model with public
access, and because it is executable for every event t′, the resulting epistemic
state has the same structure as the update: it returns S′ and R′ again. The
postcondition delivers the required valuation of atoms in the final model:
for each event t′ in U′ and for all relevant atoms p, p become true in t′ if p
is true in state t′ in M ′ (post(t′)(p) = ⊤), else p becomes false. The value
of irrelevant atoms remains the same.
4 A characteristic formula ϕ for a state (M, s) satisfies that for all ψ, (M,s) |= ϕ iff
ϕ |= ψ. In fact, for the construction we only need formulas that can distinguish all
states in the domain from one another, modulo bisimilarity. Characteristic formulas
satisfy that requirement.
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We combine these two updates into one by requiring the precondition of
the first and the postcondition of the second. Consider U′r that is exactly
as U′ except that in all events t′ in its domain the precondition is not ⊤ but




does the job: epistemic state (M⊗U′r, (s, s
′)) is isomorphic to (M ′, s′). This
will be Corollary 3.3 of our more general result, to follow.
Now consider the more general case that the agents with non-empty
access in M ′ are serial in a submodel M ser of M that contains s, with
domain Sser. In other words: at least all agents who finally have consistent
beliefs in some states, initially have consistent beliefs in all states. The
construction above will no longer work: if the actual state is not considered
possible by an agent, then that agent has empty access in actual state (s, s′)
of (M ⊗ U′r), but not in s
′ in M ′. But if we relax the precondition δ(M,s),
for the point s of (M, s), to the disjunction
∨
u∈Sser δ(M,u), that will now
carry along the serial subdomain Sser, the construction will work because
an agent can then always imagine some state wherein the update has been
executed, even it that is not the actual state. This indeed completes the
construction.
Definition 3.1 (Update for arbitrary change). Given finite epistemic mod-
els M = (S,R, V ) and M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′) for the same sets of agents and
atoms. Assume that all agents with non-empty access in M ′ are serial in
M ser containing s. The update for arbitrary change (U′′, (s, s′)) = ((E′′,R′′,
pre′′, post′′), (s, s′)) is defined as (for arbitrary agents a and arbitrary rele-
vant atoms p):
E′′ = S′







⊤ if t′ ∈ V ′(p)
⊥ otherwise
The epistemic state (M ⊗ U′′, (s, s′)) is bisimilar to (M ′, s′), which is
the desired result. It will typically not be isomorphic: M ⊗ U′′ can be seen
as consisting of a number of copies of M ′ (namely |Sser| copies) ‘with the
accessibility relations just right to establish the bisimulation’. One copy
may not be enough, namely when the state t in M to which that copy
corresponds, lacks access for some agents. This access will then also be
‘missing’ between the states of ({t} × S′). But because of seriality one of
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the other M ′ copies will now make up for this lack: there is a u ∈ Sser such
that (t, u) ∈ R(a), which will establish access when required, as in the proof
of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Given (M, s), (M ′, s′), and U′′ as in Definition 3.1. Then
R : ((M ⊗ U′′), (s, s′)) ↔ (M ′, s′) by way of, for all t ∈ Sser and t′ ∈ S′:
R(t, t′) = t′.
Proof. Let R⊗ be the accessibility relation and V ⊗ the valuation in (M ⊗
U′′).
atoms: For an arbitrary relevant atom p: (t, t′) ∈ V ⊗(p) iff (M, t) |=
post′′(t′)(p), and by definition of post′′ we have that (M, t) |= post′′(t′)(p)
iff t′ ∈ V ′(p). Irrelevant atoms do not change value.















⊗(a) follows (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R
′(a). By definition of R we














′(a). As M ser is serial for a,
and t1 ∈ S
ser, there must be a t2 such that (t1, t2) ∈ R(a). As (M, t2) |=
∨
t∈dom(M ser) δ(M,t) (because t2 is one of those t) we have that (t2, t
′
2) ∈

















Note that we keep the states outside the serial submodel M ser out of the
bisimulation. Without the seriality constraint the ‘back’ condition of the










but where t1 has no outgoing arrow for a, the required a-accessible pair
from (t1, t
′
1) does not exist. A special case of Proposition 3.2 is the corollary
already referred to during the initial two-step construction, that achieves
even isomorphy:
Corollary 3.3. Given (M, s), (M ′, s′), and U′r as above. Assume that M
is a bisimulation contraction. Then (M ⊗ U′r)
∼= M ′.
Proof. In this special case we have that (t, t′) ∈ dom(M ⊗ U′r) iff (M, t) |=
pre′(t′) iff (M, t) |= δ(M,s) for the point s of (M, s). As the last is only the
case when t = s (as M is a bisimulation contraction), we end up with a
domain consisting of all pairs (s, t′) for all t′ ∈ S′, a 1-1-correspondence.
The bisimulation R above becomes the isomorphism I(s, t′) = t′. q.e.d.
A different wording of Proposition 3.2 is that for arbitrary finite epis-
temic states (M, s) and (M ′, s′) also satisfying the serial submodel con-
straint, there is an update (U, e) transforming the first into the second. A
final appealing way to formulate this result is:
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Corollary 3.4. Given are a finite epistemic state (M, s) and a satisfiable
formula ϕ. If all agents occurring in ϕ have non-trivial beliefs in state s
of M , then there is an update realizing ϕ, i.e., there is a (U, e) such that
(M, s) |= 〈U, e〉ϕ.
Using completeness of the logic, this further implies that all consistent
formulas can be realized in any given finite model. We find this result both
weak and strong: it is strong because any conceivable (i.e., using the same
propositional letters and set of agents) formal specification can be made
true whatever the initial information state. At the same time, it is weak:
the current information state does apparently not give any constraints on
future developments of the system, or, in the opposite direction, any clue
on the sequence of events resulting in it; the ability to change the value of
atomic propositions arbitrarily gives too much freedom. Of course, if one
restricts the events to specific protocols (such as legal game moves [15], and
for a more general treatment see [11]), the amount of change is constrained.
AGM belief revision and belief update. Our results on arbitrary belief
change seem related to the postulate of success in AGM belief revision [1].
AGM belief revision corresponds to epistemic change, and AGM (in their
terminology) belief update [27] corresponds to ontic change (unfortunately,
in the AGM community ‘update’ means something far more specific than
what we mean by that term). Given this correspondence we can achieve only
expansion by epistemic change, and not proper revision; and the combina-
tion of ontic and epistemic change can be seen as a way to make belief update
result in belief revision. Apart from this obvious interpretation of epistemic
and ontic change, one can also view our result that all consistent formulas
can be realized, differently: a consequence of this is that for arbitrary con-
sistent ϕ and ψ there is an update (U, e) such that [a]ϕ → 〈U, e〉[a]ψ. In
AGM terms: if ϕ is believed, then there is a way to revise that into belief of
ψ, regardless of whether ϕ∧ψ is consistent or not. In other words: revision
with ψ is always successful. That suggests that our way of achieving that
result by combining epistemic and ontic change might somehow simulate
standard AGM belief revision. Unfortunately it is immediately clear that
we allow far too much freedom for the other AGM postulates to be fulfilled.
It is clearly not a minimal change, for example. So walking further down
this road seems infeasible.
3.2 Postconditions true and false only
The postconditions for propositional atoms can be entirely simulated by
the postconditions true or false for propositional atoms. For a simple exam-
ple, the public assignment p := ϕ can be simulated by a two-point update
e——A——f (i.e., a nondeterministic event where all agents in A cannot
distinguish e from f) such that pre(e) = ϕ, post(e)(p) = ⊤, pre(f) = ¬ϕ,
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post(f)(p) = ⊥. In the public assignment (p := ϕ, q := ψ) to two atoms p
and q we would need a four-point update to simulate it, to distinguish all
four ways to combine the values of two independent atoms.
The general construction consists of doing likewise in every event e of
an update model. For each e we make as many copies as the cardinality of
the powerset of the range of the postcondition associated with that event.
Below, the set {0, 1}dom(post(e)) represents that powerset.
Definition 3.5 (Update model U⊤⊥). Given is an update model U = (E,




e∈E{(e, f) | f ∈ {0, 1}
dom(post(e))}
• ((e, f), (e′, f ′)) ∈ R⊤⊥(a) iff (e, e′) ∈ R(a)





• post⊤⊥(e, f)(p) =
{
⊤ if f(p) = 1
⊥ if f(p) = 0
Proposition 3.6. Given an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ) and an update
model U = (E,R, pre, post) with normal update model U⊤⊥ defined as above.
Then (M ⊗ U) ↔ (M ⊗ U⊤⊥).
Proof. We show that the relation R : (M ⊗ U) ↔ (M ⊗ U⊤⊥) defined as
((s, e), (s, e, f)) ∈ R iff (M, s) |= pre⊤⊥(e, f)
is a bisimulation. Below, the accessibility relations in (M⊗U) and (M⊗U⊤⊥)
are also written as R(a).
atoms
Let (s, e, f) be a state in the domain of (M ⊗U⊤⊥). We have to show
that for all atoms p, (M, s) |= post(e)(p) ↔ post⊤⊥(e, f)(p). From the
definition of post⊤⊥ it follows that
post⊤⊥(e, f)(p) iff f(p) = 1 .
From (M, s) |= pre⊤⊥(e, f) and the definition of pre⊤⊥ follows that
(M, s) |= post(e)(p) iff f(p) = 1 .
Therefore
(M, s) |= post(e)(p) ↔ post⊤⊥(e, f)(p) .
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forth
Assume that ((s, e), (s′, e′)) ∈ R(a) and that ((s, e), (s, e, f)) ∈ R. Let
f ′ : dom(post(e′)) → {0, 1} be the function such that
f ′(p) =
{
1 if (M, s′) |= post(e′)(p)
0 otherwise
Therefore (M, s′) |= pre⊤⊥(e′, f ′). Therefore ((s′, e′), (s′, e′, f ′)) ∈ R.
From ((s, e), (s′, e′)) ∈ R⊤⊥(a) follows (s, s′) ∈ R(a) and (e, e′) ∈
R(a). From (e, e′) ∈ R(a) and the definition of access R⊤⊥ follows
((e, f), (e′, f ′)) ∈ R⊤⊥(a). From (s, s′) ∈ R(a) and ((e, f), (e′, f ′)) ∈
R⊤⊥(a) follows ((s, e, f), (s′, e′, f ′)) ∈ R(a).
back
Suppose ((s, e), (s, e, f)) ∈ R and (s, e, f), (s′, e′, f ′) ∈ R(a). From the
last follows (s, s′) ∈ R(a) and ((e, f), (e′, f ′)) ∈ R⊤⊥(a), therefore also
(e, e′) ∈ R(a). Therefore ((s, e), (s, e′)) ∈ R(a). Just as in the case of
forth it is established that ((s′, e′), (s′, e′, f ′)) ∈ R.
q.e.d.
Corollary 3.7. The logic of change with postconditions true and false only
is equally expressive as the logic of change with arbitrary postconditions.
Although it is therefore possible to use postconditions true and false only,
this is highly unpractical in modelling actual situations: the descriptions of
updates become cumbersome and lengthy, and lack intuitive appeal.
A transformation result similar to that in Proposition 3.6 can not be
established for the logic with only singleton update models, i.e., the logic of
public announcements and public assignments (as in [28]). If public assign-
ments could only be to true and to false, then updates with assignments
always result in models wherein the assigned atoms are true throughout the
model, or false throughout the model. Therefore, there is no transforma-
tion of, e.g., p——¬p into p——¬p using public assignments and public
announcements only. The construction above results in a two-event update
model, that is not a singleton.
A transformation result as in Proposition 3.6 immediately gives an ex-
pressivity result as in Corollary 3.7 for the languages concerned. It is also
tempting to see such a transformation result as a different kind of expres-
sivity result. In two-sorted languages such as the one we consider in this
paper one can then distinguish between the expressivity of two kinds of syn-
tactic objects. A formula (ϕ) corresponds to a class of models that satisfy
that formula, and a modality (α) corresponds to a relation on the class of
models. The result is stated in terms of the expressivity of formulas, but
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it is also a result about the expressivity of modalities. These two kinds of
expressivity are not necessarily linked. One can have logics with the same
expressivity of formulas, that have different expressivity of modalities and
vice versa.
3.3 Single assignments only
Consider the update model e——a——f for a single agent a and for two
atoms p1 and p2 such that in e, if ϕ1 then p1 := ϕ2 and p2 := ϕ3, and in f,
if ϕ4 then p1 := ϕ5 and p2 := ϕ6. Can we also do the assignments one by
one? In other words, does this update correspond to a sequence of updates
consisting of events g in which at most one atom is assigned a value: the
cardinality of dom(g) is at most 1. This is possible! First we ‘store’ the value
(in a given model (M, s) wherein this update is executed) of all preconditions
and postconditions in fresh atomic variables, by public assignments. This
can be in arbitrary order, so we do it in the order of the ϕi. This is the
sequence of six public assignments q1 := ϕ1, q2 := ϕ2, q3 := ϕ3, q4 := ϕ4,
q5 := ϕ5, and q6 := ϕ6. Note that such public assignments do not change the
structure of the underlying model. Next we execute the original update but
without postconditions. This is e′——a——f′ with pre(e′) = pre(e) = ϕ1
and pre(f′) = pre(f) = ϕ4 and with post(e
′) = post(f′) = id. Note that
q1 remains true whenever e
′ was executed, because q1 was set to be true
whenever ϕ1 was true, the precondition of both e and e
′. Similarly, q4
remains true whenever f′ was executed. We have now arrived at the final
structure of the model, just not at the proper valuations of atoms.
Finally, the postconditions are set to their required value, conditional to
the execution of the event with which they are associated. Agent a must
not be aware of those conditions (the agent cannot distinguish between e′
and f′). Therefore we cannot model this as a public action. The way out of
our predicament is a number of two-event update models, namely one for
each postcondition of each event in the original update. One of these two
events has as its precondition the fresh atom associated with an event in
the original update, and the other event its negation, and agent a cannot
distinguish between both. The four required updates are
• e1—a—e
′
1 with in e1, if q1 then p2 := q2 and in e
′
1, if ¬q1 then id
• e2—a—e
′
2 with in e2, if q1 then p3 := q3 and in e
′
2, if ¬q1 then id
• e3—a—e
′
3 with in e3, if q4 then p5 := q5 and in e
′
3, if ¬q4 then id
• e4—a—e
′
4 with in e4, if q4 then p6 := q6 and in e
′
4, if ¬q4 then id
Now, we are done. These four final updates do not change the structure of
the model, when executed. Therefore, now having set the postconditions
right, the composition of all these constructs is isomorphic to the original
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update model! The general construction is very much as in this simple
example.
Definition 3.8 (Update model Uone). Given an update model U = (E,R,
pre, post), update model Uone is the composition of the following update
models: First perform Σe∈E|dom(post(e)) + 1| public assignments for fresh
variables q, . . . , namely for each e ∈ E, qe0 := pre(e), and for all p1, . . . , pn ∈
dom(post(e)), qe1 := post(e)(p1), . . . , q
e
n := post(e)(pn). Then execute U but
with identity (‘trivial’) postconditions, i.e., execute U′ = (E,R, pre, post′)
with post′(e) = id for all e ∈ E. Finally, execute Σe∈E|dom(post(e))| two-
event update models with universal access for all agents wherein for each
event just one of its postconditions is set to its required value, by way of the
auxiliary atoms. For example, for e ∈ E as above the first executed update
is e1——A——e2 with in e1, if q
e
0, then p1 := q
e
1, and in e2, if ¬q
e
0 then id.
The following proposition will be clear without proof:
Proposition 3.9. Given epistemic model M and update model U exe-
cutable in M . Then Uone is isomorphic to U, and (M ⊗ Uone) is isomorphic
to (M ⊗ U).
This result brings our logic closer to the proposals in [5, 16] wherein
only one atom is simultaneously assigned a value. The relation to other
proposals will be discussed in Section 5.
4 Card game actions
In this section we apply the logic to model multi-agent system dynamics
in the general settings of various game actions for card players, such as
showing, drawing, and swapping cards. The precise description of card
game dynamics is a prerequisite to compute optimal strategies to play such
games [13, 18]. Card deals are also frequently used as standard represen-
tation for cryptographic bit exchange protocols [22, 34], where communica-
tions/transmissions should from our current perspective be seen as public
announcements and/or assignments.
Consider a deck of two Wheat, two Flax, and two Rye cards (w, x, y).
Wheat, Flax and Rye are called the commodities. Three players Anne, Bill,
and Cath (a, b, and c) each draw two cards from the stack. Initially, given
a deal of cards, it is common knowledge what the deck of cards is, that all
players hold two cards, and that all players (only) know their own cards.
For the card deal where Anne holds a Wheat and a Flax card, Bill a Wheat
and a Rye card, and Cath a Flax and a Rye card, we write wx.wy.xy, and
so on. As the cards in one’s hand are unordered, wx.wy.xy is the same deal
of cards as xw.wy.xy, but for improved readability we will always list cards
in a hand in alphabetical order. There are certain game actions that result




















Figure 2. On the left is the game state after the cards have been dealt and
Anne received Wheat and Flax, Bill received Wheat and Rye, and Cath received
Flax and Rye. On the right is part of the game state that results if Anne trades
her Wheat card for Bill’s Rye card: only states resulting from trading Wheat for
Wheat, and (what really happened) Wheat for Rye, are present. The actual deal
of cards is underlined. In the figures, assume reflexivity and transitivity of access.
The dotted lines suggest that some states are indistinguishable for Cath from yet
other states but not present in the picture.
in players exchanging cards. This is called trading of the corresponding
commodities. Players attempt to get two cards of the same suit. That is
called establishing a corner in a commodity. Subject to game rules that are
non-essential for our exposition, the first player to declare a corner in any
commodity, wins the game. For example, given deal wx.wy.xy, after Anne
swaps her Wheat card for Bill’s Rye card, Bill achieves a corner in Wheat,
and wins. Of course, players can already achieve a corner when the cards
are dealt. This six-card scenario is a simplification of the ‘Pit’ card game
that simulates the trading pit of a stock exchange [31, 13, 15]; the full game
consists of 74 cards: 8 commodities of each 9 cards, and two special cards.
An initial game state wherein players only know their own cards and
nobody has won the game yet, can be modelled as an epistemic state. There
are six such card deals. Assume that the actual deal is wx.wy.xy. The
(hexagonally shaped) epistemic state (Pit, wx.wy.xy) in Figure 2 pictures
what players know about each other. All six card deals have to occur to
describe the epistemic information present, e.g., Anne cannot distinguish
actual deal wx.wy.xy from deal wx.xy.wy, the other deal wherein Anne
holds Wheat and Flax. But if the deal had been wx.xy.wy, Bill could not
have distinguished that deal from wy.xy.wx, wherein Anne holds Wheat and
Rye. Therefore, Anne considers it possible that Bill considers it possible
that she holds Rye, even though this is actually not the case.
The event wherein Anne and Bill swap one of their cards involves both
epistemic and ontic change. Assume that, given deal wx.wy.xy,
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Anne swaps her Wheat card for Bill’s Rye card.
This informal description is not specific enough to be modelled as an update.
In the first place, the role of Cath in the event is not specified. The event
where Cath is unaware of the swap taking place, is different from the event
where Cath observes the swap and where all agents are commonly aware
of this. If Cath had been unaware of the event, she would be mistaken
about the actual state of the world. For example, she would incorrectly still
believe that neither Anne nor Bill has a corner in a commodity, whereas
Bill holds two Wheat cards after the trade (and we assume that he has not
yet so declared). It is hard to conceive of such a scenario as a game: even
in imperfect information games, such as Pit, a basic condition of fairness
must be fulfilled for players to be able to act rationally. This means that
all events should at least be partially observable, and that ‘what actually
happened’ should be considered a possibility for all players. We therefore
assume, for now, that Cath learns that Anne and Bill swap one of their
cards, but not which card it is. (The ‘private swap’ will be modelled later,
as another example.)
Anne and Bill’s roles in the event are also underspecified. Anne may
knowingly choose a card to hand to Bill (the obvious interpretation), or
blindly draw one of her cards to hand to Bill. The latter is not obvious,
given this description, but becomes more so if we see it as Bill drawing
(therefore blindly) one of Anne’s cards. For now, assume the obvious. An-
other specification issue is that we may think of Bill as receiving Anne’s
Wheat card facedown and only then, in a subsequent action, picking it up.
From our modelling perspective, Bill already can be said to own the card
after he has been handed it, but before he has picked it up he does not yet
know that he owns it. We first assume that players immediately ‘see’ the
card they are being traded (in this case maybe not the most obvious choice,
but the simplest one to model). In other words: Anne and Bill jointly learn
the new ownership of both cards.
To describe this multi-agent system and its dynamics, assume a propo-
sitional language for three agents a, b, c and with atoms una expressing that
Anne holds n cards of suit u. For example, w2a expresses that Anne holds
two Wheat cards. In the event where Anne and Bill swap Wheat for Rye,
Anne gets one less Wheat card, Bill gets one more Wheat card, Bill gets
one less Rye card, and Anne gets one more Rye card. In the update model
we have to distinguish separate events for each card deal wherein this swap
can take place, i.e., corresponding to wx.wy.xy, wx.xy.wy, and wy.xy.wx
(in general this depends on a feature of the local states of the card swapping
agents only, namely for both agents on the number of Wheat and Rye cards
in their hands, in this specific case that information is sufficient to determine
the entire card deal). In case the card deal is wx.wy.xy the precondition
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and postcondition are







w1a := ⊥ and w
0
a := ⊤ and w
1
b := ⊥ and w
2
b := ⊤
and y0a := ⊥ and y
1
a := ⊤ and y
1
b := ⊥ and y
0
b := ⊤.
We name this event swapwx.wy.xyab (w, y). If two cards of the same suit
are swapped, a simpler description is sufficient. For example, the event
wherein Anne and Bill swap Wheat given deal wx.wy.xy is described as
swapwx.wy.xyab (w,w) with (the same) precondition and (empty) postcondi-
tion






b ), then ∅.
From the point of view of an actual card deal, there are always four
different ways to exchange a single card, namely for each agent either the
one or the other card. All of these are clearly different for Anne and Bill,
because they either give or receive a different card (we assumed that they
know which card they give and see which card they receive). None of these
are different for Cath. For different card deals, card swapping events are
indistinguishable if those deals were indistinguishable. For example, the
event where (Anne and Bill swap Wheat and Rye given wx.wy.xy) is in-
distinguishable for Anne from the event where (Anne and Bill swap Wheat
and Rye given wx.xy.wy), because card deals wx.wy.xy and wx.xy.wy are
the same for Anne.
Therefore, the update model for Anne swapping her Wheat card for
Bill’s Rye card consists of 24 events. The preconditions and postconditions
of the events are as above. The accessibility relations are defined as, for
deals d, d′ ∈ dom(Pit) = {wx.wy.xy, wx.xy.wy, . . . } and cards q, q′, q1, q
′
1 ∈







1)) ∈ R(a) iff (d, d







1)) ∈ R(b) iff (d, d







1)) ∈ R(c) iff (d, d
′) ∈ R(c)
We name the update model Swap. The event of Anne and Bill swapping
Wheat for Rye has therefore been modelled as update (Swap, swapdab(w, y)).
The result of executing this update model in epistemic state (Pit, wx.wy.xy)
has the same structure as the update model, as the preconditions are unique
for a given state, and as access between events in the update model copies
that in the epistemic state. It has been partially visualized in Figure 2.
An intuitive way to see the update and the resulting structure in Fig-
ure 2, is as a restricted product of the Pit model and nine card swapping
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events swap(q, q1), namely for each combination of the three different cards.
Figure 2 then shows just two of those copies, namely for swap(w, y) and
swap(w,w). For example, the event swap(w, y) ‘stands for’ the three events
swapwx.wy.xyab (w, y), swap
wy.xy.wx
ab (w, y), and swap
wx.xy.wy
ab (w, y).
Why did we not define such swap(q, q1) as updates in their own right, in
the first place? Although intuitive, this is not supported by our modelling
language. We would like to say that the postconditions are ‘Anne gets
one less Wheat card, and Bill gets one more Wheat card,’ and similarly
for Rye. But instead, we only can demand that in case Bill already had a
Wheat card (extra precondition), then he now has two, etc. Incidentally, we
can also add non-deterministic choice to the update language by notational
abbreviation, as [α ∪ β]ϕ ↔ ([α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ) (this corresponds to taking the
union of the epistemic state transformations induced by α and β). We
can then define, in the update language, swap(w, y) = swapwx.wy.xyab (w, y)∪
swapwy.xy.wxab (w, y) ∪ swap
wx.xy.wy
ab (w, y).
The case where Anne does not choose her card but Bill blindly draws
one of Anne’s can also be modelled as an update. The accessibility for Anne






1)) ∈ R(a) iff (d, d
′) ∈ R(a) and q′ = q′1
This is somewhat counterintuitive when we still suppose that Anne observes
which card she receives from Bill. (We’d have to imagine Bill blindly draw-
ing one of Anne’s cards, Anne putting her remaining card facedown on the
table, and receiving the card Bill gives her faceup.) A more realistic setting
is then that Bill draws one of Anne’s card and ‘pushes the card he gives
to Anne facedown towards her’. At that stage Anne can already be said
to own the card, but not yet to know that. All four swapping actions for
a given deal are indistinguishable for Anne (as they were and still are for
Cath).
Yet another event is where Anne chooses a card to show to Bill, and






1)) ∈ R(a) iff (d, d
′) ∈ R(a) and q = q1
Obviously, all these variables can be applied to Bill as well.
Picking up a card. The action of picking up a card after it has been
handed to you, has another description (see, using another dialect of the
language, [15]). One aspect is interesting to observe in the current context.
Imagine that given deal wx.wy.xy after Anne and Bill swapping Wheat and
Rye, Bill receives the card facedown in the following way: after having laid
down his remaining card (a Wheat card) facedown on the table, Anne puts
her Wheat card facedown on top of it or under it in a way that Bill cannot
110 H. van Ditmarsch, B. Kooi
see that. He now picks up his two cards. How does Bill know which of
the two Wheat cards that he then holds, is the received card? He does not
know, but he does not care either. By looking at his cards after the swap,
he effectively learns that he holds two Wheat cards (which was already true
after having received the card), and after that event he then knows that he
holds two Wheat cards. A neat way to express that he learns the suit of the
card he received, is to say that there is a suit for which he learns to have
one more card than he knows. This makes sense in the general Pit game
setting wherein one only is allowed to trade a certain number of cards of
the same suit. This is formalized in our setting by an update (U, e) with an
event with precondition pre(e) = w2b ∧¬[b]w
2
b (and empty postcondition), as
a result of which Bill then knows to hold two Wheat cards, i.e., [U, e][b]w2b .
Private swap. The event where Anne and Bill swap Wheat for Rye but
where Cath is unaware of the event is modelled by a four-event update with
events swapwx.wy.xyab (w, y), swap
wy.wx.xy
ab (w, y), swap
wx.wy.xy
ab (w, y) and skip,
such that for Anne and Bill access among the swap events is as already dis-
cussed (including all variations), but where ‘Cath thinks nothing happens’:
for the deals d in the three swap events: (swapdab(w, y), skip) ∈ R(c), and
(skip, skip) ∈ R(a), R(b), R(c).
5 Comparison to other approaches
Action model logic. Dynamic modal operators for ontic change, in ad-
dition to similar operators for epistemic change, have been suggested in
various recent publications. As far as we know it was first mentioned by
Baltag, Moss, and Solecki as a possible extension to their action model logic
(for epistemic change), in [5]. This was by example only and without a
language or a logic. A precise quotation of all these authors say on ontic
change may be in order:
Our second extension concerns the move from actions as we have been
working them to actions which change the truth values of atomic sen-
tences. If we make this move, then the axiom of Atomic Permanence5
is no longer sound. However, it is easy to formulate the relevant ax-
ioms. For example, if we have an action α which effects the change
p := p∧¬q, then we would take an axiom [α]p ↔ (PRE(α) → p∧¬q).
Having made these changes, all the rest of the work we have done goes
through. In this way, we get a completeness theorem for this logic. [5,
p. 24]
The logic that we present here is a realization of their proposal, and we
can confidently confirm that the authors were correct in observing that
“all the rest (. . . ) goes through”. To obtain such theoretical results the
5 I.e., [α]p ↔ (PRE(α) → p), [5, p. 15].
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notion of simultaneous postconditions (assignments) for a finite subset of
atomic propositional letters is essential; this feature is not present in [5]
(but introduced in [20]).
In a later proposal by Baltag [2] a fact changing action flipP is proposed
that changes (‘flips’) the truth value of an atom P , with accompanying
axioms (for the proper correspondent action α resembling a single-pointed
action model) [α]p ↔ (pre(α) → ¬p) if “p changes value (flips) in α”, and
otherwise [α]p↔ (pre(α) → p) [2, p. 29]. The approach is restricted to ontic
change where the truth value of atoms flips. In the concluding section of
[2], the author defers the relation of this proposal to a general logic of ontic
and epistemic change to the future.
Recent work in dynamic epistemics. More recently, in a Multi-Agent
Systems application-driven line of research [16, 15] assignments are added
to the relational action language of [12] but without providing an axiomati-
zation. In this setting only change of knowledge is modelled and not change
of belief, i.e., such actions describe transformation of S5 models only, such
as Kripke models corresponding to interpreted systems.
A line of research culminating in Logics of communication and change
[10] also combines epistemic and ontic change. It provides a more expressive
setting for logical dynamics than our approach. The logic presented here
is a sublogic of LCC. In [10] the focus is on obtaining completeness via
so-called reduction axioms for dynamic epistemic logics, by extending the
basic modal system to PDL. Our treatment of postconditions, also called
substitutions, stems from [20]. In the current paper we focus on specific
semantic results, and, as said, we use a dynamic epistemic ‘dialect’, not full
PDL.
A recent contribution on combining public ontic and epistemic change,
including detailed expressivity results for different combinations of static
and dynamic modalities, is found in [28]. Our work uses a similar approach
to ontic events but describes more complex than public events: the full
generality of arbitrarily complex events involves exchange of cards among
subgroups of the public, and other events with a ‘private’ (as opposed to
public) character.
Finally, a general dynamic modal logic is presented in [33], where ontic
changes are also studied. The semantics of this logic uses tree-like struc-
tures, and fixed points are introduced in the language to be able to reason
about updates.
Belief revision. An independent recent line of investigation combining
epistemic with ontic change arises from the belief revision community. Mod-
elling belief revision, i.e., epistemic change, by dynamic operators is an old
idea going back to Van Benthem [7]. In fact, this is one of the two original
publications—together with [32]—that starts the area of dynamic epistemic
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logic. For an overview of such matters see [3, 14, 17]. But modelling on-
tic change—known as belief update [27]—in a similar, dynamic modal, way,
including its interaction with epistemic change, is only a recent focus of on-
going research by Herzig and collaborators and other researchers based at
the Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT) [25, 26, 29].
Their work sees the execution of an event as so-called progression of infor-
mation, and reasoning from a final information state to a sequence of events
realizing it as regression—the last obviously relates to planning. The focus
of progression and regression is the change of the theory describing the in-
formation state, i.e., the set of all true, or believed, formulas. As already
mentioned in Section 3, the results for arbitrary belief change in Proposi-
tion 3.2 and following corollaries can potentially be applied to model belief
update in the AGM tradition.
Interpreted systems. In a way, dynamic epistemic logics that combine
epistemic and ontic change reinvent results already obtained in the inter-
preted systems community by way of knowledge-based programs [30, 21]:
in that setting, ontic and epistemic change are integrated. Let us point out
some correspondences and differences, using the setting of van der Mey-
den’s [30]. This work investigates the implementation of knowledge-based
programs. The transition induced by an update between epistemic states,
in our approach, corresponds exactly to a step in a run in an interpreted
system that is the implementation of a knowledge-based program; the rela-
tion between both is explicit in van der Meyden’s notion of the progression
structure. Now the dynamic epistemic approach is both more general and
more restrictive than the interpreted systems approach. It is more restric-
tive because dynamic epistemics assumes perfect recall and synchronicity.
This assumption is implicit: it is merely a consequence of taking a state
transition induced by an update as primitive. But the dynamic epistemic
approach is also somewhat more general: it does not assume that accessibil-
ity relations for agents are equivalence relations, as in interpreted systems.
In other words, it can also be used to model other epistemic notions than
knowledge, such as introspective belief and even weaker notions.
Knowledge-based programs consist of joint actions 〈ae, a1, . . . , an〉 where
ae is an action of the environment and where a1, . . . , an are simultaneous
actions by the agents 1 to n. An agent a acts according to conditions of
the form ‘if ϕ′ do a′, if ϕ′′ do a′′, . . . ’ etc. Let us overlook the aspect that
conditions ϕ′ have the form of known formulas (by agent a). Still, such
statements look familiar to our alternative format for what goes on in an
event, as in ‘for event e: if ϕ, then p1 := ψ1, . . . , and pn := ψn.’ (see
after Definition 2.4 on page 91). This correspondence is not really there,
but the similar format is still revealing. The different cases in a knowledge-
based program are like the different events in an update model, and they
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equally express non-determinism. This is a correspondence. There are also
differences. In dynamic epistemics, the condition ϕ in ‘if ϕ, then p1 := ψ1,
. . . ’ is both an executability precondition and an observation. Inasmuch
as it is an observation, it determines agent knowledge. In the interpreted
systems approach, observations are (with of course reason) modelled as
different from preconditions. The assignments such as p1 := ψ1 in the ‘then’
part of event descriptions are merely the ontic part of that event, with the
‘if’ part describing the epistemic part. Epistemic and ontic features together
correspond to actions such as a′ in ‘if ϕ′ do a′’. In the interpreted systems
approach, epistemic and ontic features of information change are therefore
not separately modelled, as in our approach.
6 Further research
An unresolved issue is whether updates can be described as compositions of
purely epistemic events (preconditions only) and purely ontic events (post-
conditions only). In [25] it is shown for public events, for a different logical
(more PDL-like) setting. Such a result would be in the line of our other
normalization results, and facilitate comparison to related approaches. The
result in Section 3.1 seems to suggest this is possible, since a transition from
one epistemic model to another is achieved by an epistemic event followed
by an ontic event. However, the method described in Section 3.1 is geared
towards the original epistemic model. We would like a decomposition that
is based solely on the update, which would work regardless of the particular
epistemic model to which it is applied.
The logic can be applied to describe cryptographic bit exchange proto-
cols, including protocols where keys change hands or are being sent between
agents. The logic is very suitable for the description of protocols for com-
putationally unlimited agents, such as described in the cited [22, 34]. Using
dynamic logics may be an advantage given the availability of model check-
ing tools for such logics, as e.g., the very versatile epistemic model checker
DEMO [19] by van Eijck. The current version of DEMO only allows epis-
temic events. But van Eijck and collaborators are in the process of extending
DEMO with assignments (postconditions), needed to model events that are
both epistemic and ontic.
Our more fine-grained analysis of events may contribute to the descrip-
tion and verification of more complex protocols that also include non-public
events. An example that demonstrates the applicability of the logic to the
analysis of such protocols is the (solution of the) ‘one hundred prisoners and
a light bulb’ riddle (see e.g., [35]), of which we have a detailed analysis in
preparation that we consider of independent interest.
The results for ‘arbitrary belief change’ suggest yet another possibly
promising direction. Under certain conditions arbitrary formulas are real-
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izable. What formulas are still realizable if one restricts the events to those
considered suitable for specific problem areas, such as forms of multi-agent
planning? And given a desirable formula (a ‘postcondition’ in another sense
of the word), what are the initial conditions such that a sequence of events
realizes it? This is the relation to AI problems concerning regression as
pointed out in the introductory section [25], and also to reasoning given
specific protocols, such as always has been the emphasis for knowledge-
based programs in the interpreted systems community [21], and as recently
investigated in [11] in a dynamic epistemic context.
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Abstract
We extend our work that uses atl to reason about social laws. In
a system with social laws, every agent is supposed to refrain from
performing certain forbidden actions. Rather than assuming that all
agents abide to the law, we reason about what happens if certain
agents do, i.e., they act socially, while others don’t. In particular, we
are interested in the strategic abilities, under such mixed conditions.
We also compare our approach with one in which labels are added to
atl that record whether agents behaved socially or not.
1 Introduction
A multiagent system [15] on the one hand aims at treating the agents as
autonomous entities, whose behaviour should not be over-specified or too
constrained, while at the same time one wants this system to achieve, or
maintain certain objectives. As a consequence, one of the defining prob-
lems in multiagent systems research is that of coordination—managing the
interdependencies between the actions of multiple interacting agents [1, 15].
There are broadly two techniques to approach this. Online techniques aim
to equip agents with the ability to dynamically coordinate their activities,
for example by explicitly reasoning about coordination at run-time. In con-
trast, offline techniques aim at developing a coordination regime at design-
time, and hardwiring this regime into a system for use at run-time. There
are arguments in favour of both approaches: the former is potentially more
flexible, and may be more robust against unanticipated events, while the
latter approach benefits from offline reasoning about coordination, thereby
reducing the run-time decision-making burden on agents [15].
One prominent approach to “offline” coordination is the social laws
paradigm, introduced largely through the work of Shoham, Tennenholtz,
and Moses [12, 11, 13, 14]. A social law can be understood as a set of rules
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 119–151.
120 W. van der Hoek, M. Roberts, M. Wooldridge
imposed upon a multiagent system with the goal of ensuring that some de-
sirable global behaviour will result. Social laws work by constraining the
behaviour of the agents in the system—by forbidding agents from perform-
ing certain actions in certain circumstances. Limiting the agents’ abilities
as this may sound, this may also open new opportunities for them: assum-
ing that other agents abide to the norms, may imply that an individual can
in fact achieve more. Shoham and others investigated a number of issues
surrounding the development and use of social laws, including the computa-
tional complexity of their synthesis, and the possibility of the development
of social laws or conventions by the agents within the system themselves.
In [5], we extended this social laws framework. In particular, we argued
that Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) provides a rich and natural
technical framework within which to investigate social laws and their prop-
erties. In this framework, a social law consists of two parts: an objective
of the law, written as an atl specification, and a behavioural constraint,
which is a function that for every action returns the set of states where
that action is forbidden from being performed. The objective of the law
represents what the society aims to achieve by adopting the law, and the
behavioural constraint corresponds to the requirements that the law places
on the members of society. In [4] we then added an epistemic flavour to this
atl-based approach to social laws, enabling one not only to express that
an agent should behave in certain ways given his information, but also that
certain information should emerge by following a social law.
In this paper we extend our social laws framework further. In our pre-
vious work [5, 4], it is assumed that once social laws are imposed on the
system, all the agents will abide by these laws. However, this does not seem
to be the most realistic way of modelling social laws. Certainly in human
societies, just because laws are imposed does not mean that all members
of the society will follow these laws. In this paper we do away with the
need for this assumption and give agents the choice of whether to follow
these laws or not. We make a distinction between agents acting physically
and agents acting socially. Acting physically—we use this in lack of a bet-
ter term we know—corresponds to performing any action that is physically
possible to be performed, in the sense of being possible by the system de-
scription. Acting socially then corresponds to performing any action from a
subset of these physical actions, known as the social actions. Social actions
are those that are consistent with the social laws imposed on the system.
An example scenario is in the case of traffic laws. Traffic lights are used
to coordinate the flow of traffic on our roads to ensure no collisions occur
when cars cross each other’s paths. Cars are only allowed to move from the
traffic lights when the light is green. Acting socially (and physically) would
correspond to only moving when the lights are green. However, acting phys-
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ically (but not socially) could correspond to moving when the lights are red.
This would be an illegal action, but still a physically possible action. It is
important to note that all social actions are also physically possible actions.
Agents now have both physical and social strategies, where the set of
social strategies is always a subset of the physical strategies. So after giving
the agents these extra possibilities, we need to extend the logic to be able to
reason about whether an agent or coalition of agents is able to act socially
or physically (of course if an agent is able to act physically, this agent can
choose to only perform social strategies if it desires). We introduce two
logical languages: in Social atl (satl), one can express properties like the
following: “Even if the coalition abides by the laws, and all the other agents
neglect them, our coalition can achieve a particular temporal property”,
and in Social atel (satel) one can also refer to informational attitudes of
the agents, like in: “the server knows that, where all the clients are act-
ing socially, then eventually each granted write-permission will terminate”.
Finally, we investigate an alternative approach for expressing properties of
systems that refer to whether the agents are acting socially or physically.
Rather than using the logical language, Social atl, we see to what extent
we can capture the same notions using only atl and atl?.
This paper is structured as follows: We first introduce the semantic
structures that our model is based on. We call these Social Action-based
Alternating (Epistemic) Transition Systems (saaets and saats). We then
introduce our logical languages, Social atel and Social atl, and give its
semantics. In Section 4 we introduce a case study known as the Alternat-
ing Bit Protocol and go on to investigate various interesting properties of
this model. In Section 5 we try to capture similar properties in an alterna-
tive framework and find direct equivalences between the two. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 Semantic Structures
In this section we introduce the semantic structures our model is based
upon. The structures we use are called Social Action-Based Alternating
Epistemic Transition Systems (saaetss). Our structures are most similar
to the aaetss we introduced in [4]. However, our structures differ from those
in several ways. Instead of having one action pre-condition function, ρ, we
now have both a physical action precondition function, ρ, and a legal action
precondition function, `. Also, where the emphasis in [5] is on implementing
a social law on a system, we do not consider such updates: rather, we assume
the ` function is given, constraining the set of possible transitions, and we
are not concerned about which social goal or objective such constraints are
supposed to achieve. Rather, this framework is used to investigate social
laws at the system level. Hence the system designer is able to see which
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properties hold depending on who follows the social laws.
Formally, an saaets is a (2n+ 8)-tuple
〈Q, q0,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn,∼1, . . . ,∼n, ρ, `, τ,Φ, π〉 where
• Q is a finite, non-empty set of states;
• q0 ∈ Q is the designated initial state of the system;
• Ag = {1, . . . , n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• Aci is a finite, non-empty set of actions, for each i ∈ Ag, where Aci ∩
Acj = ∅ for all i 6= j ∈ Ag. With AcAg we mean the set of all
actions: AcAg =
⋃
i∈Ag Aci. Moreover, JAg is the set of joint actions
j = 〈a1, . . . , an〉, with action ji = ai in Aci (i ≤ n);
• ∼i ⊆ Q×Q is an epistemic accessibility relation for each agent i ∈ Ag.
Each ∼i must be an equivalence relation.
• ρ : AcAg → 2Q is a physical action precondition function, which for
each action α ∈ AcAg defines the set of states ρ(α) from which α may
be physically performed; and,
• ` : AcAg → 2Q is a legal action precondition function, which for each
action α ∈ AcAg defines the set of states `(α) from which α may be
physically and legally performed. We require that for all α ∈ AcAg,
`(α) ⊆ ρ(α).
• τ : Q × JAg → Q is a partial system transition function, which de-
fines the state τ(q, j) that would result by the performance of j from
state q—note that, as this function is partial, not all joint actions are
possible in all states (cf. the physical action pre-condition function
above).
• Φ is a finite, non-empty set of atomic propositions; and
• π : Q → 2Φ is an interpretation function, which gives the set of
primitive propositions satisfied in each state: if p ∈ π(q), then this
means that the propositional variable p is satisfied (equivalently, true)
in state q.
As with aatss, saaetss must satisfy two coherence constraints: Firstly,
non-triviality [11] : Agents always have at least one legal action: ∀q ∈
Q,∀i ∈ Ag,∃α ∈ Aci s.t. q ∈ `(α). Secondly, consistency : The ρ and τ
functions agree on actions that may be performed: ∀q,∀j ∈ JAg, (q, j) ∈
dom τ iff ∀i ∈ Ag, q ∈ ρ(ji). Sometimes we are not interested in knowledge
and leave out the accessibility relations: such a system is called a saats.
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Example 2.1 (The Train Example). We refer to this system as Train.
There are two trains, one of which (E) is Eastbound, the other of which
(W ) is Westbound, each occupy their own circular track. At one point,
both tracks pass through a narrow tunnel—a crash will occur if both trains
are in the tunnel at the same time.
We model each train i ∈ Ag = {E,W} as an automaton that can be
in one of three states: “awayi” (the initial state of the train); “waitingi”
(waiting to enter the tunnel); and “ini” (the train is in the tunnel). Initially,
both trains are away. Each train i ∈ {E,W} has two actions available. They
can either move or idle. Idling causes no change in the train’s state. If a
train i moves while it is awayi, then it goes to a waitingi state; moving while
waitingi causes a transition to an ini state; and finally, moving while ini
causes a transition to awayi as long as the other train was not in the tunnel,
while if both trains are in the tunnel, then they have crashed, and will idle
indefinitely. In order to prevent this from happening, train E is not allowed
to move when either W is waiting or in the tunnel, while ` forbids W to
move when E is in. See Figure 1, where ∼i (q) is shorthand for {q′ | q ∼i q′}
(i ∈ {E,W}). So ∼i (q) are those states that look similar to q, for agent i.
In our example, each train knows about itself where it is: away, waiting or
in the tunnel.
Given an agent i ∈ Ag and a state q ∈ Q, we denote the physical options
available to i in q by ρ-options(i, q) = {α | α ∈ Aci and q ∈ ρ(α)} and,
similarly, the legal options available to i in q by `-options(i, q) = {α | α ∈
Aci and q ∈ `(α)}. Let Q∗ be the set of finite sequences of elements of
Q, with typical element µ, ν ∈ Q∗, and where µ · q denotes concatenation
of an element µ from Q∗ with a state q ∈ Q. Q+ ⊆ Q∗ collects all finite
sequences of length at least 1. Now we can define a physical strategy and
a legal strategy for an agent. A physical strategy for an agent i ∈ Ag is a
function: γi : Q+ → Aci which must satisfy the constraint that γi(µ ·q) ∈ ρ-
options(i, q) for all µ ∈ Q∗ and q ∈ Q. A legal strategy for an agent i ∈ Ag
is a function: δi : Q+ → Aci which must satisfy the legality constraint that
δi(µ · q) ∈ `-options(i, q) for all µ ∈ Q∗ and q ∈ Q.
A physical strategy profile for a coalition G = {1, . . . , k} ⊆ Ag is a tuple
of physical strategies 〈γ1, . . . , γk〉, one for each agent i ∈ G. Similarly, a
legal strategy profile for a coalition G = {1, . . . , k} ⊆ Ag is a tuple of legal
strategies 〈δ1, . . . , δk〉, one for each agent i ∈ G. By ΓG, we denote the set of
all physical strategy profiles for coalition G, whereas ∆G ⊆ ΓG denotes the
set of all legal strategy profiles for G. By σG, we denote a strategy profile for
coalition G where we are not concerned about whether the strategy profile
is legal or not; if σG ∈ ΓAg and i ∈ Ag, then we denote i’s component of σG
by σiG. Given a coalition G, a grand coalition strategy profile σAg can be






, where σG represents the choices made by
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States and Initial States:
Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7, q8} Initial state q0
Epistemic relations:
∼E (q0) = {q0, q1, q2} ∼E (q3) = {q3, q5, q6} ∼E (q4) = {q4, q7, q8}
∼W (q0) = {q0, q3, q4} ∼W (q1) = {q1, q5, q7} ∼W (q2) = {q2, q6, q8}
Agents, Actions, and Joint Actions:
Ag = {E, W} AcE = {idleE , moveE} AcW = {idleW , moveW }
JAg = {〈idleE , idleW 〉| {z }
j0
, 〈idleE , moveW 〉| {z }
j1
, 〈moveE , idleW 〉| {z }
j2






q0 if j = j0
q1 if j = j1
q3 if j = j2
q5 if j = j3
τ(q1, j) =
8>><>>:
q1 if j = j0
q2 if j = j1
q5 if j = j2
q6 if j = j3
τ(q2, j) =
8>><>>:
q2 if j = j0
q0 if j = j1
q6 if j = j2
q3 if j = j3
τ(q3, j) =
8>><>>:
q3 if j = j0
q5 if j = j1
q4 if j = j2
q7 if j = j3
τ(q4, j) =
8>><>>:
q4 if j = j0
q7 if j = j1
q0 if j = j2
q1 if j = j3
τ(q5, j) =
8>><>>:
q5 if j = j0
q6 if j = j1
q7 if j = j2
q8 if j = j3
τ(q6, j) =
8>><>>:
q6 if j = j0
q3 if j = j1
q8 if j = j2
q4 if j = j3
τ(q7, j) =
8>><>>:
q7 if j = j0
q8 if j = j1
q1 if j = j2
q2 if j = j3
τ(q8, jk) = q8 (k = 0 . . . 3)
Legal action precondition function:
`(idleE) = Q
`(idleW ) = Q
`(moveE) = Q \ {q5, q6}
`(moveW ) = Q \ {q7}
Propositional Variables:
Φ = {awayE , awayW , waitingE , waitingW , inE , inW }
Interpretation Function:
π(q0) = {awayE , awayW }
π(q1) = {awayE , waitingW }
π(q2) = {awayE , inW }
π(q3) = {waitingE , awayW }
π(q4) = {inE , awayW }
π(q5) = {waitingE , waitingW }
π(q6) = {waitingE , inW }
π(q7) = {inE , waitingW }
π(q8) = {inE , inW }
Figure 1. The saaets for the trains scenario.
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agents in G and σ′
Ḡ
represents the choices made by all other agents in the
system.
Given a strategy profile σAg and non-empty sequence µ · q ∈ Q+, let
out(σAg, µ · q) denote the next state that will result by the members of
Ag acting as defined by their components of σAg for one step from µ · q.
Formally, out(σAg, µ · q) = τ(q, j) = q′, where σiAg(µ · q) = ji for i ∈ Ag.
Given a strategy profile σAg for the grand coalition Ag, and a state q ∈ Q,
we define comp(σAg, q) to be the run that will occur if every agent i ∈ Ag
follows the corresponding strategy σi, starting when the system is in state
q ∈ Q. Formally, comp(σAg, q) = λ = λ[0]λ[1] . . . where λ[0] = q and
∀u ∈ N : λ[u+ 1] = out(σAg, λ[0]λ[1] . . . λ[u]).
Given an saaets, S, and the initial state of the system, q0, we define a
set of socially reachable states as follows:
sreach(S) = {q | ∃δAg ∈ ∆Ag and ∃u ∈ N s.t. q = comp(δAg, q0)[u]}
The socially reachable states are all the states which are reachable when
every agent in the system performs only social strategies.
3 Social ATEL
In this section we define the logical language used to express social laws
in our framework. Our language is essentially an extension of atel [7]. In
satel, we reason about physical and about social strategies. Our modalities
are of the form 〈〈G〉〉yx, where x and y denote which kind of strategies G and
Ag \ G, respectively, are allowed to use: only social strategies (denoted by
s), or all their available ones (denoted by p). For example, the formula
〈〈G〉〉sp♦goal expresses that there exists a strategy for the coalition G, such
that, no matter what the other agents do as long as they only follow social
strategies, at some point in the future some goal state will occur. We can
also require all the agents to act socially, e.g., 〈〈G〉〉ss ¬fail, which expresses
that G has a social strategy, such that, no matter what the other agents
do, providing they act socially, the system will never enter a fail state.
Finally, consider the nested formula, 〈〈G〉〉ss g〈〈G〉〉ps ϕ, which reads: “G
can ensure, by using a social strategy, and assuming that all the others also
act socially, that in the next state, G can ensure, again by acting socially,
that even if the others from now on act non-socially, ϕ will always hold”.
Or, a bit more informally: “if we require G to act socially, and the others
socially for at least the first step, but unconstrained thereafter, then G can
guarantee that always ϕ”.
atel adds knowledge operators Ki on top of atl. However, on top of
that we add operators to express more enhanced informational attitudes.
First of all, now that the possibility of violating social laws exists, we define
a notion of social belief , i.e., belief under the assumption that all agents
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in the system are acting as they should do according to the social laws
imposed. We introduce a belief operator SBi, where SBiϕ expresses that,
if i assumes that everybody acts socially, he believes ϕ to be the case. For
example, if we use ϕ to denote the fact that a car is stopped at a red traffic
light, SBiϕ means that agent i believes that a car is stopped at a red traffic
light, under the assumption that all agents in the system are acting socially.
So in all indistinguishable social states to agent i, a car is stopped at a red
traffic light. An obvious difference with the standard notion of knowledge
is that social belief is not veridical: it is perfectly well possible that agent i
socially believes ϕ (SBiϕ) while ¬ϕ at the same time.
Formally, the set of formulae, formed with respect to a set of agents Ag,
and a set of primitive propositions Φ, is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kiϕ | SBiϕ | 〈〈G〉〉yx gϕ | 〈〈G〉〉yx ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉yxϕU ϕ
where p ∈ Φ is a propositional variable, G ⊆ Ag is a set of agents, i ∈ Ag is
an agent, and x and y can be either p or s.
We now give the truth definition of Social atel formulae on an saaets
S and a state q. For G ⊆ Ag and x ∈ {s, p}, let Strat(G, x) = ΓG if x = p,
and Strat(G, x) = ∆G if x = s.
S, q |= p iff p ∈ π(q) (where p ∈ Φ)
S, q |= ¬ϕ iff S, q 6|= ϕ;
S, q |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff S, q |= ϕ or S, q |= ψ;
S, q |= 〈〈G〉〉yx gϕ iff ∃σG ∈ Strat(G, x) s.t. ∀σḠ ∈ Strat(Ḡ, y), if
λ = comp(〈σG, σḠ〉 , q), we have S, λ [1] |= ϕ;
S, q |= 〈〈G〉〉yx ϕ iff ∃σG ∈ Strat(G, x) s.t. ∀σḠ ∈ Strat(Ḡ, y),
if λ = comp(〈σG, σḠ〉 , q), we have for alln ∈
N, S, λ [n] |= ϕ;
S, q |= 〈〈G〉〉yxϕU ψ iff ∃σG ∈ Strat(G, x) s.t. ∀σḠ ∈ Strat(Ḡ, y),
if λ = comp(〈σG, σḠ〉 , q), there is k ∈
N s.t. S, λ [k] |= ψ, and for all n with 0 ≤ n < k,
we have S, λ [n] |= ϕ;
S, q |= Kiϕ iff for all q′ such that q ∼i q′ : S, q′ |= ϕ;
S, q |= SBiϕ iff for all q′ ∈ sreach(S) such that q ∼i q′, we
have S, q′ |= ϕ.
Other connectives (“∧”, “→”, “↔”) are assumed to be defined as ab-
breviations in terms of ¬,∨. 〈〈G〉〉yx♦ϕ is shorthand for 〈〈G〉〉yx>U ϕ. We
write 〈〈i〉〉 rather than 〈〈{i}〉〉. Validity of ϕ, written |= ϕ is defined as usual.
Social Laws and Anti-Social Behaviour 127
An objective formula is a purely propositional formula, with no knowl-
edge, coalitional or temporal operators. The sublanguage obtained from
satel by leaving out the epistemic and social belief operators is satl. The
language of atl can be seen as being subsumed by satl. Coalitional modal-
ities in atl are implicitly indexed with a p: the only type of strategy in atl
is physical. In atl, one writes 〈〈G〉〉 gϕ (corresponding to our 〈〈G〉〉ss gϕ),
and similarly for the other temporal operators. Note that in satel and atl
every temporal operator is immediately proceeded by a coalition modal-
ity. If one drops this constraint on atl, the thus obtained language is
called atl∗. Examples of atl∗ formulas are 〈〈G〉〉( (ϕ → ♦ψ) (‘G can
cooperate such that whenever ϕ occurs, eventually ψ will happen’) and
〈〈G〉〉( gϕ ∨ g gϕ ∨ g g gϕ) (‘G has a strategy that ensures that within
three steps, ϕ’).
In atl, the cooperation modality 〈〈〉〉T (where T is a temporal formula,
i.e., a formula of which the main operator is either g, or U ) denotes
a special case: it means that the empty set of agents has a strategy, such
that, no matter what the other (i.e., all) agents do, T holds. In other
words, no matter what the agents in Ag do, T . This resembles the ctl
operator AT : on every future path, T . Similarly, 〈〈Ag〉〉T means that the
grand coalition has a strategy such that, no matter what the empty coalition
does, T . In ctl terminology: ET , or, for some path, T . For satel this gives
us the following. Since in 〈〈〉〉yx, the constraint to play an x-type of strategy
is a constraint for nobody, it does not really matter whether x is s or p.
Similarly, in 〈〈Ag〉〉yxT the constraint to play a y-type of strategy is a void
restriction for Ag \ Ag, i.e., the empty set, so it does not matter whether x








As a convention, when having an empty coalition, we will only write 〈〈〉〉ss
and 〈〈〉〉pp, which is no restriction, given the equivalence above. Similarly, for
the full coalition, we will only write 〈〈Ag〉〉ss and 〈〈Ag〉〉
p
p.
Multiple 〈〈G〉〉yx goperators are used as an abbreviation in the following
way:
(〈〈G〉〉yx g)n ϕ ∧= { 〈〈G〉〉yx gϕ if n = 1(〈〈G〉〉yx g)(〈〈G〉〉yx g)n−1ϕ otherwise
Social strategies ∆G are a subset of the physical strategies ΓG, and
hence:
|= 〈〈G〉〉ysT → 〈〈G〉〉
y





where T here is an arbitrary temporal formula and x and y are vari-
ables over p and s. These properties express the following. The first,
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〈〈G〉〉ysT → 〈〈G〉〉
y
pT says that if a coalition G are able to enforce a prop-
erty ϕ by adopting social strategies, then they can also enforce this same
property when adopting physical strategies (‘if you can enforce it nicely,
you can enforce it anyhow’); and 〈〈G〉〉pxT → 〈〈G〉〉
s
xT can be interpreted as
saying that if a coalition G are able to enforce a property ϕ when playing
against an adversary who is able to use physical strategies, then they can
also enforce this property when playing against the same adversary when
this adversary is constrained to use only social strategies (‘if you can beat
an opponent when he can cheat, you can beat him when he plays by the
rules’).
4 Case Study
We now present a case study in order to demonstrate Social atel. The case
study is known as “The Alternating Bit Protocol” and is adapted from [6].
In this scenario there are three agents, a sender S and a receiver R, who
wish to communicate through a communication environment, represented
as an agent E. The sender S owns a tape X = 〈x0, x1, . . .〉, where each
element xi comes from a given alphabet, say Alph = {0, 1}. The goal of the
protocol is that the contents of this tape are sent to R, who writes what he
receives on a tape Y that, after k elements of X have been received, will be
Y = 〈y0, y1 . . . , yk〉. The sender only sends one item xi at the time. The
environment E determines whether messages are delivered or get lost: E
does not alter the content of any message. And, although the environment
is unreliable, it satisfies the fairness property that it will not loose messages
forever: if an agent repeatedly sends the same message, eventually it will be
delivered. We wish to design a protocol that satisfies the safety requirement
that the receiver never prints incorrect bits, and the liveness requirement
that every bit will eventually be written by the receiver onto Y .
The obvious solution to this problem is to use acknowledgements to let
the sender know an element xi has been received. So the sender would
repeatedly send the current element xi until eventually it receives an ac-
knowledgement back from the receiver, at which point it would go on to
send the next element xi+1. The problem arises when the value of an item
xi+1 is the same as xi. The receiver does not know whether its acknowledge-
ment for xi has been received, so the receiver does not know whether the
message he currently receives (with the value of xi+1) is a repetition of xi, or
whether this bit is supposed to represent xi+1 on the tape. To overcome this
problem, the sender can put more information on which element he sends
by adding a “colour” to it: a 0 to every xi for even i, and a 1 for every odd i.
So the alphabet will now be Alph′ = {x.0 | x ∈ Alph}∪{x.1 | x ∈ Alph}. We
also need two acknowledgements: ack0 and ack1. Now the protocol works
as follows: S first sends x0.0. When it receives ack0, it goes on to the next
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state on the tape and sends x1.1. R can see that this is a new message
(since it has a different colour), and sends ack1 to acknowledge the receipt
of it. S can also see that this is a different acknowledgement and starts to
send x2.0, and so on.
We model the scenario with an saaets called AltBit. We introduce
variables with the following interpretation: SSX = 1 means that the last
bit S sent was of type x.1; SRA = 1 indicates the last message received
by S was ack1; RRX = 1 means the last bit R received was of type x.1;
and RSA = 1 indicates the last message R sent was ack1. In the object
language, atom ssx will mean that SSX = 1, and ¬ssx denotes SSX = 0.
Similarly for the other variables and corresponding atoms.
A state in our system is defined to be a tuple
qi = 〈SSX, SRA | RRX,RSA〉
where
• SSX,SRA,RRX,RSA ∈ {0, 1} = B; and
• qi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, is the name of the state. This is just a decimal
representation of the binary number the state corresponds to (e.g.,
q3 = 〈0, 0 | 1, 1〉). The initial state of the system is q15 = 〈1, 1 | 1, 1〉:
no information about the first bit x0 is assumed to be sent or received.
Given the nature of our states and the correspondence between variables
and atomic propositions, we have: ssx ∈ π(〈SSX,SRA | RRX,RSA〉)
iff SSX = 1, and similarly for the other variables. We are not inter-
ested in knowledge of E, but for S and R we assume that they know
the contents of their own variables: if q = 〈SSX,SRA | RRX,RSA〉 and
q′ = 〈SSX ′, SRA′ | RRX ′, RSA′〉 are two states, then q ∼S q′ iff SSX =
SSX ′ & SRA = SRA′, and similarly for ∼R.
In every state of the system, the sender has two physical actions available
to it: send.0 and send.1, corresponding to sending a bit with colour 0 and
sending a bit with colour 1, respectively. The receiver also has two physical
actions available to it in every state of the system: sendack.0 and sendack.1,
corresponding to sending an acknowledgement of a bit with colour 0 and
colour 1, respectively. Actions of the environment are pairs (eS , eR), where
eS is either dS or gS (i.e., either deny or grant the request of the sender),
and eR ∈ {dR, gR}.
Concerning the transition function τ : Q×JAg → Q, we have the follow-
ing:
τ(〈SSX,SRA | RRX,RSA〉, 〈aS , aR, aE〉) = 〈SSX ′, SRA′ | RRX ′, RSA′〉




1 if aS = send.1
0 if aS = send.0
SRA′ =

SRA if aE = (·, dR)
1 if aR = sendack.1 & aE = (·, gR)
0 if aS = sendack.0 & aE = (·, gR)
RRX ′ =

RRX if aE = (dS , ·)
1 if aS = send.1 & aE = (gS , ·)
0 if aS = send.0 & aE = (gS , ·)
RSA′ =
{
1 if aR = sendack.1
0 if aR = sendack.0
This transition function reflects the fact that both S and R are free to
decide which message they send: S can choose the value of SSX ′ and R
chooses that of RSA′. However, whether a message arrives depends on E
as well. For instance, in order for a new state to have SRA′ = 1, saying
that the last acknowledgment that S received was an ack1, either this value
was just sent by R and this was granted by E, or S had received SRA′ = 1
in a previous state, and in the meantime he did not receive any update.
Regarding the legal transitions, of course, the idea is that S should
alternate x.0’s, once known to be received, with x.1’s, and R is expected
not to acknowledge receipt of a bit he did not receive. Let q be 〈SSX,SRA |
RRX,RSA〉. Then:
q ∈ `(send.1) ⇔ SRA = 0
q ∈ `(send.0) ⇔ SRA = 1
q ∈ `(sendack.1) ⇔ RRX = 1
q ∈ `(sendack.0) ⇔ RRX = 0
For E, rather than putting a legality constraint, we require a fairness
constraint on its behaviour. We say that a computation λ = q0q1 · · · is fair
if
• there are infinitely many indices n for which there is an action aS for
the sender and an action aR for the receiver and some eR ∈ {gR, dR}
such that qn+1 = τ(qn, 〈aS , aR, (gS , eR)〉).
• there are infinitely many indices n for which there is an action aS for
the sender and an action aR for the receiver and some eS ∈ {gS , dS}
such that qn+1 = τ(qn, 〈aS , aR, (eS , gR)〉).
In words: a fair computation is one in which both the request of the
sender and that of the receiver are granted infinitely often. Although fairness
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is a property of computations, we here can connect it to the legality of
strategies of E. The legal strategies ∆E of E are all strategies that guarantee
that the resulting computation is fair, no matter what R and S do.
A socially necessary fact ϕ is a fact which should be true no matter
what, providing all the agents in the system act in a social manner. A snf
ϕ is defined as follows:
SNF(ϕ) ≡ 〈〈〉〉ss ϕ
4.1 Properties of the model
Let us discuss some properties, and verify whether they hold, either in our
system AltBit, or in AltBit, q15. Recall that 〈〈〉〉pp ϕ means that ϕ is true
no matter what the agents do, while 〈〈〉〉ss ψ says that ψ is true, as long
as everybody acts socially. For instance, under what circumstances is it the
case that if S sends an item (say xi.1), R will eventually receive it? For




This is good, and indeed, without demanding that E acts socially, he
could indeed spoil it: we have 〈〈〉〉pp ((ssx∧¬rrx) → 〈〈E〉〉
s
p ¬rrx), saying,
that when ssx is true, E can guarantee, even if the others act socially, that
this message will never arrive. Returning to (4.1), it is not hard to see
that E’s next action is partially determined if he wants to ensure ♦rrx:
if E does not immediately grant the request of S (i.e., E plays (dS , dR) or
(dS , gR)), and we allow S to act physically, it can from any next state on
decide to send x.0 (where, socially speaking, it should send x.1 again), and
then, no matter which strategy E chooses, rrx may never be true again. In




g(rrx ∨ 〈〈E〉〉ps♦rrx)) (4.2)
i.e., it is not the case that under all social strategies, in the next state the
message has either been received, or else the environment can still guarantee
it will be received eventually. (The counterexample is the earlier given
strategies of E and S.)
If E and S both are social, we have the following positive result, which
says that if x.1 is sent, then E and S can socially guarantee that this
remains true until it is received, and moreover, it will be received under any
behaviour, as long as E and S act socially:
〈〈〉〉pp (ssx→ (〈〈E,S〉〉
p
s(ssxU rrx) ∧ ¬〈〈E,S〉〉
p
s ¬rrx)) (4.3)
Now suppose R has received a message with odd parity: rrx. How can
we derive that S will know about this? In other words, for which group G
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and attitudes x and y do we have AltBit, q15 |= 〈〈〉〉pp (rrx→ 〈〈G〉〉
y
x♦sra)?
In case x = y = p it holds iff G ⊇ {R,E}: the receiver and environment
are needed to ensure that a received bit by the receiver is acknowledged to
the sender. This only says that G can do it, however, and we also have
〈〈〉〉pp (rrx → 〈〈G〉〉
p
p♦¬sra), even for G = {R} and for G = {E}: in
both cases, G can ensure that S does not get acknowledged properly. For
that, illegal actions are needed, however, and indeed we have 〈〈〉〉pp (rrx→
¬〈〈R,E〉〉ps ¬sra): If E and R act legally, it is impossible for them to not
have a message from the sender ever acknowledged. Indeed, we even have
〈〈〉〉ss(rrxU (rrx∧ rsa)): if everybody acts socially, received messages will be
acknowledged and not overwritten in the meantime.
Let us write SLT(ϕ,ψ), (‘ϕ socially leads to ψ’) if the following holds:
ϕ → 〈〈〉〉ss(ϕU ψ). That is, if ϕ is true, then, if everybody acts socially, it
will stay true until some point where ψ is true. We then have:
〈〈〉〉ss ( SLT((¬ssx ∧ ¬srx), (ssx ∧ ¬srx)) ∧ (4.4)
SLT((ssx ∧ ¬srx), (rrx ∧ rsx)) ∧ (4.5)
SLT((rrx ∧ rsx), (ssx ∧ srx)) ∧ (4.6)
SLT((ssx ∧ srx), (¬ssx ∧ srx)) ∧ (4.7)
SLT((¬ssx ∧ srx), (¬ssx ∧ ¬srx)) (4.8)
)
The displayed formula describes some properties of a correct run: (4.4)
ensures that when S has sent and received an even-coloured message and
corresponding acknowledgement, he will next send an odd-coloured message.
According to (4.5) this is (socially) guaranteed to lead to a state where R has
received this odd-coloured message and where he also acknowledges receipt
of it. Then (4.6) says that this will socially lead to a state where S was
still sending this odd-coloured message, and has received the corresponding
acknowledgement. This will lead then (4.7) to a state where S sends again
an even-coloured message that is not yet acknowledged, after which (4.8)
at some point, while S was still repeating the even-coloured message, this
becomes acknowledged.
Recall that a socially necessary fact ϕ is an objective formula for which
〈〈〉〉ss ϕ holds. They express that some unwanted states will never be
reached. For instance, we have in our example that (ssx∧sra) → (rrx∧rsx)
is a socially necessary fact: if everybody behaves, then if S is sending an
even-coloured message which has been acknowledged, then R’s last received
message must be even-coloured, and his last sent acknowledgement must be
odd as well.
To conclude this case study, let us look at some informational properties
in the alternating bit protocol, in particular knowledge and social belief. If
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the agents cannot assume others behave socially, the agents actually have
no knowledge whatsoever about the other agent’s state. In other words, if
agents can act arbitrarily, then very little knowledge ensues. For instance,
in q15, S knows of course its own state, but has no clue of R’s: q15 |=
¬KSrrx ∧ ¬KS¬rrx ∧ ¬KSrsa ∧ ¬KS¬rsa.
However, this is not the case for social beliefs, where the agents mu-
tually assume to abide to the social laws. Recall that we have AltBit |=
SNF((ssx ∧ sra) → (rrx ∧ rsx)). Hence, in q15, if S can assume that ev-
erybody behaves socially, he is able to infer the state of R, i.e., we have
AltBit, q15 |= SBS(rrx ∧ rsx): the sender has the social belief about the
correct contents of the receiver’s local state.
5 Reducing Social ATL to ATL?
In this section we introduce an alternative approach for expressing prop-
erties of systems that refer to whether the agents are acting socially or
physically. Rather than using our logical language, Social atel, introduced
in Section 3, we see to what extent we can capture the same notions us-
ing only atl and atl?. To this end, we introduce the notion of “good”
and “bad” states, similar to the “red” and “green” states of Lomuscio and
Sergot in [8]. This idea goes in fact back to a discussion in the deontic
logic literature regarding the two notions of ought to do and ought to be
(see for instance [10] and the references therein). Although we do not refer
to actions in our object language, the framework discussed in the previous
section can be seen to fit in the spirit of an ought to do approach: in the
semantics, we specify which actions are forbidden in which states. In an
ought to be based deontic logic, the emphasis is on which states should be
avoided. A celebrated paper to link the two is [9], where the fact that ac-
tion α is forbidden, is represented in a dynamic logic like language as [α]V ,
where V is a propositional atom flagging violation of a norm. In words:
the action α is forbidden iff doing α leads to only states that mark that
something bad has happened.
The paper [8] puts this in an interpreted system context [2], where,
rather than an atom V , they use a label green to signal green states, states
that are reached without any violation. Of course the languages of [9], [8]
and ours are all different: [9] uses a dynamic deontic logic, [8] interprets a
deontic (epistemic) language over runs (structures with a temporal flavour)
while we have both ability operators for different norms and temporal op-
erators. A full comparison between the approaches would be an interesting
exercise. Here, we will relate satl to the languages atl and atl∗ that we
enrich with a specific atom good (which plays the same role as ¬V and green
above).
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More precisely, we modify our Social Action-Based Alternating Transi-
tion Systems by introducing an atomic proposition for each agent, which is
only true in the current state if the agent arrived here from the previous
state using a legal action. So essentially, we are labeling the states based
on how the agents arrived at each state. This gives rise to a larger state
space in the modified systems, as now we have copies of each state, repre-
senting all the combinations of the agents acting socially or physically to
reach it. Ideally we would like to be able to reduce properties expressed
in Social atel into atl, expressed using these “good” atomic propositions,
in order to automatically verify Social atel properties using existing atl
model checkers, such as mocha. However, since Social atel and atl are
interpreted over different structures, it is not feasible to find direct equiv-
alences between the two. We can, however, express interesting properties
using atl and atl?.
Using the approach outlined above, we look at several types of Social
atel properties and see how closely we can express these in atl?. We in-
vestigate the relationship between the two using three special cases of G,
where G is the coalition of agents cooperating to achieve some objective.
We look at the case where G is the grand coalition (Ag), the empty coali-
tion (∅), and finally, an arbitrary coalition (G). We show that there is a
general pattern between Social atel properties and properties expressed in
this approach, which holds regardless of the coalition type and the temporal
operators being used. Finally, we prove equivalences between general for-
mulae expressed in Social atel and formulae expressed using this approach,
for each combination of the coalition acting socially or physically, while the
other agents act socially or physically.
5.1 Modifying SAATSs
In this section we introduce the atomic propositions used to give a labeling
to each state based on how each agent arrived there. This can either be by
performing a legal action or by simply performing any physically possible
action. We introduce an atomic proposition, gi, one for each agent i ∈ Ag,
with the interpretation that gi is true in the current state if agent i’s last
action was a legal one. This corresponds to agent i acting in a social manner
(for one time step). GP = {g1, . . . , gn} is a set of good propositions where
GP ⊆ Φ. In order to reason about coalitions of agents, we introduce a
proposition good(G) which holds if all the agents in G acted socially to





Now we must modify saaetss with these gi propositions. It is impor-
tant to note that the definition of the gi propositions comes from the `(α)
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function in the given saaets. Now, given a saaets
Sys = 〈Q, q0,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn, ρ, `, τ,Φ, π〉
in order to express properties of systems in this way, we need to convert the
system into a modified system as below:
Sys◦ = 〈Q◦, q◦0 ,Ag,Ac1, . . . ,Acn, ρ◦, τ◦,Φ◦, π◦〉
where the modified components have the following interpretation:
• Q◦: For each state q ∈ Q, we now have at worst 2|Ag| copies of q
to represent all the combinations of agents being “good” and “bad”
(this is a worst case estimate, since we can leave out states that are
not reachable from q◦0). We encode this extra information as qx1,...,xn ,
where xi ∈ {0, 1}. xi being 1 means agent i’s last action was a social
one, whereas a 0 means it was anti-social. The new set of states
formed, Q◦, in the worst case, is of size |Q× 2Ag|. See Figures 2 and
3 for an example of how the train system is transformed;
• q◦0 : q0 becomes q◦0 , which is an abbreviation of q◦0x1,...,xn , where ∀i ∈
Ag, xi = 1. This is the initial state of the system, which is the same
as before, except gi is true for all agents;
• ρ◦: ∀i ∈ Ag,∀α ∈ AcAg,∀q ∈ Q,∀xi ∈ {0, 1} : q ∈ ρ(α) ⇔ qx1,...,xn ∈
ρ◦(α);
• Φ◦: Φ is updated with the new gi propositions: Φ◦ = Φ ∪GP ;
• π◦:
∀i ∈ Ag,∀p ∈ Φ,∀q ∈ Q,∀xi ∈ {0, 1} :
p ∈ π(q) ⇔ p ∈ π◦(qx1,...,xn)
∀i ∈ Ag,∀gi ∈ GP : gi ∈ π◦(qx1,...,xn) ⇔ xi = 1.
• τ◦: ∀i ∈ Ag,∀q, q′ ∈ Q,∀αi ∈ Aci,∀xi ∈ {0, 1} : [τ(q, 〈α1, . . . , αk〉) =
q′ ⇔ τ◦(qx1,...,xn , 〈α1, . . . , αk〉) = q′f1(x1),...,fn(xn), where fi(xi) = 1 ⇔
q ∈ `(αi)].
So now we have modified saaetss to work with these gi propositions.
Firstly, the set of states has been modified. We have a new copy of each
state for all combinations of gi, for all agents. The initial state is the same
as before, but gi is true for all agents, hence the system starts in a good
state. The new action precondition function, ρ◦, is directly equivalent to ρ
for all states and actions, regardless of the gi propositions. In other words,
if an agent can perform α in q, then the agent can perform α in qx1,...,xn ,
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no matter what the values of xi are. The set of atomic propositions, Φ, is
updated with the set of good propositions, GP . The truth definition func-
tion, π, is the same as before for atomic propositions in Φ. It is updated
for the propositions in GP , where a gi proposition is true in a state where
xi = 1. Finally, the transition function, τ , is updated in the following way:
transitions are the same as before, but now, if agent i performs a legal ac-
tion, in the resultant state, gi will be true and the xi subscript of the state
will be 1. Performing an illegal action results in the gi proposition being
false and the xi subscript of the state being 0.
Remark 5.1. In this section we do not look at properties that refer to
knowledge. We briefly consider how we would modify the epistemic acces-
sibility relations from saaetss to account for these good propositions. We
propose the following modification to the epistemic accessibility relations:
∼◦i : ∀i ∈ Ag,∀q, q′ ∈ Q,∀xi ∈ {0, 1} : q ∼i q′ ⇔ qx1,...,xn ∼◦i q′x1,...,xn
So if two states, q and q′ are indistinguishable in Sys, qx1,...,xn and q
′
x1,...,xn
will be indistinguishable in Sys◦. This will now mean that agents will know
if they have acted socially, and also if other agents have acted socially. This
would allow us to formulate informational properties about systems where
agents can reason about the behaviour of the other agents in the system.
An alternative way to modify the epistemic accessibility relations would be
as follows:
∼◦i : ∀i ∈ Ag,∀q, q′ ∈ Q,∀xi, x′i ∈ {0, 1} : q ∼i q′ ⇔ qx1,...,xn ∼◦i q′x′1,...,x′n
where xi = x′i.
This is the same as above, but now agents only know whether they
have acted socially themselves, and about how other agents have acted is
known. This would mean agents would only be able to reason about their
own behaviour.
5.2 Reducing some formulae
There are various interesting types of properties we can form with these
good(G) propositions. We will construct example properties using the train
system Train that we introduced in Example 2.1. Let Train◦ be the aats
after modifying Train. We can see the affect modifying the systems has by
comparing Figure 2, showing the states and transitions of the standard train
system, with Figure 3, which shows the same system after being modified.
States are assumed to have a reflexive arc labelled ‘i, i’, which we omit for
clarity.
We start by looking at the following Social atel formula:
Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ss ϕ (5.1)































































































Figure 2. State transitions in Train. The top atom in a state refers to
train E, as does the top action at each transition.
where ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula. This Social atel
formula says that G has a social strategy, such that, no matter what the
other agents do, providing they follow social strategies, ϕ will always be
true. We will now try to capture the above using these good(G) propositions
where we take G to be the grand coalition, Ag:
Sys◦, qx1,...,xn |= 〈〈Ag〉〉 (good(Ag) ∧ ϕ) (5.2)
where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1. This formula states that the grand coalition of
agents has a strategy such that it will always be the case that good(Ag) is
true and ϕ is true at the same time. This appears to express the same as
(5.1) above. If we refer to the train scenario we can formulate the following
example property:
Sys◦, q011 |= 〈〈Ag〉〉 (good(Ag) ∧ ¬ (inE ∧ inW )) (5.3)















































































































































Figure 3. State transitions in Train◦.
So this property states that the grand coalition should have a strategy so
that it is always the case that the agents follow only social strategies and
that both of the trains are not in the tunnel at the same time. Property
(5.3) passes when we model check it in our implementation of Train◦.
Following on from what we said about acting socially leading to the
goal, we can formulate the following, where now we take G to be the empty
set, ∅:
Sys◦, qx1,...,xn |= 〈〈〉〉 ( good(Ag) → ϕ) (5.4)
where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1 and ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula.
The above atl? formula reads that on all paths, no matter what any of the
agents do, good(Ag) always being true implies that ϕ will always be true.
In other words, if the agents always follow social strategies, the goal, ϕ,
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is achieved. Referring back to the train scenario, we look at this example
property:
Sys◦, q011 |= 〈〈〉〉 ( good(Ag) → ¬ (inE ∧ inW )) (5.5)
So this reads, no matter what the agents do, on all paths, if the agents
always follow social strategies, this implies that the trains will never enter
the tunnel at the same time. This sounds intuitively correct based on what
we said earlier about social strategies leading to the objective of the social
law being satisfied. Using Figure 3, we leave it to the reader to check
that (5.5) is satisfied.
Let us now consider
Sys◦, qx1,...,xn |= 〈〈〉〉 ( good(Ag) → ϕ) ∧ 〈〈Ag〉〉 good(Ag) (5.6)
where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1 and ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic
formula. So, as before in (5.4), this formula says that the agents always
acting socially implies that the goal will always be achieved, but now also
the grand coalition should have a strategy such that they will always act in
accordance with the social laws. However, if we refer back to the definition
of saaetss we see that there is a condition which states that agents should
always have at least one legal action available to them in every state of the
system. As Sys◦ is a modified version of Sys, this condition still holds in
Sys◦, thus guaranteeing that there is at least one social path, hence Ag will
always have a strategy to ensure good(Ag) is true. This makes this property
redundant, as it is directly equivalent to (5.4).
Finally we consider the case where we have an arbitrary coalition, G:







where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1 and ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula.
So this formula reads that coalition G has a strategy so that agents in G are
always good and that if the other agents in the system are always good then
ϕ will always hold. We needed to separate out the good(Ag) proposition
into good(G) and good(Ḡ), as G has no control over what the agents in Ḡ
do. Therefore, we can precisely capture (5.1) in this way. If we refer to the
trains example, we can formulate a property such as the following:
Sys◦, q011 |= 〈〈E〉〉 ( good(E) ∧ ( good(W ) → ¬ (inE ∧ inW ))) (5.8)
This property states that the Eastbound train has a strategy so that it is
always social, and if the Westbound train is always social, then the two
trains will never be in the tunnel at the same time. This property holds
and can be verified by inspection of Figure 3.
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Now we consider another type of Social atel formula:
Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ss♦ϕ (5.9)
where ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula. This formula says
that G has a social strategy, such that, no matter what the other agents do,
as long as they all only follow social strategies, then ϕ will be true either
now or at some point in the future. We will now try to express a similar
property using good(G) propositions, where we take G to be the empty set:
Sys◦, qx1,...,xn |= 〈〈〉〉
(
good(Ag) →♦ϕ) (5.10)
where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1 and ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula.
This formula says that no matter what the agents do, on all paths, good(Ag)
always being true means that ϕ will either be true now or at some point
in the future. That is to say that if all the agents always act socially, the
goal ϕ will eventually be achieved.
We can also consider situations in which the other agents are constrained
to social strategies and the coalition of interest can act in an unconstrained
manner:
Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉sp ϕ (5.11)
where ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula. This formula states
that G has a strategy to ensure ϕ is always true, providing the other agents
always act in a social manner. We can express something similar to this in
the good states approach in the following way:





where ∀i ∈ Ag : xi = 1 and ϕ is assumed to be a propositional logic formula.
So, here we are saying that G has a strategy such that no matter what the
other agents in the system do, providing the other agents follow only social
strategies, G can always achieve ϕ. We can look at an example property of
the same type as (5.12):
Sys◦, q011 |= 〈〈W 〉〉 ( good(E) → ¬ (inE ∧ inW )) (5.13)
This property states that the westbound train has a strategy so that if
the eastbound train always acts socially, then the trains will never enter
the tunnel at the same time. This property holds and can be verified by
inspection of Figure 3.
5.3 Reducing Social ATEL to ATL?
After investigating the above formulae, we have noticed a general pattern
between formulae of Social atel and formulae expressed in this good states
approach, which seems to follow regardless of the coalition type (grand,
empty or arbitrary coalition) and the temporal operator being used.
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5.3.1 Bisimulations between computations
Thinking in terms of strategies, there are in general more strategies σ◦i for
an agent i in S◦ than there are strategies σi for him in S. To see this
consider the following example.
Example 5.2. Suppose we have two agents, called 1 and 2. Suppose agent 1
can perform three actions in q: actions a and b (which we assume are
legal) and action c (an illegal action). Suppose agent 2 has two actions at
his disposal in q: action d (legal) and e (illegal), and no other action to
choose there. Suppose furthermore that the transition function τ is such
that τ(q, 〈a, d〉) = τ(q, 〈c, d〉) = q. In S◦, this gives rise to transitions
τ(q11〈a, d〉) = q11, while τ(q11, 〈c, d〉) = q01. This enables agent 2 in S◦
to allow for strategies that depend on how lawful agent 1 behaved in the
past in S◦. For instance, agent 2 might play a kind of ‘tit for tat’ by using
strategy σ with σ(q11q11) = d, but at the same time σ(q11q01) = e: a legal
action of agent 1 is replied to by a legal action of agent 2, but after an
illegal move of agent 1, agent 2 responds by an illegal action. Notice that
such a strategy cannot be implemented in S, since both sequences q11q01
and q11q01 only correspond to the single sequence qq in S.
However, as we will see, there is a way to connect computations in both
systems directly to each other.
Definition 5.3. We say that a computation λ = q0q1q2 . . . is compliant
with strategy profile σAg, if comp(σAg, q0) = λ. That is, the computation
can be seen as the effect of applying the strategy profile σAg to q0. If such a
strategy profile exists for λ we also say that λ is an enforceable computation
in the given system.
For any state qx1...xn ∈ Q◦, let projQ(qx1...xn) be its corresponding state
q ∈ Q. Similarly, for a sequence of states ~s in Q◦, the sequence projQ+(~s)
denotes the point-wise projection of every state in the sequence to the cor-
responding state in Q.
Given a system S and its associated system with good states S◦, let
λ = q0q1 . . . be a computation in S, and λ◦ = s0s1 . . . a computation in S◦.
We say that λ and λ◦ bisimulate if there are two strategy profiles, σAg in S
and σ◦Ag in S
◦ such that
1. λ is compliant with σAg and λ◦ is compliant with σ◦Ag
2. for every u ∈ N, and every i ∈ Ag, σi(q0 . . . λ[u]) = σ◦i (s0, . . . λ◦[u])
3. for every u ∈ N, λ[u] = projQ(λ◦[u])
We say in such a case also that λ and λ◦ bisimulate with strategy profiles
σAg and σ◦Ag. Notation: 〈λ, σAg〉 ' 〈λ◦, σ◦Ag〉.
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Note that a computation need not be compliant with any strategy, and,
moreover, if it is compliant with one, it will in general be compliant with
several others as well. The latter is so because of two reasons: first of all,
a computation only specifies what the transitions are within a particular
sequence of states, and says nothing about choices on states that do not
occur in that computation. Secondly, even within a computation, it is
well possible that a transition from qi to qi+1 can be the effect of different
choices by the grand coalition Ag. For two computations to be bisimilar,
Definition 5.3 demands however that there are two strategies, one for each
computation, in which exactly the same actions are taken, at every state in
the computation. Moreover, item 3 guarantees that the computations also
only visit corresponding states.
Let an objective temporal formula ψ be defined as follows:
ψ := p | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | gψ | ψ | ψ U ψ
Such formulae can be interpreted on infinite paths of states λ = q0q1 . . . in
a straightforward way:
S, q0q1 . . . |= p iff S, q0 |= p
S, q0q1 . . . |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff S, q0q1 . . . |= ψ1 and S, q0q1 . . . |= ψ2
S, q0q1 . . . |= gψ iff S, q1 . . . |= ψ
S, q0q1 . . . |= ψ iff ∀i, S, qiqi+1 . . . |= ψ
S, q0q1 . . . |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff ∃i s.t. S, qiqi+1 . . . |= ψ2 and
∀0 ≤ j < i, S, qjqj+1 . . . |= ψ1
Note that, in particular, since the propositions gi are atomic propositions
in S◦, we can interpret them on an infinite path in S◦.
Lemma 5.4. Let λ = q0q1q2 . . . and λ◦ = s0s1s2 . . . . Suppose furthermore
that 〈λ, σAg〉 ' 〈λ◦, σ◦Ag〉. Then:
1. for every u ∈ N and every objective temporal formula ψ:
S, λ[u] |= ψ iff S◦, λ◦[u] |= ψ
2. for every u ∈ N, i ∈ Ag,
λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u])) iff S◦, λ◦[u+ 1] |= gi
Proof.
1. Let λ and λ◦ be as specified. Recall that, by item 3 of Definition 5.3,
for all u ∈ N, λ[u] = projQ(λ◦[u]) (∗). We now prove by induction
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ψ that for all u ∈ N, S, λ[u] |= ψ iff S◦, λ◦[u] |= ψ. For atomic
propositions p, this follows immediately from the equivalence (∗) and
the definition of π◦. Now suppose the property is proven for ψ: we
only do the g-case. Let u ∈ N be arbitrary.
S, λ[u] |= gψ iff (definition of g)
S, λ[u+ 1] |= ψ iff (induction hypothesis)
S◦, λ◦[u+ 1] |= ψ iff (definition of g)
S◦, λ◦[u] |= gψ
2. Let λ[u+1] = q, for some q ∈ Q. Note that, by item 3 of Definition 5.3
projQ(λ◦[u + 1]) = q. So, λ◦[u + 1] is qx1...xi−1,xi,xi+1,...xn for some
sequence x1 . . . xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n. By definition of τ◦, we
have xi = 1 iff λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u])). Moreover, by the truth defini-
tion of gi, we have xi = 1 iff S◦, λ◦ |= gi The result now immediately
follows from the above two statements.
q.e.d.
So, if we have two computations that bisimulate, then according to
item 1 of Lemma 5.4, they verify the same objective temporal formulae,
and, by item 2, a choice for an agent i in the original system is legal, if and
only if in the associated system, in the state that results the proposition gi
is true.
Definition 5.5. Let a computation λ be compatible with strategy profile
σAg. We say that coalition G behaves socially according to this profile along
the computation λ, if ∀u ∈ N,∀i ∈ G, (λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u]))).
So, G behaves social along λ, if it has a contribution to generate the
computation λ that consists only of social actions.
Corollary 5.6. Suppose that λ and λ◦ are bisimilar computations, with
strategy profiles σAg and σ◦Ag, respectively. Let G be an arbitrary coalition.
Then
1. G behaves social according to σAg along λ iff S◦, λ◦ |= good(G)
2. If for all i ∈ G, σi ∈ ∆i, then S◦, λ◦ |= good(G).
Proof.
1. Note that item 2 of Lemma 5.4 implies
∀u ∈ N,∀i ∈ G (λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u])) iff S◦, λ◦[u+ 1] |= gi)
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This, in turn, implies
(∀u ∈ N,∀i ∈ G λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u]))) iff
∀u ∈ N,∀i ∈ G(S◦, λ◦[u+ 1] |= gi)
The left-hand side of the above ‘iff’ states that G behaves social
according to σAg along λ, and the right-hand side is equivalent to
S◦, λ◦ |= good(G).
2. This follows immediately from the above: note that if for all i ∈ G,
σi ∈ ∆i, then ∀u ∈ N,∀i ∈ G λ[u] ∈ `(σi(q0 . . . λ[u])).
q.e.d.
The converse of item 2 of Corollary 5.6 is in general not true: if S◦, λ◦ |=
good(G), then we only know that along the computation λ, all members of
G behave well, but outside λ, they may not and hence their strategy need
not be social.
Definition 5.7. Let λ be a computation. We say that strategies σi and σ′i
for i coincide along λ, written, σi ≡λ σ′i, if for all u ∈ N, σi(λ[0] . . . λ[u]) =
σ′i(λ[0] . . . λ[u]). For a coalition, σG ≡ σ′G, if for every i ∈ G, σi ≡λ σ′i.
Moreover, for any strategy profile σAg, and τi a strategy for i, we write
σ[τi/σi] for the strategy profile that is like σAg, except that for agent i, the
component σi is replaced by τi. Similarly for σ[τG/σG].
It is easy to see that if σAg is compliant with λ, and σi ≡λ σ′i, then
σ[σ′i/σi]Ag is also compliant with λ.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose λ is a computation, and strategy profile σ is com-
pliant with it. Suppose furthermore that G behaves social according to this
profile along λ. Then there exists a set of strategies τG, such that τG ∈ ∆G
and σG ≡λ τG.
Proof. For every finite prefix q0q1 . . . qn of λ, and every i ∈ G, take
τi(q0q1 . . . qn) = σi(q0q1 . . . qn). For this choice, we obviously have σi ≡λ τi.
Also, note that every action τi(q0q1 . . . qn) is a legal choice, because i be-
haves social according to the profile σ along λ. Since by definition of a
system S every agent can always perform a social action, we can extend τi
for any other sequence ~s of states in such a way that the choice τi(~s) is a
legal action. It is clear that τG satisfies the conditions of the lemma. q.e.d.
We noted above that in general there are more strategies for a coalition
in S◦ than there are in S. Our main result connecting a system S with
S◦ now says that all enforceable computations in one of the systems have a
computation that is bisimilar in the other.
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Theorem 5.9. Let S and S◦ be as defined before. Suppose λ is compliant
with profile σAg. Then: there is a computation λ◦ in S◦ and a strategy
profile σ◦Ag, such that 〈λ, σAg〉 ' 〈λ◦, σ◦Ag〉. The converse is also true: for
every computation λ◦ in S◦ that is compliant with a strategy λ◦Ag we can find
a strategy profile σAg and computation λ in S such that 〈λ, σAg〉 ' 〈λ◦, σ◦Ag〉.
Proof. From S to S◦: let λ = q0q1 . . . be an enforceable computation in S
and let it be compliant with σAg. Let σ◦ be a strategy in S◦ for agent i
satisfying:
σ◦i (~s) = σi(projQ+(~s))
The strategy profile σ◦Ag generates a computation λ
◦ = s0s1 . . . for any s0
with projQ(s0) = q0. Hence, by definition, σ◦Ag is compliant with λ
◦. This
shows item 1 of Definition 5.3. By definition of this λ◦ and σ◦i , also item 2
of Definition 5.3 is satisfied. We now demonstrate item 3 using induction on
the length of the computations, u. If u = 0, λ[0] = q0 = projQ(s0) = λ◦[0]
(note that q0 = projQ(s0) by our choice of s0). Now suppose the following
induction hypothesis (ih) holds: ∀n ≤ u : λ[n] = λ◦[n]. Then
λ[u+ 1] = by definition of computation
τ(λ[u], σAg(q0 . . . λ[u])) = definition of τ◦ and ih
τ◦(λ◦[u], σ◦Ag(s0 . . . λ
◦[u])) = by definition of computation
λ◦[u+ 1]
From S◦ to S: Let λ◦ = s0s1 . . . . Since λ◦ is enforceable, we know
that λ◦ is generated by some strategy profile σ◦Ag. Let λ = projQ+(λ
◦) =
projQ(s0)projQ(s1) . . . . It is easy to see that λ is generated by any strategy
profile σAg that satisfies, for any i ∈ Ag:
σi(projQ(s0)projQ(s1) . . .projQ(su)) = σ
◦
i (s0s1 . . . su)
Hence, σAg is compliant with λ. Item 2 of Definition 5.3 follows directly, as
does item 3 of that definition. q.e.d.
Going briefly back to Example 5.2, although the strategy τ in S◦ for
agent 2 that simulates ‘tit for tat’ has not immediately a counterpart in S,
in a computation λ◦, agent 1 must have made up his mind between behav-
ing ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and hence we either have the computation q11q11 . . .
or q11q01 . . . . And those do have a counterpart qq . . . in S, and they are
generated by different strategy profiles: in the first, 1 plays initially a, in
the second, it would be c.
5.3.2 Proving some reductions
The following reduction holds where G acts socially and the other agents
also act socially.
146 W. van der Hoek, M. Roberts, M. Wooldridge
Proposition 5.10. Let Tψ be an objective path formula and let q◦ be such
that projQ(q◦) = q.
Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ssTψ ⇔ Sys






Proof. Let ψ be an objective path formula. Suppose Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ssTψ. This
means that there is a social strategy σG ∈ ∆G for G, such that for any social
strategy σḠ ∈ ∆Ḡ for Ḡ, if λ = comp(〈σG, σḠ〉, q), then Sys, λ |= Tψ. (∗).
Now consider an arbitrary state q◦ in Sys◦ for which projQ(q◦) = q. Let,
for every i ∈ G, the strategy σ◦i for agent i be fixed: it is exactly like σi on ev-
ery projected sequence, that is, let σ◦i (~s; s) be σi(projQ+(~s); projQ(s)). Now
consider an arbitrary strategy σ◦
Ḡ
for Ḡ, and let λ◦ = comp(〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉, q
◦). If









To show that Sys◦, λ◦ |= good(G), recall that σG is a social strategy
for G, and then apply Corollary 5.6, item 2. To show that also Sys◦, λ◦ |=
good(Ḡ) → Tψ, assume that Sys◦, λ◦ |= good(Ḡ). Recall that λ◦ is
a computation λ◦ = comp(〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉, q
◦), where σ◦G is fixed. To stress that
the computation depends on the strategy σ̄◦G, we will also write λ
◦(σ̄◦G) for
λ◦. Obviously, each such λ◦(σ◦
Ḡ
) is compliant with 〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉. For each
such σ◦
Ḡ
, let the strategy σḠ in Sys be obtained from σ◦Ḡ in the stan-
dard way: it has to satisfy, for every agent ḡ in the coalition Ḡ, that
σḡ(projQ(λ◦[0]) . . .projQ(λ◦[n])) = σ◦ḡ(λ
◦[0], . . . λ◦[n]). Let λ(σḠ) =
comp(〈σG, σḠ〉, q), one computation for each σḠ. It is clear that, for each
σ◦
Ḡ
, λ(σḠ) and λ◦(σ◦Ḡ) are bisimilar computations, with strategy profiles




good(Ḡ), by Corollary 5.6, item 1, we have that Ḡ behaves social ac-
cording to 〈σG, σḠ〉 along λ. By Lemma 5.8, there is a strategy τG for G
such that τG ≡λ σG, and τG ∈ ∆G. That is, τG is a social strategy. By (∗),
we then have Sys, λ |= Tψ. Since λ and λ◦ are bisimulating computations,
we also have Sys◦, λ◦ |= Tψ, which had to be proven.
For the converse, let Sys◦, q◦ |= 〈〈G〉〉( good(G)∧( good(Ḡ) → Tψ)).
By the semantics of atl, this means that there is a strategy σ◦G for G,
such that for all strategies σ◦
Ḡ
, if λ◦ = comp(〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉, q
◦), then Sys◦, λ◦ |=
( good(G) ∧ ( good(Ḡ) → Tψ)). Note that σ◦G is fixed. From Corol-
lary 2 we know that every strategy 〈σG, σḠ〉 that is bisimilar to 〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉 is
such that G behaves social according to 〈σG, σḠ〉, i.e., σG ∈ ∆G. For any
q ∈ Q, let q1̃ be the a corresponding state in S◦ with all indices being a 1.
Now we define a strategy σi, for each i ∈ G, as follows:
σi(q0q1 . . . qn) = σ◦i (q01̃q11̃ . . . qn1̃)
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That is, σi ‘copies’ the behaviour as prescribed in σ◦i on ‘good paths’. We
are going to show that σG has the property that, if we combine it with any
σḠ ∈ ∆Ḡ, every computation λ = comp(〈σG, σḠ〉, q) has the property that
S, λ |= Tψ. This would complete the proof that S, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ssTψ.
So, take any social strategy σḠ for Ḡ. Take the strategy profile σAg =
〈σG, σḠ〉. Obviously, this is in ∆Ag, since both coalitions act socially. Let
λ be the computation comp(〈σG, σḠ〉, q). We know from Theorem 5.9 that
there is a computation λ• and a strategy profile σ•Ag such that 〈λ, σAg〉 '
〈λ•, σ•Ag〉. Note that we use fresh symbols for this compuation and strategy
profile, since λ◦ and σ◦ already have a meaning. Now we argue that λ•
can be conceived as a computation comp(〈σ◦G, σ◦Ḡ〉, q
◦). First of all, recall
that both G and Ḡ are acting socially in S. Hence, the computation λ•
is of the form q◦q11̃q21̃ . . . . In other words, apart from possibly the first
state, all states have indices xi that are all equal to 1! But then, on this
computation, we can just assume that the strategy of G is the earlier σ◦G:
on sequences with only 1’s, we have copied the choices of σ◦G to σG and
now back to λ•. Formally: for all u ∈ N and i ∈ G: σ•i (q◦q11̃q21̃ . . . qu1̃)
= σi(qq1q2 . . . qu) = σ◦i (q
◦q11̃q21̃ . . . qu1̃). Moreover, since σAg ∈ ∆Ag, we
have S◦, λ• |= (good(G) ∧ good(Ḡ)). But we know that on such paths,
when they are generated by σG, that Tψ holds. Now we use Lemma 5.4, to
conclude that S, λ |= Tψ, as required. q.e.d.
So far we have only looked at the reduction for cases where G is acting
socially and the other agents are also acting socially. When we alter the type
of strategies that the agents must follow, we obtain the following reductions,
of which the proof is similar to that of Proposition 5.10:
Proposition 5.11. Let ψ be an objective path formula, and T a temporal
operator. Let q◦ be such that projQ(q◦) = q.
1. Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉psTψ ⇔ Sys
◦, q◦ |= 〈〈G〉〉( good(G) ∧ Tψ)
2. Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉spTψ ⇔ Sys
◦, q◦ |= 〈〈G〉〉( good(Ḡ) → Tψ)
3. Sys, q |= 〈〈G〉〉ppTψ ⇔ Sys
◦, q◦ |= 〈〈G〉〉Tψ
There are properties we can express with the good states approach that
we can’t express with Social atel. For example, the following formula:
Sys◦, qx1,...,xn |= 〈〈〉〉 (good(Ag)U ϕ) (5.14)
Comparing this with (5.9) we see that both are generally saying that if
Ag act in a social manner then ϕ will eventually be true, however, (5.14)
only requires Ag to follow social strategies until ϕ is satisfied whereas (5.9)
requires Ag to always act in a social manner.



























l is forbidden in x’
S’S
Figure 4. Systems S and S′.
We now prove that (5.14) can not be expressed in Social atel. Firstly,
we introduce two systems, S and S′, illustrated in Figure 4. Both of these
systems consist of only one agent, which in each state is faced with the
choice of two actions: l or r (for left or right, respectively). There is only




Both the systems are the same apart from in S′ the action l is forbidden in
x′. It does not matter if the agent chooses l or r as both of these actions
lead to a state where the same propositions hold. This is given formally by
the following lemma:
Lemma 5.12. For the two systems S and S′, the following holds:
a. ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S, y1 |= ϕ⇔ S, y2 |= ϕ and S, z1 |= ϕ⇔ S, z2 |= ϕ;
b. ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S′, y′1 |= ϕ⇔ S′, y′2 |= ϕ and S′, z′1 |= ϕ⇔ S′, z′2 |= ϕ.
Proof. We only prove part a., as the proof of part b. follows exactly the
same reasoning. Firstly, we argue ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S, z1 |= ϕ ⇔ S, z2 |= ϕ, and
we do this using induction on ϕ. For atomic propositions p, negation and
conjunctions, this is straightforward. For the 〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ case, where T is
an arbitrary temporal operator, suppose the following induction hypothesis
holds: S, z1 |= ϕ ⇔ S, z2 |= ϕ. To evaluate S, z1 |= 〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ we will
consider computations that only visit z1, and, similarly, for S, z2 |= 〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ
gives rise to computations which only visit z2. So, using induction, the
computations visit ‘equivalent’ states, and we are done.
Finally, we want to prove:
∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S, y1 |= ϕ⇔ S, y2 |= ϕ
by induction on ϕ. The cases of p, ¬ϕ and ϕ1∧ϕ2 are again straightforward.
For the 〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ case, notice how τ(y1, l) = z1 and τ(y2, l) = z1, and
also τ(y1, r) = z2 and τ(y2, r) = z2. So l and r lead to the same states no
matter whether they are performed in y1 or y2. As we have already proven
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∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S, z1 |= ϕ⇔ S, z2 |= ϕ, it follows that S, y1 |= 〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ⇔ S, y2 |=
〈〈G〉〉ppTϕ. q.e.d.
The following theorem illustrates the fact that (5.14) can not be ex-
pressed in Social atel:
Theorem 5.13. Given the two systems, S and S′, shown in Figure 4,
we claim that ∀ϕ ∈ Φ, where Φ is the set of all Social atel formulae:
S, x |= ϕ ⇔ S′, x′ |= ϕ, but in the system with good states, S, x |=
〈〈〉〉(good(Ag)U p) while S′, x′ 6|= 〈〈〉〉(good(Ag)U p).
Proof. We prove ∀q ∈ Q,∀ϕ ∈ Φ : S, q |= ϕ⇔ S′, q′ |= ϕ by induction on ϕ.
For q ∈ {y1, y2, z1, z2} this is clear: every q and q′ satisfy the same atomic
propositions, and furthermore, the transitions lead to ‘similar’ states.
Let us now look at q = x ∈ Q. The key now is that every physical
computation in S starting in x has a corresponding physical computation
in S′ starting in x′, and the same for every legal computation in S: if
our agent chooses l in x in S, the next state is y1, which, by Lemma 5.12
is equivalent to y2, which, by the above, is equivalent to y′1. Also, every
physical (legal) computation in S′ from x′ has a corresponding physical
(legal) computation in S from x.
Finally, we show that in the system with good states, S, x |=
〈〈〉〉(good(Ag)U p) while S′, x′ 6|= 〈〈〉〉(good(Ag)U p). Recall we only have
one agent. In the good-state system associated with S, good(1) is true
everywhere, and we also have S, x |= 〈〈〉〉(good(Ag)U p): along every path,
good(1) is true until a p-state is reached. But in S′, good(1) is false in y1′
and there is a computation x′, y1′, z1′, z1′, . . . along which good(1)U p is
false. q.e.d.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended our social laws framework further. In pre-
vious work, the basic framework was extended to incorporate epistemic no-
tions, but here, we have extended this by removing the assumption that all
agents in the system will adhere to the social laws. Firstly, we extended the
semantic structures to allow us to model physical action pre-conditions and
legal action pre-conditions, in turn, allowing us to construct both physical
and legal strategies for the agents. With the semantic constructs in place,
we introduced our logical language for reasoning about such systems—Social
atel—based on atel but extended to allow us to refer to the type of strate-
gies being followed by the coalition of agents and the other agents in the
system.
Our paper is in fact only a modest first hint as to what can be done
when allowing for social and anti-social behaviour. There are many venues
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to further explore. For instance, our account of knowledge and belief here
only suggests some of its use, a deep analysis is not provided here. Especially
the notion of social belief deserves further attention. Next, connecting our
setup to atl and atl∗ as done in Section 5 left many questions unanswered:
we did not provide a precise fit. Finally, there are many other ways one can
deal with anti-social behaviour. A more quantitative way of thinking for
instance is provided in [3], where a property holds in a robust way if it
is guaranteed even if the system does at most one non-allowed transition.
One might also take a more qualitative view and consider some forms of
non-social behaviour more acceptable than others. Finally, to have a norm
as a condition on strategies rather than actions seems an interesting venue
to explore further.
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This paper is concerned with the problem of how to make inferences
about an agent’s beliefs based on an observation of how that agent
responded to a sequence of revision inputs over time. We collect
and review some earlier results for the case where the observation
is complete in the sense that (i) the logical content of all formulae
appearing in the observation is known, and (ii) all revision inputs
received by the agent during the observed period are recorded in the
observation. Then we provide new results for the more general case
where information in the observation might be distorted due to noise
or some revision inputs are missing altogether. Our results are based
on the assumption that the agent employs a specific, but plausible,
belief revision framework when incorporating new information.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
One of the overall goals of AI research is designing autonomous intelligent
agents that are capable of acting successfully in dynamic environments.
These environments may be artificial or even natural. In any case, it is very
likely that they are “inhabited” by more than one agent. So, an agent will
in general have to interact with (some of) the others. On the one hand,
the agent—if it does not want to be purely reactive—needs a model of its
environment in order to make informed choices of actions that change it in
a way that brings the agent closer to achieving its goal. On the other, it
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 153–182.
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also needs to model the other agents, making successful interaction more
likely.
Much research has been done on formalising and reasoning about the
effects of actions on an environment. Research on an agent’s view of the
world usually focuses on a first person perspective. How should the agent
adapt its beliefs about the world in the light of new information? However,
reasoning about other agents’ beliefs or background knowledge is just as
important. This work is intended to contribute to this latter question.
We will adopt a much narrower perspective than reasoning about other
agents in their full complexity which includes goals, intentions, (higher or-
der) beliefs, preferences, etc. and restrict our attention to their (proposi-
tional) beliefs about the world. We will also forget about the dynamic
environment and assume a static world. That is, we will work in a very
traditional belief revision setting. But rather than answering the question
of how an agent should rationally change its beliefs in the light of new in-
formation, we address the question of what we can say about an agent we
observe in a belief change process.
In [10], the authors use observable actions to draw conclusions about
other agents’ mental attitudes. But the beliefs of an agent manifest them-
selves not only in its actions. They may also be observed more directly, e.g.,
in communication. So indirectly we have access to parts of other agents’
belief revision processes. Information they receive is their revision input,
responses to that information are a partial description of their beliefs af-
ter the revision. From this information we may want to reason about the
observed agent. Consider the following scenarios.
• We are directly communicating with another agent, i.e., we are the
source of revision inputs for that agent. The feedback provided by the
agent will not reflect its entire set of beliefs. To get a more complete
picture we may want to infer what else was believed by the agent,
what its background knowledge might be.
• We observe a dialogue between two or more agents. Beliefs one agent
expresses are revision inputs for the others. Due to noise, private mes-
sages etc., we might not have access to the entire dialogue—possibly
missing some inputs completely. So we have to deal with partial in-
formation about the revision inputs.1 As we might have to deal with
the observed agents later, forming a picture of them will be useful.
The information at our disposal for reasoning about another agentA will
be of the following form. We are given a (possibly incomplete) sequence of
1 This is of course possible in the first case, as well. The communication might take place
in several sessions and we do not know which inputs the agent received in between.
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(partially known) revision inputs that were received by A. Further we are
given information on what the agent believed and did not believe after hav-
ing received each input. All this information constitutes an observation of
the agent. First we will briefly recall results for the case where observations
are complete with respect to the revision inputs received by A. These are
then used for dealing with the more general case.
The general approach to reasoning about an agent based on observations
will be as follows. We assume A to employ a particular belief revision
framework for incorporating revision inputs. We will then try to find a
possible initial state of A that best explains the observation. By initial
state we mean A’s epistemic state at the time the observation started. As
we do not know the true initial state, we will have to select a reasonable
one. This state explains the observation if it yields the beliefs and non-
beliefs recorded in the observation given the revision inputs received by the
agent. The meaning of best in this context will be explained later. The
initial state, which can be interpreted as A’s background knowledge, will
allow us to reason about beliefs not recorded in the observation.
Many approaches for reasoning about action, belief revision, etc. assume
the initial belief state being given and deal with the case of progression
through sequences of actions/revision inputs. They say little or nothing
about the case where the initial state is not known. In particular with
respect to the belief revision literature this work is intended to be a step
towards filling this gap.
1.2 Simplifying assumptions
We make several simplifying assumptions which will naturally limit the
applicability of the methods developed in this work but at the same time
allow a focused analysis of the problem we approach.
As mentioned above, we assume a static world in the sense that the
revision inputs and the information about the agent’s beliefs refer to the
same world. However, it is essential for our work that the revision inputs
were received over time. One central point is to exploit having intermediate
steps at our disposal. The observed agent itself may only be interested in
the final picture of the world. We in contrast want to extract information
about the agent from the process of its arriving there.
We restrict ourselves to propositional logic, and all components of an
observation are already provided in propositional logic generated from a
finite language. That is, we assume that revision inputs, beliefs and non-
beliefs are (and are directly observed as) propositional formulae. Agents are
assumed to be sincere, i.e., they are not deceptive about their beliefs, al-
though the information may be partial. The observed agent will be referred
to as A. We will disregard concepts like (preferences for) sources, compe-
tence, context, etc. A will be assumed to employ a particular belief revision
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framework which we describe in detail in Section 2. The only thing that
happens during the time of observation is that A incorporates the revision
inputs. In particular, it does not change its revision strategy or learns in
any other way. In that sense, we consider the observations to be short term.
We do not investigate strategies for extracting as much information about
A as possible. The observing agent simply uses the information provided to
reason along the way, being passive in that sense. That is, our focus is not on
the elicitation of information about other agents; the question of optimising
the reasoning process by putting agents in a setting where observations yield
the most precise results is another interesting topic which we do not pursue.
From the choice of revision framework it will become apparent that we
equate recency with reliability of the information. We are well aware that
this is highly debatable. We will briefly address this issue in the conclusion.
For real world applications many of these assumptions have to be
dropped or weakened. Many of the issues we disregarded will have to be
taken into account. But for the moment we try to keep the number of free
variables low in order to give more precise formal results. We hope to con-
vince the reader that even in this very restricted setting we will be able to
draw interesting, non-trivial conclusions. Also, we will show that even if
these assumptions are correct, there are very strict limitations to what we
can safely conclude about A.
1.3 Preliminaries
As stated above, the observed agent will be denoted by A. L will be used to
denote a propositional language constructed from a finite set of propositional
variables p, q, r, . . . , the connectives ∧,∨,¬,→,↔ and the symbols ⊥ for
some contradiction and ⊤ for some tautology. α, β, δ, θ, λ, ϕ, φ, ψ, and N
(often with subscript) will denote propositional formulae, i.e., particular
elements of L. In Section 3, χ will be used as placeholder for an unknown
formula. ⊢ is the classical entailment relation between a set of formulae
and a formula, where we abbreviate {α} ⊢ β by α ⊢ β for singleton sets.
Cn(S) denotes the set of all logical consequences of a set of formulae S, i.e.,
Cn(S) = {α | S ⊢ α}.
The revision operation ∗ introduced will be left associative and conse-
quently K ∗ ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2 is intended to mean (K ∗ ϕ1) ∗ ϕ2. σ and ρ are used to
denote sequences of formulae, () being the empty sequence. The function ·
denotes concatenation, so σ · ρ and σ · α represents sequence concatenation
and appending a formula to a sequence, respectively.
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 will introduce
the assumed agent model as well as the formal definition of an observation.
It further recalls the central results for the case where all revision inputs
received by A during the time of observation are completely known, i.e., in
particular the method for calculating the best explaining initial state and its
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properties. The section thus summarises [5, 6, 7]. It extends these papers
by also discussing the question of how safe conclusions we draw about A
are. Section 3 uses these results to deal with the case where the observation
is allowed to be more partial. In particular, some inputs may not have been
recorded in the observation (see also [23]) and the logical content of parts
of the observation may only be partially known. We show how this lack
of information can be represented and dealt with. This paper is intended
to give a broad overview over our proposed method for reasoning about an
observed agent. Hence, we give only short proofs sketches. Full proofs are
available in the first author’s PhD thesis [24].
2 Belief Revision Framework, Observation and
Explanation
2.1 The assumed belief revision framework
We already mentioned that we will assume the agent to employ a particular
belief revision framework. The first thing we will do is describe it. As we
consider observations of A’s belief revision behaviour over time, it is obvi-
ous that such a framework needs to support iterated revision [12, 17, 21].
Further, an observation may imply that a revision input was in fact not
accepted. For example it might be explicitly recorded that after being in-
formed that Manchester is the home of the Beatles, the agent does not be-
lieve this statement. Consequently, the assumed revision framework should
also account for non-prioritised revision [16, 19], i.e., revision where the
input is not necessarily believed after revising.
We will assume A to employ a belief revision framework [3] that is
conceptually similar to the approaches in [4, 9, 20, 25] but is able to handle
non-prioritised revision as well. The agent’s epistemic state [ρ,N] is made
up of two components: (i) a sequence ρ of formulae and (ii) a single formula
N, all formulae being elements of L. N stands for the agent’s set of core
beliefs—the beliefs of the agent it considers “untouchable”. One main effect
of the core belief is that revision inputs contradicting it will not be accepted
into the belief set. ρ is a record of the agent’s revision history. Revision by
a formula is carried out by simply appending it to ρ. The agent’s full set
of beliefs Bel([ρ,N]) in the state [ρ,N] is then determined by a particular
calculation on ρ and N which uses the function f which maps a sequence σ
of propositional formulae to a formula. This is done by starting off with the
last element of σ and then going backwards through the sequence collecting
those formulae that can be consistently added and forgetting about the
remaining ones.
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Definition 2.1.






β1 k = 1
βk ∧ f (βk−1, . . . , β1) k > 1 & βk ∧ f (βk−1, . . . , β1) 0 ⊥
f (βk−1, . . . , β1) otherwise
As hinted at above, iterated revision is handled quite naturally by the
framework. All revision steps are simply recorded and the problem of what
A is to believe after each revision step, in particular whether the input just
received is accepted, i.e., is believed, is deferred to the calculation of the
beliefs in an epistemic state. In order to calculate them the agent starts
with its core belief N and then goes backwards through ρ, adding a formula
as an additional conjunct if the resulting formula is consistent. If it is not,
then the formula is simply ignored and the next element of ρ is considered.
The belief set of A then is the set of logical consequences of the formula
thus constructed.
Definition 2.2. The revision operator ∗ is defined for any epistemic state
[ρ,N] and formula ϕ by setting [ρ,N]∗ϕ = [ρ·ϕ,N]. The belief set Bel([ρ,N])
in any epistemic state [ρ,N] is Bel([ρ,N]) = Cn(f (ρ ·N)).
Note, that we do not prohibit the core belief N to be inconsistent in
which case A’s belief set is inconsistent. This is the essential difference of
to the linear base-revision operator in [22]. From the definition, it is easy
to see that Bel([ρ,N]) is inconsistent if and only if N is inconsistent.
Example 2.3. Consider the epistemic state [(),¬p] of an agent. The beliefs
of the agent in this state are Cn(f (¬p)) = Cn(¬p). If q is received as a
new input, we get [(),¬p] ∗ q = [(q),¬p] as the new epistemic state. The
corresponding beliefs are Cn(f (q,¬p)) = Cn(q ∧ ¬p).
A further input q → p changes the epistemic state to [(q, q → p),¬p].
Note, that f (q, q → p,¬p) = (q → p) ∧ ¬p and q cannot be consistently
added, so now the agent believes the logical consequences of ¬q ∧ ¬p.
The revision input p changes the epistemic state to [(q, q → p, p),¬p]
but the beliefs remain unchanged, as p contradicts the core belief.
Given the state [ρ,N] of A and a sequence (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) of revision inputs
received in that state we can define the belief trace of the agent. This is a
sequence of formulae characterising the beliefs of A after having received
each of the inputs starting with the beliefs in [ρ,N].
Definition 2.4. Given a sequence (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) the belief trace
(Belρ0,Bel
ρ
1, . . . ,Bel
ρ
n) of an epistemic state [ρ,N] is the sequence of formulae
Bel
ρ
0 = f (ρ ·N) and Bel
ρ
i = f (ρ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The belief trace in the above example is (¬p, q ∧ ¬p,¬q ∧ ¬p,¬q ∧ ¬p).
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2.2 Observations
After having formalised the assumptions about any observed agent, we now
turn to the specific information we receive about a particular agent A—
some observation on its belief revision behaviour. An observation contains
information about revision inputs A received, what it believed and did not
believe upon receiving them.
Definition 2.5. An observation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 is a
sequence of triples (ϕi, θi, Di), where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: ϕi, θi, and all δ ∈ Di
(Di is finite) are elements of a finitely generated propositional language L.
The intuitive interpretation of an observation is as follows. After having
received the revision inputs ϕ1 up to ϕi starting in some initial epistemic
state, A believed at least θi but did not believe any element of Di. In
this section, we assume that during the time of the observation A received
exactly the revision inputs recorded in o, in particular we assume that no
input was received between ϕi and ϕi+1, the observation being correct and
complete in that sense. For the θi and Di we assume the observation to
be correct but possibly partial, i.e., the agent did indeed believe θi and did
not believe any δ ∈ Di, but there may be formulae ψ for which nothing
is known. In this case we have both θi 0 ψ and ψ 0 δ for any δ ∈ Di.
Note that complete ignorance about what the agent believed after a certain
revision step can be represented by θi = ⊤ and complete ignorance about
what was not believed by Di = ∅.
The observation does not necessarily give away explicitly whether a re-
vision input was actually accepted into A’s belief set or not. If θi ⊢ ϕi then
the revision input ϕi must have been accepted and if θi ⊢ ¬ϕi or ϕi ⊢ δ
for some δ ∈ Di then it must have been rejected. But if none of these
conditions hold, it is not obvious whether an input has been accepted or
rejected. Often, none of these two cases can be excluded. One of the aims
of our investigation is to draw more precise conclusions with respect to this
question.
A given observation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 covers only a
certain length of time of the agent’s revision history. When the observation
started, A already was in some epistemic state [ρ,N]. We will give the formal
conditions for an initial state to explain an observation o. The intuitive
interpretation of o is formally captured by the system of relations in the
second condition of the definition.
Definition 2.6. Let o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉. Then [ρ,N] ex-
plains o (or is an explanation for o) if and only if the following two condi-
tions hold.
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1. N 0 ⊥
2. For all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi) ⊢ θi
and
∀δ ∈ Di : Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi) 0 δ
We say N is an o-acceptable core iff [ρ,N] explains o for some ρ.
For us, an explanation of a given observation o is an epistemic state that
verifies the information in o and has a consistent core belief. It is (conceptu-
ally) easy to check whether an epistemic state [ρ,N] is an explanation for o.
It suffices to confirm that the conditions in Definition 2.6 are satisfied, i.e.,
that N is consistent and that for all i we have f (ρ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)) ⊢ θi and
f (ρ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)) 0 δ for all δ ∈ Di. A state with an inconsistent core
belief satisfies the second condition if and only if Di = ∅ for all i, so there
are observations that could be explained by such a state. However, we do
not consider claiming the agent to be inconsistent worthy of being called an
explanation.
Example 2.7. Let o = 〈(p, q,∅), (q, r,∅)〉 which states that A after receiv-
ing p believes q and after then receiving q believes r. It does not inform us
about any non-beliefs of the agent.
[ρ,N] = [(p → q), r] explains o because f (p→ q, p, r) entails q and
f (p→ q, p, q, r) entails r (both are equivalent to p ∧ q ∧ r). [(p → q),⊤]
does not explain o because f (p→ q, p, q,⊤) ≡ p ∧ q 0 r. [(), p ∧ q ∧ r],
[(p → q ∧ r),⊤], [(¬p, q, r), s], and [(q ∧ r),¬p] are some further possible
explanations for o.
There is never a unique explanation for o, in fact there are infinitely
many in case o can be explained. This is why our proposed method for rea-
soning about A is to choose one explanation [ρ,N]. Using N and the belief
trace we then draw our conclusions as follows. Revision inputs consistent
with N will be accepted by A, those inconsistent with N are rejected. A’s
beliefs after receiving the ith input are characterised by Belρi . In Section 2.4
we will discuss the quality of these conclusions and present a method for
improving them. But first we have to say how to actually choose one expla-
nation.
2.3 The rational explanation
This section recalls the essential results from [5, 6, 7] for identifying and
justifying the best of all possible explanations. A very important property
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of the framework is that A’s beliefs after several revision steps starting in
an initial state can equivalently be expressed as the beliefs after a single
revision on the same initial state. Intuitively, the agent merges its core
belief and all revision inputs received using f into a single formula and then
conditions its epistemic state using it.
Proposition 2.8. Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi)=Bel([ρ,N] ∗ f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)).
Proof (Sketch). Note that by Definition 2.4 it suffices to show that
f (ρ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)) ≡ f (ρ · (f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) ,N)) .
One property of f that follows from its recursive definition is f (σ · σ′) ≡
f (σ · f (σ′)). If we can show that f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) ≡ f (f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) ,N)
we are done as then in both cases equivalent formulae have been collected
before processing ρ. We can restrict our attention to consistent N, in which
case f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) is consistent and entails N. Hence
f (f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) ,N) = f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) ∧ N ≡ f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) .
q.e.d.
How does that help to reason about the observed agent A? Recall that
an observation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 expresses the information
that “revision by ϕ1 in the initial state leads to a new state (where θ1 but
no element of D1 is believed) in which revision by ϕ2 leads to. . . ” That
is, the observation contains bits of information concerning beliefs and non-
beliefs in different (if related) epistemic states. This proposition now allows
us to translate the observation into information about a single state—the
initial epistemic state we are after. Note however, that N needs to be
known for applying the proposition as otherwise f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) cannot be
calculated. So, given a core belief N, o yields that A would believe θi (and
would not believe any δ ∈ Di) in case it revised its initial epistemic state
by f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N). This is nothing but conditional beliefs held and not
held by A in its initial state [ρ,N]. That is, o is a partial description of A’s
conditional beliefs in [ρ,N]. The proposition further entails that if we had a
full description of its conditional beliefs we could calculate the beliefs after
any sequence of revision inputs.
It turns out that the assumed belief revision framework allows us to
apply existing work ([18] and in particular [8]) on completing partial infor-
mation about conditional beliefs2 and to construct a suitable ρ such that
2 [8] presents a rational closure construction that takes into account both positive and
negative information as is necessary in our case. It extends the case of positive-only
information studied in [18]. These papers also inspired the name rational explanation.
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[ρ,N] is indeed an explanation for o in case N is o-acceptable. ρR(o,N)
denotes the sequence thus constructed. The construction even reveals if a
given core belief is o-acceptable.
We further showed that the set of o-acceptable cores is closed under dis-
junction. If N1 and N2 are o-acceptable, then so is N1 ∨ N2.
3 This entails
that—if o can be explained at all—there is a unique logically weakest o-
acceptable core belief, which we denote by N∨(o). Consequently N ⊢ N∨(o)
for any o-acceptable N. The rationale behind choosing N∨(o) for an ex-
planation is that any input we predict to be rejected by A will indeed be
rejected. Furthermore, it can be shown that adding beliefs or non-beliefs
to o by strengthening some θi or enlarging some Di as well as appending
observations to the front or the back of o to get an observation o′ cannot
falsify this conclusion as N∨(o
′) ⊢ N∨(o). For any other core belief explain-
ing o, a revision input predicted to be rejected by the agent might in fact
be accepted. In this sense, we consider N∨(o) to be optimal.
The choice of ρR(o,N∨(o)), which we call the rational prefix, as the se-
quence in the agent’s initial epistemic state is justified by showing that it
yields an optimal belief traces. Let ρ = ρR(o,N∨(o)) and σ be the se-
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n) be the corresponding belief traces. Then the following
holds: If Belρj ≡ Bel
σ





4 This tells us that the
formulae we predict the agent to believe initially will indeed be believed
(although some further formulae might be believed as well)—provided the
agent’s core belief really is N∨(o). And if our predicted belief trace exactly
captures the agent’s beliefs up to the ith input then again all beliefs pre-
dicted after the next input will indeed be believed. The assumption that
the two explanations use the same core belief causes this criterion, which
we will refer to as the optimality criterion for the rational prefix, to be a
rather weak one as we will see shortly.
In [7], we defined [ρR(o,N∨(o)),N∨(o)] to be the rational explanation
of an observation o—if there is an explanation at all. That paper and [5]
contain more results about the rational explanation but these are the most
important ones which justify the claim that the rational explanation is the
best explanation for a given observation o. An algorithm which calculates
the rational explanation is given below and described in more detail in [6].
The problem with calculating [ρR(o,N∨(o)),N∨(o)] is that N∨(o) has to be
known, which it is not in the beginning. So the idea is to iteratively refine
the core belief starting with the weakest possible of all ⊤.
3 The proof is constructive and not deep but lengthy.






need not hold. Consider [(¬p),⊤] and [(p ∧ q,¬p),⊤]. The belief traces
when assuming a single input p are (¬p, p) and (¬p, p ∧ q). Although the beliefs are
equivalent initially, they need not be after a revision step.
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Algorithm 1: Calculation of the rational explanation.
Input: observation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉
Output: the rational explanation for o
N ⇐ ⊤
repeat
ρ⇐ ρR(o,N) /* now ρ = (αm, . . . , α0) */
N ⇐ N ∧ αm
until αm ≡ ⊤
return [ρ,N] if N 6≡ ⊥, “no explanation” otherwise
Having calculated the rational explanation [ρ,N] of an observation
o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉, we can make predictions concerning
which inputs A accepts and rejects based on N and our conclusions about
its beliefs after having received each input are summarised by the corre-
sponding belief trace (Belρ0,Bel
ρ
1, . . . ,Bel
ρ
n).
2.4 Safe conclusions and hypothetical reasoning
In the remainder of this section, we will illustrate some limitations of the
rational explanation. In particular, we will show that predictions based on
it will almost never be safe ones. However, this is inherent in the problem
and not due to our solution to it.
As with many optimisation problems the quality of the solution and the
conclusions we can draw from it depend heavily on the quality of the data
and validity of the assumptions made. In our case, we clearly stated the
assumptions made about the given observation as well as the agent’s being
ruled by the assumed framework. The optimality result for the best ex-
plaining core belief N∨(o), i.e., that N∨(o) is entailed by any o-acceptable
core, depends on those. The optimality of the rational prefix ρR(o,N) and
therefore the conclusions about A′s further beliefs also depend on its actu-
ally employing the assumed core belief. That is, if we cannot be sure of the
agent’s actual core belief then most of what we can say about the agent’s
belief trace based on the rational explanation is merely justified guesses but
not safe bets.
Example 2.9. (i) Let o = 〈(⊤, p,∅), (¬p,⊤,∅), (r ↔ ¬p, r ∨ p,∅)〉. The
rational explanation for o is [(p),⊤] and the corresponding belief trace is
(p, p,¬p, r ∧ ¬p). That is, we conclude that A accepted the input ¬p and
believes r ∧ ¬p after then receiving r ↔ ¬p.
Now assume the agent’s real initial belief state was [(), p]—note that
the core belief does not correspond to the one calculated by the rational
explanation—and thus the belief trace in truth is (p, p, p,¬r ∧ p). That is,
it did not accept the input ¬p and believed ¬r ∧ p after receiving r ↔ ¬p .
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So except for the beliefs before the observation started and after receiving
the tautology (where we are informed that the agent believes p and hence
must have believed it initially) most of the conclusions about beliefs held
by A we draw from the belief trace are wrong!
(ii) Let o = 〈(p, p,∅), (q, q,∅), (r ↔ p,⊤,∅)〉. The rational expla-
nation for o is [(),⊤] and the belief trace implied by that explanation is
(⊤, p, p∧ q, p∧ q ∧ r). Assuming that [(), q → ¬p] was A’s true initial state,
the belief trace in truth is (q → ¬p, p ∧ ¬q, q ∧ ¬p, q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬r). Again, for
large parts the conclusions we draw about the agent’s beliefs based on the
rational explanation are wrong. For example, we conclude that agent con-
tinues to believe p once it has been received. This is clearly not the case.
This strong dependence on the core belief can be easily explained. There
are two main effects due to the core belief. First, it causes revision inputs to
be rejected immediately. This is why the conclusions based on the rational
explanation are off the mark in case (i) in the above example. Secondly,
the core also accounts for interactions between revision inputs. An earlier
input is eliminated from the belief set in the light of the core and some
later inputs. This effect is illustrated in case (ii). For one choice of the core
belief, after having received the input ϕi+j , the agent may still believe the
input ϕi received earlier, while for another core it may believe ¬ϕi.
Even if we got the core belief right and hence the agent really employs
N∨(o), conclusions based on the rational explanation of o should not be
used without care. The optimality result for the rational prefix does not
exclude mistakes. Correct conclusions about beliefs are guaranteed only up
to the point in the belief trace where the beliefs we calculate and the agent’s
actual ones first fail to be equivalent. This can easily be the case already
for the initial beliefs.
Consider o = 〈(p, q,∅), (r,⊤,∅)〉 for which the rational explanation is
[(p → q),⊤], the corresponding belief trace being (p → q, p ∧ q, p ∧ q ∧ r).
So we would conclude the agent to keep believing in q. If the agent’s real
initial epistemic state was [(¬q,¬r ∧ q),⊤] then the real belief trace would
be (¬r ∧ q, p∧¬r ∧ q, r ∧¬q). Although the correct core was calculated, we
would still be wrong about q whose negation is in fact believed after having
received the input r.
As stated above, using the rational explanation [ρ,N∨(o)] we conclude
that A believed Belρi = f (ρ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N∨(o))) after having received the
first i revision inputs recorded in o. How safe is this conclusion? The above
example showed that it is not very safe. So what can we do to further
improve the results?
Here, we will consider only one very strong notion. We call the con-
clusion that A believes ψ after receiving the ith revision input recorded
in o safe if and only if for all explanations for o we have Beli ⊢ ψ, where
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Beli is the element of the belief trace corresponding to that input. In other
words, every possible explanation predicts that belief (so in particular the
one corresponding to the agent’s real initial state). Analogously, we call the
conclusion that the agent did not believe ψ at a certain point safe when-
ever no explanation predicts that formula to be believed. Note that a safe
conclusion about an agent’s belief does not mean that this belief is correct.
The agent may have received and accepted unreliable information, but it
means that given the observation, the agent must have held this belief.
We will now describe a way to calculate whether a conclusion of that
form is safe, a method we call hypothetical reasoning. By this we mean mod-
ifying the given observation according to some conjecture and rerunning the
rational explanation construction on the observation thus obtained. Note
that any explanation for
o′ = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕi, θi ∧ ψ,Di), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 or
o′ = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕi, θi, Di ∪ {ψ}), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉
will also explain o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕi, θi, Di), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉. This
follows directly from Definition 2.6. If θi ∧ψ belongs to the beliefs after the
ith revision step then so does θi and if none of the elements of Di ∪ {ψ} is
believed at that point, the same holds for any subset.
So in order to check whether the conclusion of A believing ψ after re-
ceiving the ith revision input is a safe one, we simply add ψ to Di and
test whether the observation thus obtained has an explanation.5 If so, then
the conclusion is not safe as there is an explanation where ψ is in fact not
believed. However, if no such explanation exists then ψ must indeed be be-
lieved by A. The non-belief of a formula ψ can be verified by replacing the
corresponding θi by θi ∧ ψ. If the observation thus obtained has an expla-
nation then the agent may have believed ψ and consequently the conclusion
is not safe.
With a small modification this method works also for hypothetical rea-
soning about the agent’s initial beliefs, i.e., before receiving the first input.
It does not work directly, as the observation does not contain an entry for
the initial state. By appending 〈(ϕ0, θ0, D0)〉 = 〈(⊤,⊤,∅)〉 to the front of
the observation o we create this entry. The point is that receiving a tau-
tology as input leaves the beliefs unchanged. We can now add a formula ψ
to D0 or θ0 as described above to verify conclusions about the initial state.
Further, there is no restriction which formulae ψ can be used for hypothet-
ical reasoning. It is even possible to add several ψj simultaneously to o to
get a modified observation o′.
5 The rational explanation algorithm always finds an explanation if there is one, and
returns “no explanation” if there is none.
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Hypothetical reasoning can also be used in order to improve the con-
clusions about A’s core belief N. We already know that N ⊢ N∨(o), i.e.,
all inputs we predict to be rejected by A will indeed be rejected. This is
because any o-acceptable core entails N∨(o). But what about the other in-
puts, must they really have been accepted? Can we be sure that ϕi really
was accepted if it is consistent with N∨(o)? Rejecting ϕi is equivalent to
not believing the input after having received it. So, we simply add ϕi to
Di, i.e., replace (ϕi, θi, Di) in o by (ϕi, θi, Di ∪ {ϕi}) to get o
′. If there is
an o′-acceptable core, then A may in fact have rejected ϕi. However, if o
′
does not have an explanation then we know that A must have accepted that
input.
It might be nice to be able to check whether conclusions aboutA’s beliefs
are safe, but can we ever be sure to have the correct core belief in order to
apply the optimality results we gave for the rational prefix? The answer to
this question is almost exclusively negative. Usually, there is more than one
o-acceptable core. In a different context Sébastien Konieczny6 suggested the
additional assumption that the last belief θn recorded in the observation
o is in fact complete. This assumption gives us an upper bound on the
actual core belief N as then θn ⊢ N ⊢ N∨(o) must hold and we can use
the hypothetical reasoning methodology in order to get an improved core
belief. As we know the exact belief θn at the end of the observation, we
can iteratively add to Dn those formulae ψ which the rational explanation
predicts to be believed but which are not entailed by θn. This method will
yield an improved lower bound for the core belief of the agent, but it cannot
guarantee uniqueness of the core.
Even if we assumed that every θi completely characterises the beliefs of
the agent after receiving ϕi, we would not be guaranteed to get the real core
belief. Consider o = 〈(p, p,∅), (q, p∧ q,∅), (r, p∧ q∧ r,∅)〉 to illustrate this.
The rational explanation for o is [(),⊤]. However, p is also an o-acceptable
core, [(), p] being one possible explanation. That is, the conclusion that an
input ¬p will be accepted by the agent is not safe. This illustrates that even
using much more severe assumptions about a given observation, identifying
the agent’s real core belief is impossible.
3 Extension to Unknown Subformulae
Up to this point we considered observations that were complete with respect
to the revision inputs received. We knew exactly which inputs were received
during the time of observation. The scenarios in the introduction suggested
that it is well possible that some of the inputs might have been missed. Fur-
ther, the observer may not understand the complete logical content of all the
revision inputs, A’s beliefs and non-beliefs. Consider the following example
6 Personal communication.
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where the agent is observed to receive exactly two inputs p and q. After
hearing p, the agent believed something we cannot understand, but after
then hearing q, it did not believe that anymore. In the original framework
this cannot be formalised as there is no means to represent the unknown
belief. However, we should be able to conclude that A believed ¬q after
having received p. This is because the assumed belief revision framework
satisfies (most of) the AGM postulates [1]. In particular, if the input is
consistent with the current beliefs they have to survive the revision process
(cf. the “Vacuity” postulate from AGM) which is clearly not the case in
the example. The current section investigates how the previous results can
still be used to reason about A if the observations are allowed to be less
complete in this sense.
We want to emphasise that there is a big difference between knowing
there was a revision input while being ignorant about its logical content
and not even knowing whether there were one or more revision inputs. We
will first deal with the former case which will provide results to deal with
the latter one in Section 3.3.
3.1 Modelling unknown logical content
We will model partial information by allowing formulae appearing in the
observation to contain unknown subformulae which are represented by n
placeholders χj . λ(χ1, . . . , χn)[(χi/φi)i] denotes the result of replacing in λ
every occurrence of χi by φi.
Definition 3.1. Let L be a propositional language and χ1, . . . , χn be place-
holders not belonging to L.
A “formula” λ(χ1, . . . , χn) possibly containing χ1, . . . , χn is called a
parametrised formula based on L iff λ(χ1, . . . , χn)[(χi/φ)i] ∈ L whenever
φ ∈ L. o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕl, θl, Dl)〉 is a parametrised observation
based on L iff all ϕi, θi, δ ∈ Di are parametrised formulae based on L.
We denote by L(o) the smallest language L a parametrised observation o is
based on.
To put it differently, a parametrised formula based on L is a formula from
L in which some subformulae have been replaced by placeholders χi. This
allows hiding parts of the logical content of a formula. So in order to model
(even more) partial knowledge, we will consider parametrised observations.
The example from the introductory paragraph can now be represented by
o = 〈(p, χ,∅), (q,⊤, {χ})〉. We will often write λ rather than λ(χ1, . . . , χn)
to denote a parametrised formula in order to ease reading.
Unknown subformulae χi are allowed to appear in all components of
an observation—revision inputs, beliefs and non-beliefs. The same χi can
appear several times. In fact, this is when it contributes to the reasoning
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process. It is not unreasonable to assume that this can happen. For ex-
ample, the meaning of an utterance in a dialogue might not be understood
as part of the language may not be known to the observing agent, but the
utterance might be recognised when it appears again later. Analogous to
a learner of a foreign language, the observer may be familiar with (parts
of) the structure of the language while being ignorant about the meaning
of certain “phrases”. In case we are completely ignorant about the logical
content the entire parametrised formula will simply be a placeholder.
Let o be a parametrised observation. o[χ1/φ1, . . . , χn/φn] and equiva-
lently o[(χi/φi)i] denote the observation obtained by replacing in o every
occurrence of the placeholder χi by a formula φi.
We still assume correctness of the information contained in the parame-
trised observation o, i.e., we assume the existence of instantiations φi of all
unknown subformulae χi such that the observation o[(χi/φi)i] is a correct
observation in the sense of Section 2—in particular, there must be an entry
for every revision input received. The agent indeed received exactly the
inputs recorded and beliefs and non-beliefs are correct if partial. Note that
this implies that we are not yet able to deal with missing inputs. These will
be considered in Section 3.3. One important technical restriction is that
the instantiations of unknown subformulae χi must not contain unknown
subformulae χj themselves, i.e., the instantiations must be elements of the
underlying language—however, not necessarily elements of L(o). That is,
the true meaning of χi is not assumed to be expressible in the language of
the known part of o. Abusing notation we will write that o has an expla-
nation, meaning that there exist instantiations φ1, . . . , φn for the unknown
subformulae such that o[(χi/φi)i] has an explanation; similarly that N is
o-acceptable if N is o[(χi/φi)i]-acceptable.
3.2 Finding an acceptable core belief
In this section, we will present results on what can be said about A’s core
belief given a parametrised observation o. If an explanation exists at all,
once more there will be a unique weakest o-acceptable core N. This may
be surprising as there are many different possible instantiations for the un-
known subformulae. But this will also allow us to choose them such that any
o-acceptable core entails N. If we knew the instantiations of the unknown
subformulae we could simply use the rational explanation algorithm, as in
that case a parametrised observation could be transformed into a regular
one. As we do not know them, we have to guess. The trick is to extend the
language and treat every χi as a new propositional variable xi.
Proposition 3.2. If [ρ,N] explains o[(χi/φi)i] and x1, . . . , xn are prop-
ositional variables not appearing in o, N, ρ or any φi then o[(χi/xi)i] is
explained by [ρ,N ∧
∧
1≤i≤n(xi ↔ φi)].
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Proof (Sketch). λ[(χi/φi)i] ⊢ ⊥ iff
∧
1≤i≤n(xi ↔ φi) ∧ λ[(χi/xi)i] ⊢ ⊥ for
any parametrised formula λ not containing xi is the key to this result. As
the xi are not contained in [ρ,N] or o[(χi/φi)i], requiring
∧
(xi ↔ φi) en-
sures that the different instantiations have the same logical consequences—
modulo entailment of irrelevant formulae containing the xi. The (relevant)
beliefs are the same for both explanations. q.e.d.
The proposition formalises that given there is some instantiation for
the unknown subformulae in o such that the resulting observation has an
explanation, we can also replace them by new variables and still know that
there is an explanation. However, this tells us that we can apply the rational
explanation algorithm to o[(χi/xi)i] and be guaranteed to be returned an
explanation if there is one. If this fails, i.e., we are returned an inconsistent
core belief, then no explanation can exist using any instantiation of the
unknown subformulae in o. The core belief N ∧
∧
1≤i≤n(xi ↔ φi) ensures
that the new variables xi behave exactly as the “correct” instantiations φi
for the unknown subformulae in o.
In general, N∨(o[(χi/xi)i])—the core belief returned by the rational ex-
planation algorithm—will not be that particular formula. Note that this
would be impossible as there can be several suitable instantiations such
that o[(χi/φi)i] has an explanation. The core belief calculated will in gen-
eral be weaker but may still contain (some of) the additional variables xi.
We will now go on to show that it is possible to eliminate these variables
from the core belief by choosing different instantiations for the unknown
subformulae.
The idea is to split the core N calculated by the rational explanation
construction into two parts, one N′ that talks only about L(o) and not
at all about the additional variables and one ψ part that talks also about
those. Formally, we choose N′ and ψ such that N ≡ N′ ∧ ψ and Cn(N′) =
Cn(N) ∩ L(o), which is possible as we are in a finite setting.7 Instead of xi
we then use xi ∧ ψ to instantiate the placeholders. This shifting of parts of
the core to the new variables is possible because the part of the core belief
that talks about the xi becomes relevant in the calculation of the beliefs of
an agent only when those variables themselves appear.
Proposition 3.3. If [ρ,N] explains o[(χi/xi)i] then there exist N
′ and ψ
such that N′ contains no xi and [ρ · ψ,N
′] explains o[(χi/xi ∧ ψ)i] .
Proof (Sketch). Let ψ = N and N′ such that Cn(N′) = Cn(N) ∩ L(o). It
can now be shown that f (ϕ1[(χi/xi)i], . . . , ϕj [(χi/xi)i],N) is equivalent to
f (N, ϕ1[(χi/xi ∧N)i], . . . , ϕj [(χi/xi ∧ N)i],N
′). Again, the proof of that is
7 We can trivially choose ψ = N and N′ to represent all logical consequences of N in
L(o).
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not deep but lengthy. The intuition is that N′ makes sure that with respect
to L(o) all formulae are treated correctly and using xi∧N rather than just xi,
the effect of N with respect to new variables is maintained. Consequently,
before processing ρ when calculating the beliefs, in both cases equivalent
formulae have been constructed and the beliefs will thus be equivalent.
q.e.d.
To summarise what we know so far. Given a parametrised observation
o has an explanation, we can construct one for o[(χi/xi)i]. However, the
corresponding core belief N∨(o[(χi/xi)i]) may still contain variables that
are not contained in L(o) and thus we cannot claim that the agent had
contact with them. The last proposition now showed that we can construct
instantiations for the unknown subformulae such that the explaining core
belief N′ is in L(o). We can even go one step further and show that any
o[(χi/φi)i]-acceptable core N
′′ must entail the core N′ constructed as de-
scribed above.
Proposition 3.4. Let [ρ′′,N′′] be an explanation for o[(χi/φi)i] and [ρ,N]
be the rational explanation for o[(χi/xi)i], where xi are additional propo-
sitional variables not appearing in any φi, N
′′ or the language L = L(o).
Further let N′ such that Cn(N′) = Cn(N) ∩ L. Then N′′ ⊢ N′.
Proof. By Proposition 3.2 N′′ ∧
∧
(xi ↔ φi) is o[(χi/xi)i]-acceptable and




(xi ↔ φi) ⊢ N
′. Now assume N′′ does not entail N′ which implies
there is a model for N′′ ∧ ¬N′. Neither N′′ nor N′ contain any xi so we can
extend that model to one for N′′ ∧
∧
(xi ↔ φi) ∧ ¬N




(xi ↔ φi) ⊢ N
′. q.e.d.
There is an important consequence of that result. As in the original case
there is a unique weakest o-acceptable core for a parametrised observation o.
This follows directly from the last two propositions. N′, being constructed as
described above, is o-acceptable and is entailed by any o-acceptable core, so
in particular by the agent’s real core belief. Hence, all formulae inconsistent
with N′ will be rejected by A. That is, N′ yields a safe conclusion with
respect to which formulae must be rejected by A—no matter what the
instantiations of the unknown subformulae really are.
Example 3.5. Consider o = 〈(χ, χ,∅), (p, q ∧ ¬χ,∅)〉. This parametrised
observation expresses that the observed agent accepted an input whose
meaning is unknown to us. After then receiving p, it believed q and the
negation of the unknown input. The observation constructed according to
Proposition 3.2, where χ is replaced by a new variable x, is
o[χ/x] = 〈(x, x,∅), (p, q ∧ ¬x,∅)〉. The rational explanation for o[χ/x] is
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[(p ∧ ¬x → q), p → ¬x] and (p → (¬x ∧ q), x ∧ ¬p, p ∧ q ∧ ¬x) is the
corresponding belief trace.
This indicates that after receiving the unknown input the agent believes
¬p. In order to test whether this is necessarily the case, we investigate the
parametrised observation o′ = 〈(χ, χ, {¬p}), (p, q ∧ ¬χ,∅)〉. According to
the hypothetical reasoning methodology, ¬p was added to the non-beliefs.
Applying the rational explanation algorithm yields that o′[χ/x] has no ex-
planation. Proposition 3.2 now tells us that there cannot be an explanation
for o′—no matter how χ is instantiated. That is, if the parametrised obser-
vation correctly captures the information about the agent, it must believe
¬p after receiving the first input.
o is based on the language L constructed from the variables p and q
and Cn(p → ¬x) ∩ L = Cn(⊤). To illustrate Propositions 3.3 and 3.4
note that o[χ/x ∧ (p → ¬x)] = 〈(x ∧ ¬p, x ∧ ¬p,∅), (p, q ∧ (¬x ∨ p),∅)〉 is
explained by [(p∧¬x→ q, p→ ¬x),⊤], the corresponding belief trace being
(p→ (¬x∧ q), x∧¬p, p∧ q∧¬x). ⊤ is trivially entailed by any o-acceptable
core.
In order to find an acceptable core for a parametrised observation o,
we extended the language L(o) with new variables. In [23], we gave an
example—which we will not repeat here—illustrating that there are param-
etrised observations that have an explanation when language extension is
allowed but which cannot be explained restricting the language to L(o). In
other words, the proposed algorithm of replacing each χi by a new vari-
able xi, running the rational explanation construction and then eliminating
the xi from the core belief (the result being N
′) may yield an explanation,
although none exists when restricting the instantiations of the χi to L(o).
Although we know that each acceptable core will entail N′, we cannot gener-
ally say that restricting the instantiations to L(o) will allow the same core,
a strictly stronger one or none at all to explain o.
Note that Proposition 3.2 makes no assumption about the language of
the instantiations φi of the unknown subformulae. They may or may not
belong to L(o). They may contain arbitrarily (but finitely) many propo-
sitional variables not belonging to L(o). However, that proposition has
an interesting implication. It says if o[(χi/φi)i] has an explanation then
so does o[(χi/xi)i], but o[(χi/xi)i] contains only variables from L(o) and
n additional variables xi, one for each placeholder. As that observation
has an explanation, the rational explanation construction will return one.
However, that construction uses only formulae present in the observation.
Consequently, it does not invent new variables. So, no matter how many
variables not appearing in L(o) were contained in the φi, n additional vari-
ables suffice for finding an explanation for the parametrised observation o.
This yields an upper bound on additional variables needed.
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In Section 2.4 we showed that assuming the wrong core belief greatly
affects the quality of the conclusions about A’s other beliefs. And even if
the core is correct, the belief trace implied by the rational explanation does
not necessarily yield only safe conclusions with respect to the beliefs of the
agent during the observation.
These problems are obviously inherited by the current extension to par-
tial information about the logical content of the formulae in an observation.
They cannot be expected to become less when not even knowing what in-
puts the agent really received or when information about the beliefs and
non-beliefs becomes even more vague. Much depends not only on the core
belief but also on the instantiation of the unknown subformulae. So rather
than just having to calculate a best initial epistemic state, we now would
also have to find an optimal instantiation of the unknown subformulae.
However, the limitations illustrated in Section 2.4 prevent us from even at-
tempting to look for them. Instead, we propose to investigate the belief
trace implied by the rational explanation of an observation o[(χi/xi)i] and
reason hypothetically about beliefs and non-beliefs from L(o) in that belief
trace.
3.3 Intermediate inputs
Up to now, we assumed the (parametrised) observation o to contain an entry
(ϕ, θ,D) for every revision input received by A, even if some of the formulae
are only partially known. This corresponds to the assumption of having
an eye on the agent at all times during the observation. In this section,
we want to drop this assumption. That is, we will allow for intermediate
inputs between those recorded in o. In real applications this will be the
norm rather than an exceptional case. A or the observing agent may leave
the scene for a time, and if the observing agent is the source of information
then o might have been gathered over several sessions between which A may
have received further input.
Using our notation for observations, an intermediate input is one we
have no information about, i.e., we do not know what the revision input
is or what is believed or not believed after receiving it. Hence, we can
represent it by 〈(χ,⊤,∅)〉; χ again represents an unknown formula. Note
that this is different from 〈(χ, χ,∅)〉 as here the input would be required to
be accepted by A. In other words, the agent’s core belief would have to be
consistent with the instantiation of χ.
Example 3.6. Consider the following observation without intermediate in-
puts: o = 〈(p, q,∅), (p,¬q,∅)〉. Assume N was o-acceptable and thus con-
sistent. Then either it is consistent or inconsistent with p. In both cases,
the belief set does not change upon receiving the second input p. Either
the first p was accepted and hence already believed or p was rejected (both
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times) in which case the belief set never changes. So ¬q must have been
believed already after the first p was received. But it is not possible to
believe q ∧ ¬q consistently (the belief set is inconsistent if and only if the
core belief is inconsistent). Consequently, there is no o-acceptable core.
Assuming a single intermediate input 〈(χ,⊤,∅)〉, there is only one rea-
sonable position yielding o′ = 〈(p, q,∅), (χ,⊤,∅), (p,¬q,∅)〉. Instantiating
the unknown formula χ with p → ¬q, [(p → q),⊤] is an explanation. Be-
fore receiving the first input the agent believes p → q, after receiving the
first p it believes p∧ q and after receiving the (assumed) intermediate input
as well as after receiving the last input p it believes p ∧ ¬q. Hence ⊤ is
o′-acceptable. That is, while o does not have an explanation, assuming an
intermediate input allows the observation to be explained.
In the general case we do not know how many intermediate inputs were
received at which points in a given (parametrised) observation o. In [23]
we showed that number and positions of the intermediate inputs have an
impact on the possible explanations of o. If number and positions are
fixed then we deal with a parametrised observation (containing an entry
for every revision input received) and can hence use the results of Sec-
tion 3.2 in order to calculate the weakest acceptable core belief. To rep-
resent the intermediate inputs we simply have to introduce further un-
known subformulae not contained in o. Assume we have the partial ob-
servation o = 〈(p, q ∧ χ1,∅), (r,¬q,∅), (p, q, {χ1})〉 and the information
that exactly two intermediate inputs have been received immediately af-
ter r. In order to reason about A, we consider the partial observation
o′ = 〈(p, q ∧ χ1,∅), (r,¬q,∅), (χ2,⊤,∅), (χ3,⊤,∅), (p, q, {χ1})〉 which now
contains an entry for every input received. At this point we want to em-
phasise once more that intermediate inputs and partial information about
inputs are related but distinct cases.
In the following we want to indicate what can be said about the agent’s
core belief depending on how much information we have concerning possible
intermediate inputs. Naturally, the more specific our knowledge concerning
number and positions, the more informative the conclusions can be. We will
start with the case where we have no information at all, which means that
any number of intermediate inputs may have been received any time. Then
we will turn to the cases where the positions or the number are restricted.
Any number of intermediate inputs at any time. Consider an ob-
servation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉. Assume [ρ,N] explains the
observation o′ which is obtained from o by putting some arbitrary number
of intermediate inputs at any position in o. It can be proved that then there
are a sequence σ and n− 1 intermediate inputs such that [σ,N] explains o′′
obtained from o by putting exactly one intermediate input between any two
inputs ϕi and ϕi+1 in o. Note that both explanations use the same core
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belief. Intuitively, the intermediate input from o′′ before the input ϕi+1 is
the conjunction of all relevant intermediate inputs from o′ before that input.
Proposition 3.2 tells us that we can also use new variables xi instead of
those intermediate inputs8 and the observation o′′′ thus obtained is guar-
anteed to have an explanation. However, o′′′ does not contain any un-
known subformulae, so we can apply the rational explanation construc-
tion which will return some epistemic state with core belief N′. We can
now construct the weakest possible core belief by taking N′′ such that
Cn(N′′) = Cn(N′)∩L(o). Any o′-acceptable core belief—o′ being constructed
as described above—will entail N′′. That is from N′′ we can safely conclude
which formulae are rejected by A, no matter how many intermediate inputs
it received at any point during the observation.
What happens if we have further information about the positions or
the number of intermediate inputs? The following proposition implies that
we should always assume the maximal number of intermediate inputs. It
says that an additional intermediate input, which we instantiate with a new
variable for calculating the weakest possible core belief, can only make the
core logically weaker. Conversely, not assuming the maximal number of
intermediate inputs may lead to the conclusion that A rejects a formula
which it actually does not reject simply because an additional intermediate
input allows A’s core belief to be logically weaker.
Proposition 3.7. If Cn(N) = Cn(N∨(o1 · 〈(x,⊤,∅)〉 · o2)) ∩ L(o1 · o2) and
x 6∈ L(o1 · o2) then N∨(o1 · o2) ⊢ N.
Proof (Sketch). By showing N∨(o1 · o2) ≡ N∨(o1 · 〈(⊤,⊤,∅)〉 · o2), which
holds because a tautologous input has no impact, we introduce the extra
input which allows us to compare the cores. By Proposition 3.2,
N∨(o1 · 〈(⊤,⊤,∅)〉 · o2) ∧ x is o1 · 〈(x,⊤,∅)〉 · o2-acceptable and hence en-
tails N∨(o1 · 〈(x,⊤,∅)〉 · o2). We can now show that any formula from
L(o1 · o2) entailed by that core as already entailed by N∨(o1 · o2). q.e.d.
Fixed positions of intermediate inputs. Now assume we know the po-
sitions where intermediate inputs may have occurred. This is imaginable,
for example, in scenarios where the observing agent gathers o in several ses-
sions, but does not know if A receives further inputs between those sessions.
How many intermediate inputs should be assumed at each of those points?
We cannot allow an arbitrary number as this is computationally infeasible,
so it would be helpful to have an upper bound which we could then use. We
claim that it suffices to assume j intermediate inputs at a particular posi-
tion in o, where j is the number of revision inputs recorded in o following
8 That is, we put an entry 〈(xi,⊤,∅)〉 with a new variable xi between any two entries
〈(ϕi, θi,Di)〉 and 〈(ϕi+1, θi+1, Di+1)〉 in o.
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that position, i.e., ignoring possible intermediate inputs appearing later.9
The intuition is as above. For every recorded revision input, we assume one
intermediate input which collects all the relevant intermediate inputs that
have really occurred.
If this claim is correct, we can introduce into o one entry (χi,⊤,∅) for ev-
ery intermediate input. Thus we get a parametrised observation containing
an entry for every revision input received. We can then construct a weakest
acceptable core belief by instantiating each χi by xi, calculating the rational
explanation of the observation thus obtained and then eliminating the addi-
tional variables from the core belief. For example, given an observation o=
〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕ5, θ5, D5)〉 and the information that intermediate inputs
have been received only after ϕ2 and ϕ4, we can calculate the weakest pos-
sible core starting with o′ = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), (ϕ2, θ2, D2), (x1,⊤,∅), (x2,⊤,∅),
(x3,⊤,∅), (ϕ3, θ3, D3), (ϕ4, θ4, D4), (x4,⊤,∅), (ϕ5, θ5, D5)〉 and eliminating
the xi from N∨(o
′). Again, all xi are propositional variables not contained
in L(o).
The above claim for limiting the number of assumed intermediate inputs
follows almost immediately from the following proposition.
Proposition 3.8. Let ρ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) and σ = (ψ1, . . . , ψm). Then there
exists a σ′ = (ψ′1, . . . , ψ
′
n) such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
f (σ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)) ≡ f (σ
′ · (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)) .
Proof (Sketch). The proof of this result uses the fact that for every sequence
σ there is a logical chain σ′ (a sequence of formulae where each formula is
entailed by its successor) that behaves exactly like σ. That is f (σ · ρ′) ≡
f (σ′ · ρ′) for all sequences ρ′. However, for this result it suffices that σ and
σ′ behave equivalently for all prefixes of ρ. We then show that a suitable
σ′ exists, in fact using the rational explanation algorithm and hypothetical
reasoning. q.e.d.
Note that this result is not trivial, as m can be (much) greater than
n and in this case we have to find a shorter sequence yielding equivalent
formulae for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This proposition tells us that we can replace
one block of intermediate inputs σ by one of the proposed length and be
guaranteed an equivalent formula being constructed in the calculation for
each recorded revision input ϕi coming later in the observation.
We want to remark that some care has to be taken when considering the
general case, where several blocks of intermediate inputs exist. Then ρ in
the proposition may contain more elements than just the recorded revision
9 The above result—that one intermediate input between any two recorded ones is
enough—is not applicable here. Intermediate inputs may not be allowed at every
position.
176 A. Nittka, R. Booth
inputs; it also contains intermediate ones. And thus we have to find a
sequence σ′ not of length n but j ≤ n where j is the number of recorded
inputs. We are currently investigating whether the number of intermediate
inputs that have to be assumed can be reduced further without effect on
the core belief calculated.
Fixed number of intermediate inputs. If we are given a maximal (or
exact) number n of intermediate inputs that may have occurred we can draw
conclusions about the core belief of the agent using the following method.
Due to Proposition 3.7 we should indeed assume the maximal number of
intermediate inputs—n. So let o be the observation containing only recorded
inputs. If o has less than n+2 recorded inputs and there are no restrictions
as to the positions of the intermediate inputs, we can use the result that
one intermediate input between any two recorded ones suffices to explain
o; otherwise, there are not enough intermediate inputs for this result to be
applicable. In this case, we create the set of all possible observations o′
where n intermediate inputs have been inserted in o:
O′ = {o1 · 〈(x1,⊤,∅)〉 · o2 · . . . · 〈(xn,⊤,∅)〉 · on+1 | o = o1 · . . . · on+1}.
Here we have already replaced the unknown formulae by new variables. If
we have information about the positions of the intermediate inputs we can
also take this into account when constructing O′. The observation oj may be
empty, so consecutive intermediate inputs are explicitly allowed. Now any
possible core belief will entail
∨
{N | Cn(N) = Cn(N∨(o
′)) ∩ L(o), o′ ∈ O′}.
Note that this formula itself need not be an o′-acceptable core, i.e., it may
not really explain the observation using n intermediate inputs. Conclusions
about beliefs and non-beliefs can only be safe if they are safe for every
observation in O′.
3.4 Summary
In this section, we showed what can still be said about A if some of the com-
pleteness assumptions about the observation o are weakened. We started
by allowing unknown subformulae χi to appear in o. This can happen as
the logical content of the revision inputs or the beliefs need not be com-
pletely known. In case the observation still contains a record for every in-
put received, the calculation of an optimal core belief is still possible. The
proposed method for dealing with such parametrised observations was to
instantiate the unknown subformulae χi with new variables and apply the
rational explanation construction to the observation thus obtained. From
this explanation we can safely conclude which beliefs must belong to the
agents core belief no matter what the real instantiation of the χi was.
We showed in [23] that although we can construct a core belief from
L(o) this does not guarantee that o can be explained without extending the
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language. The unknown subformulae may still have to contain variables
not belonging to L(o). We claim that it is not useful to look for an optimal
instantiation of the unknown subformulae. Weakest core belief and belief
trace heavily depend on the choice of the instantiation of the χi and even
if we had the correct ones, Section 2.4 showed that the conclusions drawn
from the belief trace implied by our explanation are of limited use. Instead
we argue that the χi should be instantiated with xi and reasoning be done
based on the rational explanation. This allows us to draw correct conclu-
sions about the actual core belief of the agent, which must entail the one
calculated that way. Further, we can use hypothetical reasoning to verify
other beliefs and non-beliefs (restricted to L(o)) implied by the explanation
thus obtained.
The additional assumption that the belief corresponding to the last re-
vision input in the (parametrised) observation completely characterises A’s
beliefs at that point once more need not help. It might not even convey
additional information about the language of the agent’s epistemic state
or of the unknown subformulae. Consider the parametrised observation
〈(p ∧ χ,⊤,∅), (¬p,¬p,∅)〉. It might not be very interesting but it illus-
trates the point. As ¬p is inconsistent with the first input, χ could be
instantiated with any formula and still ¬p would completely characterise
the agent’s final beliefs.
We then further allowed intermediate inputs, i.e., the original observa-
tion does not contain a record for every input received. Some observations
can be explained only when assuming that intermediate inputs have oc-
curred. When fixing their number and positions, the problem is reduced to
partially known inputs. If the observing agent does not have this informa-
tion, we sketched procedures for drawing conclusions about what A’s core
belief must entail.
4 Conclusion, Future and Related Work
In this paper, we departed from the traditional belief revision setting of
investigating what an agent should believe after receiving (a sequence of
pieces of) new information in a given initial state. Instead, we place our-
selves in the position of an observer trying to reason about another agent in
the process of revising its beliefs. Coming up with models of other agents
is useful in many application areas as informed decisions may improve the
personal or group outcome of interactions.
The basic and admittedly oversimplified setting we consider is that we
are given an observation containing propositional information about the re-
vision inputs received by an agent A and about its beliefs and non-beliefs
following each input. We investigated several degrees of incompleteness of
the information provided. From such an observation we try to get a clearer
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picture of A. Assuming A to employ a particular belief revision frame-
work, the general approach for reasoning about the agent is to “regress”
the information contained in the observation to arrive at a possible initial
state of the agent. This state completely determines the revision behaviour
and therefore allows to draw conclusions about A’s beliefs at each point in
time during the observation as well as future beliefs. Even under the very
strict assumptions we impose, hardly any safe conclusions can be drawn.
Intuitively, this is because coming up with A’s true initial state is virtually
impossible. The observing agent can only try to extend and refine the ob-
servation and reason hypothetically in the sense of testing conjectures about
A in order to improve the model.
It should be clear that the general question does not require the use of
the belief revision framework we assumed. For future work, it might be
interesting to see if similar results can be obtained when assuming A to
employ a different framework. It would be interesting to see how differ-
ent revision frameworks compare with respect to their power to explain an
observation and whether there is a significant difference in the quality of
the conclusions that can be drawn. Another important question is whether
there is a way to actually find out which revision framework an observed
agent employs or whether other assumptions can be verified. We claimed
that it is not reasonable to look for the optimal instantiation of the un-
known subformulae but rather do hypothetical reasoning restricted to L(o).
However, in some applications it might be interesting to know what the
actual revision input was that triggered a certain reaction in the agent. So
comparing potential instantiations (possibly from a fixed set of potential
formulae) could be a topic for future research.
We want to remark that the methodology illustrated in this paper can
also be applied in slightly modified settings. It is possible to construct an
initial state that explains several observations in the sense that different
revision sequences start in the same state. This is reasonable, e.g., when
thinking about an expert reasoning about different cases (the initial state
representing the expert’s background knowledge) or identical copies of soft-
ware agents being exposed to different situations. Our work is focused on
reasoning using observations of other agents, but observing oneself can be
useful as well. By keeping an observation of itself an agent may reason
about what other agents can conclude about it, which is important when
trying to keep certain information secret. The results can also be applied
for slight variations of the assumed belief revision framework. For example,
it is possible to allow the core belief to be revised or to relax the restriction
that new inputs are always appended to the end of ρ in an epistemic state
[ρ,N]. The interested reader is referred to [24].
Our work has contact points to many other fields in AI research. Most
obvious is its relation to belief revision. The intuitive interpretation we
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used for the assumed revision framework is incorporation of evidence [13].
However, the representation of the epistemic state as a sequence of formulae
does not distinguish between background knowledge and evidence. When
applying the results, a more detailed analysis of the intended meaning of the
concepts involved and a corresponding interpretation of the results would
be needed. Reasoning about other agents is central for many areas, e.g.,
multi-agent systems, user modelling, goal and plan recognition, etc. Here
we investigated one specific aspect. In reasoning about action and change,
the question is often to find an action sequence that would cause a particular
evolution of the world—either to achieve some goal (planning), or to find
out what happened (abduction). Often, the initial state and the effects of
an action are specified. In our setting, the effect of a revision input is not
quite clear. It might be accepted by the agent or not and beliefs triggered
by the input heavily depend on the initial state. Trying to come up with
hypotheses about the inner mechanisms of an observed system, which could
be interpreted as its initial state that determines its future behaviour, is a
topic treated also in induction.
We are not aware of work that investigates reasoning about the evolution
of an observed agent’s beliefs matching our setting. So we want to conclude
by mentioning some papers that investigate similar questions. [11] considers
a much richer belief revision framework in a dialogue context. However, the
focus is on progressing beliefs through a sequence of speech acts starting in
a given initial state of the agents. This and many other publications utilise
modal logics for representing agents’ beliefs, [14] being another example
also handling the dynamics of these beliefs. Often there are proof systems
or model checkers for the logics presented, but model generation, which
is what we are doing in this paper, generally seems to be a problem. This
means that if the initial state is not given, hypotheses can only be tested (via
proofs) but not systematically generated. However, this is what calculating
a potential initial state and the corresponding belief trace is.
The papers [2, 26], which are dealing with update rather than belief re-
vision, start from a sequence of partial descriptions of an evolving world and
try to identify preferred trajectories explaining this sequence. [2] intends to
sharpen the information about the last state of the world and concentrates
on a particular preference relation, giving a representation result. [26] com-
pares different possible preference relations among trajectories, positioning
the approach with respect to revision and update. However, both allow for
arbitrary changes at any point in time, i.e., they do not allow to integrate
information about which actions were performed nor reason about possible
outcomes of an action. Recall that although our observation contains the
revision input received, this does not mean that it is actually accepted.
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Abstract
We consider a logic for reasoning about composite strategies in games,
where players’ strategies are like programs, composed structurally.
These depend not only on conditions that hold at game positions
but also on properties of other players’ strategies. We present an
axiomatization for the logic and prove its completeness.
1 Summary
Extensive form turn-based games are trees whose nodes are game positions
and branches represent moves of players. With each node is associated a
player whose turn it is to move at that game position. A player’s strategy
is then simply a subtree which contains a unique successor for every node
where it is this player’s turn to make a move, and contains all successors
(from the game tree) for nodes where other players make moves. Thus a
strategy is an advice function that tells a player what move to play when the
game reaches any specific position. In two-player win/loss games, analysis
of the game amounts to seeing if either player has a winning strategy from
any starting position, and if possible, synthesize such a winning strategy.
In multi-player games where the outcomes are not merely winning and
losing, the situation is less clear. Every player has a preference for certain
outcomes and hence cooperation as well as conflict become strategically
relevant. Moreover, each player has some expectations (and assumptions)
about strategies adopted by other players, and fashions her response ap-
propriately. In such situations, game theory tries to explain what rational
players would do.
In so-called small (normal form) games, where the game consists of a
small fixed number of moves (often one move chosen independently by each
player), strategies have little structure, and prediction of stable behaviour
(equilibrium strategy profiles) is possible. However, this not only becomes
difficult in games with richer structure and long sequences of moves, it is
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 183–208.
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also less clear how to postulate behaviour of rational players. Moreover, if
we look to game theory not only for existence of equilibria but also advice
to players on how to play, the structure of strategies followed by players
becomes relevant.
Even in games of perfect information, if the game structure is sufficiently
rich, we need to re-examine the notion of strategy as a function that deter-
mines a player’s move in every game position. Typically, the game position
is itself only partially known, in terms of properties that the player can test
for. Viewed in this light, strategies are like programs, built up systemati-
cally from atomic decisions like if b then a where b is a condition checked
by the player to hold (at some game position) and a is a move available to
the player at that position.
There is another dimension to strategies, namely that of responses to
other players’ moves. The notion of each player independently deciding
on a strategy needs to be re-examined as well. A player’s chosen strategy
depends on the player’s perception of apparent strategies followed by other
players. Even when opponents’ moves are visible, an opponent’s strategy
is not known completely as a function. Therefore the player’s strategy is
necessarily partial as well.
The central idea of this paper is to suggest that it helps to study strate-
gies given by their properties. Hence, assumptions about strategies can be
partial, and these assumptions can in turn be structurally built into the
specification of other strategies. This leads us to proposing a logical struc-
ture for strategies, where we can reason with assertions of the form “(partial)
strategy σ ensures the (intermediate) condition α”.
This allows us to look for induction principles which can be articulated in
the logic. For instance, we can look at what conditions must be maintained
locally (by one move) to influence an outcome eventually. Moreover, we can
compare strategies in terms of what conditions they can enforce.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We consider non-zero-sum games over finite graphs, and consider best
response strategies (rather than winning strategies).
• The reasoning carried out works explicitly with the structure of strate-
gies rather than existence of strategies.
• We present a logic with structured strategy specifications and formulas
describe how strategies ensure outcomes.
• We present an axiom system for the logic and prove that it is complete.
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1.1 Other work
Games are quite popularly used to solve certain decision problems in logic.
Probably the best example of a logical game is the Ehrenfeucht-Fräıssé game
which is played on two structures to check whether a formula of a certain
logic can distinguish between these structures [7]. Games are also used as
tools to solve the satisfiability and model checking questions for various
modal and temporal logics [12]. Here, an existential and a universal player
play on a formula to decide if the formula is satisfiable. The satisfiability
problem is then characterised by the question of whether the existential
player has a winning strategy in the game. These kinds of games designed
specifically for semantic evaluation are generally called logic games.
Recently, the advent of computational tasks on the world-wide web and
related security requirements have thrown up many game theoretic situa-
tions. For example, signing contracts on the web requires interaction be-
tween principals who do not know each other and typically distrust each
other. Protocols of this kind which involve selfish agents can be easily
viewed as strategic games of imperfect information. These are complex
interactive processes which critically involve players reasoning about each
others’ strategies to decide on how to act. In this approach, instead of de-
signing games to solve specific logical tasks, one can use logical systems to
study structure of games and to reason about them.
Game logics are situated in this context, employing modal logics (in
the style of logics of programs) to study logical structure present in games.
Parikh’s work on propositional game logic [13] initiated the study of game
structure using algebraic properties. Pauly [14] has built on this to pro-
vide interesting relationships between programs and games, and to describe
coalitions to achieve desired goals. Bonnano [5] suggested obtaining game
theoretic solution concepts as characteristic formulas in modal logic. Van
Benthem [2] uses dynamic logic to describe games as well as strategies. Van
Ditmarsch [6] uses a dynamic epistemic language to study complex infor-
mation change caused by actions in games. The relationship between games
defined by game logics and that of logic games, is studied by van Benthem
in [3].
On the other hand, the work on Alternating Temporal Logic [1] considers
selective quantification over paths that are possible outcomes of games in
which players and an environment alternate moves. Here, we talk of the
existence of a strategy for a coalition of players to force an outcome. [8]
draws parallels between these two lines of work, that of Pauly’s coalition
logics and alternating temporal logic. It is to be noted that in these logics,
the reasoning is about existence of strategies, and the strategies themselves
do not figure in formulas.
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In the work of [10] and [11], van der Hoek and co-authors develop logics
for strategic reasoning and equilibrium concepts and this line of work is
closest to ours in spirit. Our point of departure is in bringing logical struc-
ture into strategies rather than treating strategies as atomic. In particular,
the strategy specifications we use are partial (in the sense that a player may
assume that an opponent plays a whenever p holds, without knowing under
what conditions the opponent’s strategy picks another move b), allowing for
more generality in reasoning. In the context of programs, logics like propo-
sitional dynamic logic [9] explicitly analyse the structure of programs. This
approach has been very useful in program verification.
2 Game Arenas
We begin with a description of game models on which formulas of the logic
will be interpreted. We use the graphical model for extensive form turn-
based multiplayer games, where at most one player gets to move at each
game position.
Game arena
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a non-empty finite set of players and Σ = {a1, a2,
. . . , am} be a finite set of action symbols, which represent moves of players.
A game arena is a finite graph G = (W,−→, w0, χ) where W is the set
of nodes which represents the game positions, −→ : (W × Σ) → W is a
function also called the move function, w0 is the initial node of the game.
Let the set of successors of w ∈ W be defined as
→
w= {w′ ∈W | w
a
−→ w′
for some a ∈ Σ}. A node w is said to be terminal if
→
w= ∅. χ : W → N
assigns to each node w in W the player who “owns” w: that is, if χ(w) = k
and w is not terminal then player k has to pick a move at w.
In an arena defined as above, the play of a game can be viewed as placing
a token on w0. If player k owns the game position w0 i.e χ(w0) = k and
she picks an action ’a’ which is enabled for her at w0, then the new game
position moves the token to w′ where w0
a
−→ w′. A play in the arena is
simply a sequence of such moves. Formally, a play in G is a finite path
ρ = w0
a1−→ w1
a2−→ . . .
ak−→ wk where wk is terminal, or it is an infinite path
ρ = w0
a1−→ w1
a2−→ . . . where ∀i : wi
ai−→ wi+1 holds. Let Plays denote the
set of all plays in the arena.
With a game arena G = (W,−→, w0, χ), we can associate its tree unfold-
ing also referred to as the extensive form game tree T = (S,⇒, s0, λ) where
(S,⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges labelled by Σ and
λ : S →W such that:
• λ(s0) = w0.
• For all s, s′ ∈ S, if s
a
=⇒ s′ then λ(s)
a
−→ λ(s′).
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• If λ(s) = w and w
a
−→ w′ then there exists s′ ∈ S such that s
a
=⇒ s′
and λ(s′) = w′.
Given the tree unfolding of a game arena T , a node s in it, we can define
the restriction of T to s, denoted Ts to be the subtree obtained by retaining
only the unique path from root s0 to s and the subtree rooted at s.
Games and winning conditions
Let G be an arena as defined above. The arena merely defines the rules about
how the game progresses and terminates. More interesting are winning
conditions, which specify the game outcomes. We assume that each player
has a preference relation over the set of plays. Let i⊆ (Plays × Plays)
be a complete, reflexive, transitive binary relation denoting the preference
relation of player i. Then the game G is given as, G = (G, {i}i∈N ).
Then a game is defined as the pair G = (G, (i)i∈N ).
Strategies
For simplicity we will restrict ourselves to two player games, i.e., N = {1, 2}.
It is easy to extend the notions introduced here to the general case where
we have n players.
Let the game graph be represented by G = (W 1,W 2,−→, s0) where W
1
is the set of positions of player 1, W 2 that of player 2. Let W = W 1 ∪W 2.
Let T be the tree unfolding of the arena and s1 a node in it. A strategy




µ,⇒µ, s1) is a subtree of Ts1
which contains the unique path from root s0 to s1 in T and is the least
subtree satisfying the following properties:
• s1 ∈ S
1
µ, where χ(λ(s1)) = 1.
• For every s in the subtree of TG rooted at s1,
– if s ∈ S1µ then for some a ∈ Σ, for each s







– if s ∈ S2µ, then for every b ∈ Σ, for each s







Let Ωi denote the set of all strategies of Player i in G, for i = 1, 2. A
strategy profile 〈µ, τ〉 defines a unique play ρτµ in the game G.
3 The Logic
We now present a logic for reasoning about composite strategies. The syntax
of the logic is presented in two layers, that of strategy specification and game
formulas.
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Atomic strategy formulas specify, for a player, what conditions she tests
for before making a move. Since these are intended to be bounded memory
strategies, the conditions are stated as past time formulas of a simple tense
logic. Composite strategy specifications are built from atomic ones using
connectives (without negation). We crucially use an implication of the form:
“if the opponent’s play conforms to a strategy π then play σ”.
Game formulas describe the game arena in a standard modal logic, and
in addition specify the result of a player following a particular strategy at
a game position, to choose a specific move a, to ensure an intermediate
outcome α . Using these formulas one can specify how a strategy helps to
eventually win an outcome α.
Before we describe the logic and give its semantics, some prelimiaries
will be useful. Below, for any countable set X , let Past(X) be a set of
formulas given by the following syntax:
ψ ∈ Past(X) := x ∈ X | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | 3-ψ.
Such past formulas can be given meaning over finite sequences. Given
any sequence ξ = t0t1 · · · tm, V : {t0, · · · , tm} → 2
X , and k such that
0 ≤ k ≤ m, the truth of a past formula ψ ∈ Past(X) at k, denoted ξ, k |= ψ
can be defined as follows:
• ξ, k |= p iff p ∈ V (tk).
• ξ, k |= ¬ψ iff ξ, k 6|= ψ.
• ξ, k |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff ξ, k |= ψ1 or ξ, k |= ψ2.
• ξ, k |= 3-ψ iff there exists a j : 0 ≤ j ≤ k such that ξ, j |= ψ.
Strategy specifications
For simplicity of presentation, we stick with two player games, where the
players are Player 1 and Player 2. Let ı = 2 when i = 1 and ı = 1 when
i = 2.
Let P i = {pi0, p
i
1, . . .} be a countable set of proposition symbols where
τi ∈ Pi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let P = P
1 ∪ P 2 ∪ {leaf}. τ1 and τ2 are intended
to specify, at a game position, which player’s turn it is to move. The
proposition leaf specifies whether the position is a terminal node.
Further, the logic is parametrized by the finite alphabet set Σ = {a1, a2,
. . . , am} of players’ moves and we only consider game arenas over Σ.
Let Strati(P i), for i = 1, 2 be the set of strategy specifications given by
the following syntax:
Strati(P i) := [ψ 7→ ak]
i | σ1 + σ2 | σ1 · σ2 | π ⇒ σ
where π ∈ Stratı(P 1 ∩ P 2), ψ ∈ Past(P i) and ak ∈ Σ.
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The idea is to use the above constructs to specify properties of strategies.
For instance the interpretation of a player i specification [p 7→ a]i will be
to choose move “a” for every i node where p holds. π ⇒ σ would say, at
any node player i sticks to the specification given by σ if on the history of
the play, all moves made by ı conforms to π. In strategies, this captures
the aspect of players actions being responses to the opponents moves. As
the opponents complete strategy is not available, the player makes a choice
taking into account the apparent behaviour of the opponent on the history
of play.
For a game tree T , a node s and a strategy specification σ ∈ Strati(P i),
we define Ts |
\σ = (Sσ,=⇒σ, s0) to be the least subtree of Ts which contains
ρss0 (the unique path from s0 to s) and closed under the following condition.




– s′ is an i node: s′
a




– s′ is an ı node: s′
a




Given a game tree T and a node s in it, let ρss0 : s0
a1=⇒ s1 · · ·
am=⇒
sm = s denote the unique path from s0 to s. For a strategy specification
σ ∈ Strati(P i) and a node s we define σ(s) as follows:
• [ψ 7→ a]i(s) =
{
{a} if s ∈W i and ρss0 ,m |= ψ
Σ otherwise
• (σ1 + σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∪ σ2(s).
• (σ1 · σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∩ σ2(s).
• (π ⇒ σ)(s) =
{
σ(s) if ∀j : 0 ≤ j < m, aj ∈ π(sj)
Σ otherwise
We say that a path ρs
′
s : s = s1
a1=⇒ s2 · · ·
am−1
=⇒ sm = s
′ in T conforms
to σ if ∀j : 1 ≤ j < m, aj ∈ σ(sj). When the path constitutes a proper
play, i.e., when s = s0, we say that the play conforms to σ.
Syntax
The syntax of the logic is given by:
Π := p ∈ P | ¬α | α1 ∨ α2 | 〈a〉α | 〈a〉α | 3-α | (σ)i : c | σ ;i β
where c ∈ Σ, σ ∈ Strati(P i), β ∈ Past(P i). The derived connectives ∧,
⊃ and [a]α are defined as usual. Let 3-α = ¬2-¬α, 〈N〉α =
∨
a∈Σ 〈a〉α,
[N ]α = ¬〈N〉¬α, 〈P 〉α =
∨
a∈Σ 〈a〉α and [P ] = ¬〈P 〉¬α.
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The formula (σ)i : c asserts, at any game position, that the strategy
specification σ for player i suggests that the move c can be played at that
position. The formula σ ;i β says that from this position, there is a way of
following the strategy σ for player i so as to ensure the outcome β. These
two modalities constitute the main constructs of our logic.
Semantics
The models for the logic are extensive form game trees along with a valua-
tion function. A model M = (T , V ) where T = (S1, S2,−→, s0) is a game
tree as defined in Section 2, and V : S → 2P is the valuation function, such
that:
• For i ∈ {1, 2}, τi ∈ V (s) iff s ∈ S
i.
• leaf ∈ V (s) iff moves(s) = ϕ.
where for any node s, moves(s) = {a | s
a
=⇒ s′}.
The truth of a formula α ∈ Π in a model M and position s (denoted
M, s |= α) is defined by induction on the structure of α, as usual. Let ρss0
be s0
a0=⇒ s1 · · ·
am−1
=⇒ sm = s.
• M, s |= p iff p ∈ V (s).
• M, s |= ¬α iff M, s 6|= α.
• M, s |= α1 ∨ α2 iff M, s |= α1 or M, s |= α2.
• M, s |= 〈a〉α iff there exists s′ ∈W such that s
a
→s′ and M, s′ |= α.
• M, s |= 〈a〉α iff m > 0, a = am−1 and M, sm−1 |= α.
• M, s |= 3-α iff there exists j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m such that M, sj |= α.
• M, s |= (σ)i : c iff c ∈ σ(s).
• M, s |= σ ;i β iff for all s
′ in Ts |
\ σ such that s =⇒∗ s′, we have
M, s′ |= β ∧ (τi ⊃ enabledσ),
where enabledσ ≡
∨
a∈Σ(〈a〉True ∧ (σ)i : a).
The notions of satisfiablility and validity can be defined in the standard
way. A formula α is satisfiable iff there exists a model M , there exists s
such that M, s |= α. A formula α is said to be valid iff for all models M ,
for all s, we have M, s |= α.
































































Probably the best way to illustrate the notion of strategy specification is to
look at heuristics used in large games like chess, go, checkers, etc. A heuristic
strategy is basically a partial specification, since it involves checking local
properties like patterns on the board and specifying actions when certain
conditions hold. For instance, a typical strategy specification for chess would
be of the form:
• If a pawn double attack is possible then play the action resulting in
the fork.
Note that the above specification is in contrast with a specific advice of the
form:
• If a pawn is on f2 and the opponent rook and knight are on e5 and g5
respectively then move f2–f4.
A strategy would prescribe such specific advice rather than a generic one
based on abstract game position properties. Heuristics are usually employed
when the game graph being analysed is too huge for a functional strategy
to be specified. However, we refrain from analysing chess here due to the
difficulty in formally presenting the game arena and the fact that it fails
to give much insight into the working of our logic. Below we look at a few
simple examples which illustrates the logic.
Example 4.1. Consider the game shown in Figure 1. Players alternate
moves with 1 starting at s0. There are two cycles C1 : s5 → s6 → s7 →
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s8 → s5, C2 : s1 → s2 → s3 → s4 → s1 and two terminal nodes t1 and t2.
Let the preference ordering of player 1 be t1 
1 t2 
1 C2 
1 C1. As far
as player 2 is concerned t1 
2 C1 and he is indifferent between C2 and t2.
However, he prefers C2 or t2 over {C1, t1}. Equilibrium reasoning will advise
player 1 to choose the action “b” at s0 since at position s7 it is irrational for
2 to move x as it will result in 2’s worst outcome. However the utility differ-
ence between C1 and t1 for 2 might be negligible compared to the incentive
of staying in the “left” path. Therefore 2 might decide to punish 1 for mov-
ing b when 1 knew that {C2, t2} was equally preferred by 2. Even though
t1 is the worst outcome, at s7 player 2 can play x to implement the pun-
ishment. Let V (pj) = {s3, s7}, V (pinit) = {s0}, V (pgood) = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}
and V (ppunish) = {s0, s5, s6, s7, t1}. The local objective of 2 will be to re-
main on the good path or to implement the punishment. Player 2 strategy
specification can be written as
π ≡ ([pinit 7→ b]
1 ⇒ [pj 7→ x]
2) · ([pinit 7→ a]
1 ⇒ [pj 7→ y]
2).
We get that π ;2 (pgood ∨ ppunish). Player 1, if he knows 2’s strategy, might
be tempted to play “a” at s0 by which the play will end up in C2. Let the
proposition pworst hold at t1 which is the worst outcome for player 1. Then
we have [pinit 7→ a]
1
;1 ¬pworst. This says that if player 1 chooses a at the






























































Figure 2. Sabotage Game.
Example 4.2. The sabotage game [4] is a two player zero sum game where
one player moves along the edges of a labelled graph and the other player
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removes an edge in each round. Formally let a Σ labelled graph R for some
alphabet set Σ is R = (V, e) where V is the set of vertices and e : V ×Σ → V
is the edge function. The sabotage game is played as follows: initially
we consider the graph R0 = (V0, e0, v0). There are two players, Runner
and Blocker who move alternatingly where the Runner starts the run from
vertex v0. In round n, the Runner moves one step further along an existing
edge of the graph. I.e., he chooses a vertex vn+1 ∈ V such that there
exists some a ∈ Σ with en(vn, a) = vn+1. Afterwards the Blocker removes
one edge of the graph. i.e., he chooses two vertices u and v such that
for some a ∈ Σ, en(u, a) = v and defines the edge function en+1 to be
same as that of en except that en+1(u, a) will not be defined. The graph
Rn+1 = (V, en+1, vn+1). We can have a reachability condition as the winning
condition. I.e., the Runner wins iff he can reach a given vertex called the
goal. The game ends, if either the Runner gets stuck or if the winning
condition is satisfied.
It is easy to build a conventional game arena for the sabotage game
where player positions alternate. The game arena will have as its local
states subgraphs of R with the current position of Runner indicated. I.e.,
W = Edges × V where Edges is the set of all partial edge functions e :
V ×Σ → V . Let W 1 and W 2 be the set of game positions for Runner and
Blocker respectively. The initial vertex s0 = (e0, v0) and s0 ∈ W
1. Let
s = (e, v) and s′ = (e′, v′) be any two nodes in the arena. The transition is
defined as follows.
• if s ∈W 1 and e(v, a) = v′ then s
a
−→ s′, e = e′ and s′ ∈ W 2
• if s ∈ W 2, for some u, u′ ∈ W we have e(u, a) = u′ and e′ is the same
as e except that e′(u, a) is not defined, then s
(u,a,u′)
−→ s′, v = v′ and
s′ ∈ W 1.
Figure 2 shows the first three game positions in a possible run of the
sabotage game. The game starts with Runner moving from node A to node
B. The blocker then removes the edge a2 adjacent to node B and the game
continues. In the formulas given below, we will refer to Runner as player 1
and Blocker as player 2.
Since the Runner’s objective is to not get stuck, he might reason as
follows. If it is the case that the Blocker always removes an edge adjacent
to the node that Runner has currently selected then try to move to a node
which has multiple outgoing edges. We use the following propositions:
• presentv: denotes that the current node of runner is v
• adjm: denotes that the adjacent node has multiple edges
194 R. Ramanujam, S. Simon
Let rv denote the action which removes an adjacent edge of v and moveadj
denote the action which moves to the adjacent node with multiple edges.
The Runner’s specification can be given as:
• [presentv 7→ rv]
2 ⇒ [adjm 7→ moveadj]
1
Consider the situation where all the nodes in the graph have a single
outgoing edge and the goal state is a single state. It is quite easy to show
that in such a game, the Runner wins iff the start node is the goal or if there
is an edge connecting the start node with the goal. This property can be
captured by the following proposition:
• gBnice: denotes that in the graph the start node is not the goal and
there is no single edge between start and goal nodes. In other words
the graph is “nice” for Blocker.
• adjRg : denotes that the Runner’s current node is one adjacent to the
goal node.
Let rgadj denote the action which removes the edge connecting the current
node of Runner with the goal. Consider the following formula:
• [(gBnice ∧ adj
R




;2 (leaf ⊃ win)
This says that if the graph is “nice” for Blocker and if the current se-
lected node of Runner is one adjacent to the goal then remove the only edge
connecting it with the goal. In all the other cases the Blocker can remove
any random edge, and so this need not be mentioned in the strategy speci-
fication. This specification ensures that when the terminal node is reached
then it is winning for Blocker.
5 Axiom System
We now present our axiomatization of the valid formulas of the logic. Before
we present the axiomatization, we will find some abbreviations useful:
• root = ¬〈P 〉True defines the root node to be one that has no prede-
cessors.
• δσi (a) = τi ∧ (σ)i : a denotes that move “a” is enabled by σ at an i
node.
• invσi (a, β) = (τi∧(σ)i : a) ⊃ [a](σ ;i β) denotes the fact that after an
“a” move by player i which conforms to σ, σ ;i β continues to hold.
• invσı (β) = τı ⊃ [N ](σ ;i β) says that after any move of ı, σ ;i β
continues to hold.
• confπ = 2- (〈a〉τı ⊃ 〈a〉(π)ı : a) denotes that all opponent moves in the
past conform to π.
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The axiom schemes
(A0) All the substitutional instances of the tautologies of propositional cal-
culus.
(A1) (a) [a](α1 ⊃ α2) ⊃ ([a]α1 ⊃ [a]α2)
(b) [a](α1 ⊃ α2) ⊃ ([a]α1 ⊃ [a]α2)
(A2) (a) 〈a〉α ⊃ [a]α
(b) 〈a〉α ⊃ [a]α
(c) 〈a〉True ⊃ ¬〈b〉True for all b 6= a
(A3) (a) α ⊃ [a]〈a〉α
(b) α ⊃ [a]〈a〉α
(A4) (a) 3- root
(b) 2-α ≡ (α ∧ [P ]2-α)
(A5) (a) ([ψ 7→ a]i)i : a for all a ∈ Σ
(b) τi ∧ ([ψ 7→ a]
i)i : c ≡ ¬ψ for all a 6= c
(A6) (a) (σ1 + σ2)i : c ≡ σ1 : c ∨ σ2 : c
(b) (σ1 · σ2)i : c ≡ σ1 : c ∧ σ2 : c
(c) (π ⇒ σ)i : c ≡ confπ ⊃ (σ)i : c
(A7) σ ;i β ⊃ (β ∧ inv
σ
i (a, β) ∧ inv
σ
ı (β) ∧ (¬leaf ⊃ enabledσ))
Inference rules









α ⊃ [P ]α
α ⊃ 2-α
(Ind-past)
α ∧ δσi (a) ⊃ [a]α, α ∧ τı ⊃ [N ]α,
α ∧ ¬leaf ⊃ enabledσ, α ⊃ β
α ⊃ σ ;i β
(Ind ;)
The axioms are mostly standard. After the Kripke axioms for the 〈a〉
modalities, we have axioms that ensure determinacy of both 〈a〉 and 〈a〉
modalities, and an axiom to assert the uniqueness of the latter. We then
have axioms that relate the previous and next modalities with each other, as
well as to assert that the past modality steps through the 〈a〉 modality. An
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axiom asserts the existence of the root in the past. The rest of the axioms
describe the semantics of strategy specifications.
The rule Ind-past is standard, while Ind ; illustrates the new kind of
reasoning in the logic. It says that to infer that the formula σ ;i β holds
in all reachable states, β must hold at the asserted state and
• for a player i node after every move which conforms to σ, β continues
to hold.
• for a player ı node after every enabled move, β continues to hold.
• player i does not get stuck by playing σ.
To see the soundness of (A7), suppose it is not valid. Then there exists
a node s such that M, s |= σ ;i β and one of the following holds:
• M, s 6|= β: In this case, from semantics we get that M, s 6|= σ ;i β
which is a contradiction.
• M, s 6|= invσi (a, β): In this case, we have s ∈ W
i, M, s |= (σ)i : a and
M, s′ 6|= σ ;i β where s
a
=⇒ s′. This implies that there is a path ρsks′
which conforms to σ and either M, sk 6|= β or moves(sk) ∩ σ(sk) = ϕ.
But since s
a
=⇒ s′, we have ρsks conforms to σ as well. From which it
follows that M, s 6|= σ ;i β which is a contradiction.
• M, s 6|= invσı (β): We have a similar argument as above.
• M, s 6|= ¬leaf ⊃ enabledσ: This means that M, s |= ¬leaf and M, s 6|=
enabledσ. Therefore moves(s) ∩ σ(s) = ∅ and by semantics we have
M, s 6|= σ ;i β which is a contradiction.
To show that the induction rule preserves validity, suppose that the
premise is valid and the conclusion is not. Then for some node s we have
M, s |= α and M, s 6|= σ ;i β. i.e., there is a path ρ
sk
s which conforms to
σ such that M, sk 6|= β or sk is a non-leaf node and σ(sk) ∩moves(sk) = ϕ.
Let ρsks be the shortest of such paths.
Suppose M, sk 6|= β, then we have the following two cases to consider.
• sk−1 ∈ W
i: By assumption on the path ρsks , we have M, sk−1 |=
α∧δσi (ak−1). From validity of α ⊃ β(the premise), we haveM, sk 6|= α,
which implies M, sk−1 6|= [ak−1]α. Therefore we get M, sk−1 6|= (α ∧
δσi (ak−1)) ⊃ [ak−1]α, which gives us a contradiction to the validity of
a premise.
• sk−1 ∈W
ı: By assumption on the path ρsks , we have M, sk−1 |= α∧τı.
Using an argument similar to the previous case we also get M, sk−1 6|=
[ak−1]α. Therefore we have M, sk−1 6|= (α ∧ τı) ⊃ [N ]α, giving us a
contradiction to the validity of a premise.
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If sk is a non-leaf node and σ(sk)∩moves(sk) = ϕ then we have M, sk |=
α∧¬leaf and M, sk 6|= enabledσ. Therefore M, sk 6|= (α∧¬leaf) ⊃ enabledσ,
which is the required contradiction.
6 Completeness
To show completeness, we prove that every consistent formula is satisfiable.
Let α0 be a consistent formula, and let W denote the set of all maximal
consistent sets (MCS). We use w,w′ to range over MCS’s. Since α0 is
consistent, there exists an MCS w0 such that α0 ∈ w0.
Define a transition relation on MCS’s as follows: w
a
−→ w′ iff {〈a〉α|α ∈
w′} ⊆ w. We will find it useful to work not only with MCS’s, but also
with sets of subformulas of α0. For a formula α let CL(α) denote the
subformula closure of α. In addition to the usual downward closure, we
also require that 3- root, leaf ∈ CL(α) and σ ;i β ∈ CL(α) implies that
β, invσi (a, β), inv
σ
ı (β), enabledσ ∈ CL(α). Let AT denote the set of all max-
imal consistent subsets of CL(α0), reffered to as atoms. Each t ∈ AT is a
finite set of formulas, we denote the conjunction of all formulas in t by ̂t.
For a nonempty subset X ⊆ AT , we denote by ˜X the disjunction of all
̂t, t ∈ X . Define a transition relation on AT as follows: t
a
−→ t′ iff ̂t ∧ 〈a〉̂t′
is consistent. Call an atom t a root atom if there does not exist any atom t′
such that t′
a
−→ t for some a. Note that t0 = w0 ∩ CL(α0) ∈ AT .
Proposition 6.1. There exist t1, . . . , tk ∈ AT and a1, . . . ak ∈ Σ (k ≥ 0)
such that tk
ak−→ tk−1 . . .
a1−→ t0, where tk is a root atom.
Proof. Consider the least set R containing t0 and closed under the following
condition: if t1 ∈ R and for some a ∈ Σ there exists t2 such that t2
a
−→ t1,
then t2 ∈ R. Now, if there exists an atom t
′ ∈ R such that t′ is a root then
we are done. Suppose not, then we have ⊢ ˜R ⊃ ¬root. But then we can
show that ⊢ ˜R ⊃ [P ] ˜R. By rule Ind-past and above we get ⊢ ˜R ⊃ 2-¬root.
But then t0 ∈ R and hence ⊢ ̂t0 ⊃ ˜R and therefore we get ⊢ ̂t0 ⊃ 2-¬root,
contradicting axiom (A4a). q.e.d.
Above, we have additional properties: for any formula 3-α ∈ tk, we also
have α ∈ tk. Further, for all j ∈ {0, · · · , k}, if 3-α ∈ tj , then there exists i
such that k ≥ i ≥ j and α ∈ ti. Both these properties are ensured by axiom
(A4b). A detailed proof can be found in the Appendix, Lemma A.2.
Hence it is easy to see that there exist MCS’s w1, . . . , wk ∈ W and
a1, . . . ak ∈ Σ (k ≥ 0) such that wk
ak−→ wk−1 . . .
a1−→ w0, where wj ∩
CL(α0) = tj . Now this path defines a (finite) tree T0 = (S0,=⇒0, s0) rooted
at s0, where S0 = {s0, s1, . . . , sk}, and for all j ∈ {0, · · · , k}, sj is labelled
by the MCS wk−j . The relation =⇒0 is defined in the obvious manner.
From now we will simply say α ∈ s where s is the tree node, to mean that
α ∈ w where w is the MCS associated with node s.
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Inductively assume that we have a tree Tk = (Sk,=⇒k, s0) such that
the past formulas at every node have “witnesses” as above. Pick a node
s ∈ Sk such that 〈a〉True ∈ s but there is no s
′ ∈ Sk such that s
a
=⇒ s′.
Now, if w is the MCS associated with node s, there exists an MCS w′ such
that w
a
−→ w′. Pick a new node s′ /∈ Sk and define Tk+1 = Sk ∪ {s
′} and
=⇒k+1 = =⇒k ∪ {(s, a, s
′)}, where w′ is the MCS associated with s′. It is
easy to see that every node in Tk+1 has witnesses for past formulas as well.
Now consider T = (S,=⇒, s0) defined by: S =
⋃
k≥0 Sk and =⇒ =
⋃
k≥0 =⇒k. Define the model M = (T, V ) where V (s) = w ∩ P , where w is
the MCS associated with s.
Lemma 6.2. For any s ∈ S, we have the following properties.
1. if [a]α ∈ s and s
a
=⇒ s′ then α ∈ s′.
2. if 〈a〉α ∈ s then there exists s′ such that s
a
=⇒ s′ and α ∈ s′.
3. if [a]α ∈ s and s′
a
=⇒ s then α ∈ s′.
4. if 〈a〉α ∈ s then there exists s′ such that s′
a
=⇒ s and α ∈ s′.
5. if 2-α ∈ s and s′ =⇒∗ s then α ∈ s′.
6. if 3-α ∈ s then there exists s′ such that s′ =⇒∗ s and α ∈ s′.
Proof. Cases (1) to (5) can be shown using standard modal logic techniques.
Case (6) follows from the existence of a root atom (Proposition 6.1) and
axiom (A4b). q.e.d.
Lemma 6.3. For all ψ ∈ Past(P ), for all s ∈ S, ψ ∈ s iff ρs, s |= ψ.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 6.2 using an inductive argument. q.e.d.
Lemma 6.4. For all i, for all σ ∈ Strati(P i), for all c ∈ Σ, for all s ∈ S,
(σ)i : c ∈ s iff c ∈ σ(s).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of σ. The nontrivial cases
are as follows:
σ ≡ [ψ 7→ a]:
(⇒) Suppose ([ψ 7→ a]i)i : c ∈ s. If c = a then the claim holds trivially.
If c 6= a then from (A5a) we get that ¬ψ ∈ s, from Lemma 6.3 ρs, s 6|= ψ.
Therefore by definition we have [ψ 7→ a]i(s) = Σ and c ∈ σ(w).
(⇐) Conversely, suppose ([ψ 7→ a]i)i : c 6∈ s. From (A5a) we have a 6= c.
From (A5b) we get ψ ∈ s. By Lemma 6.3 ρs, s |= ψ. Therefore c 6∈ σ(s) by
definition.
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σ ≡ π ⇒ σ′: Let ρss0 : s0
a0=⇒ · · ·
ak−1
=⇒ sk = s be the unique path from the
root to s.
(⇒) Suppose (π ⇒ σ′)i : c ∈ s. To show c ∈ (π ⇒ σ
′)(s). Suffices to show
that ρss0 conforms to π implies c ∈ σ
′(s). From (A6c) we have confπ ⊃ (σ
′)i :
c ∈ s. Rewriting this we get 3- (〈a〉τı ∧ [a](¬(π)ı : a)) ∨ (σ
′)i : c ∈ s. We
have two cases,
• if (σ′)i : c ∈ s then by induction hypothesis we get c ∈ σ
′(s). Therefore
by definition c ∈ (π ⇒ σ)i(s).
• otherwise we have 3- (〈a〉τı ∧ [a](¬(π)ı : a)) ∈ s. From Lemma 6.2(6),
there exists sl ∈ ρs such that 〈a〉τı ∧ [a](¬(π)ı : a) ∈ sl. By Lemma
6.2(4) there exists sl−1 ∈ ρs∩W
ı such that sl−1
a
=⇒ sl. From Lemma
6.2(3), ¬(π)ı : a ∈ sl−1. Since sl−1 is an MCS, we have (π)ı : a 6∈ sl−1.





(⇐) Conversely, using (A6c) and a similar argument it can be shown that
if (π ⇒ σ′)i : c 6∈ s then c 6∈ (π ⇒ σ
′)(s). q.e.d.
Theorem 6.5. For all α ∈ Π, for all s ∈ S, α ∈ s iff M, s |= α.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of α. α ≡ (σ)i : c. From
Lemma 6.4 we have (σ)i : c ∈ s iff c ∈ σ(s) iff by semantics M, s |= (σ)i : c.
α ≡ σ ;i β.
(⇒) We show the following:
(1) If σ ;i β ∈ s and there exits a transition s
a
=⇒ s′ such that a ∈ σ(s),
then {β, σ ;i β} ⊆ s
′. Suppose σ ;i β ∈ s, from (A7) we have β ∈ s.
We have two cases to consider.
• s ∈ W i: We have τi ∈ s. Since a ∈ σ(s), by Lemma 6.4 we have
(σ)i : a ∈ s. From (A7) we get [a](σ ;i β) ∈ s. By Lemma
6.2(1) we have σ ;i β ∈ s
′.
• s ∈ W ı: We have τı ∈ s. From (A7) we get [N ](σ ;i β) ∈ s,
since s is an MCS we have for every a ∈ Σ, [a](σ ;i β) ∈ s. By
Lemma 6.2(1) we have σ ;i β ∈ s
′.
By applying (A7) at s′ we get β ∈ s′.
(2) If σ ;i β ∈ s and s is a non-leaf node, then ∃s
′ such that s
a
=⇒ s′
and a ∈ σ(s).
Suppose s is a non-leaf node. From (A7),
∨
a∈Σ(〈a〉True∧(σ)i : a) ∈ s.
Since s is an MCS, there exists an a such that 〈a〉True ∧ (σ)i : a ∈ s.
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By Lemma 6.2(2), there exists an s′ such that s
a
=⇒ s′ and by Lemma
6.4 a ∈ σ(s).
(1) ensures that whenever σ ;i β ∈ s and there exists a path ρ
sk
s which
conforms to σ, then we have {β, σ ;i β} ⊆ sk. Since β ∈ Past(P ), by
Lemma 6.3 we have M, sk |= β. (2) ensures that for all paths ρ
sk
s which
conforms to σ, if sk is a non-leaf node, then moves(s)∩σ(s) 6= ϕ. Therefore
we get M, s |= σ ;i β.
(⇐) Conversely suppose σ ;i β 6∈ s, to show M, s 6|= σ ;i β. Suffices to
show that there exists a path ρsks that conforms to σ such that M, sk 6|= β
or sk is a non-leaf node and moves(sk) ∩ σ(sk) = ϕ.
Lemma 6.6. For all t ∈ AT , σ ;i β 6∈ t implies there exists a path
ρtkt : t = t1
a1−→AT t2 . . .
ak−1
−→AT tk which conforms to σ such that one of
the following conditions hold.
• β 6∈ tk.
• tk is a non-leaf node and moves(tk) ∩ σ(tk) = ϕ.
We have t = s ∩ CL(σ ;i β) is an atom. By Lemma 6.6 (proof given
in the Appendix), there exists a path in the atom graph t = t1
a1−→AT
t2 . . .
ak−→AT tk such that β 6∈ tk or tk is a non-leaf node and moves(tk) ∩
σ(tk) = ϕ. t1 can be extended to the MCS s. Let t
′
2 = t2 ∪ {α|[a1]α ∈ s}.




a1=⇒ s2. Continuing in this manner we get a path in s = s1
a1=⇒
s2 . . .
ak−1
=⇒ sk in M which conforms to σ where either β 6∈ sk or sk is a
non-leaf node and moves(sk) ∩ σ(s) = ϕ. q.e.d.
7 Extensions for Strategy Specification
Until operator
One of the natural extensions to strategy specification is to come up with a
construct which asserts that a player strategy conforms to some specification
σ until a certain condition holds. Once the condition is fulfilled, he is free
to choose any action.
We can add the future modality 3α in the logic defined in Section 3
with the following interpretation.
• M, s |= 3γ iff there exists an s′ such that s =⇒∗ s′ and M, s′ |= γ.




) := p ∈ P i | ¬α | α1 ∨ α2 | 3-α
Future(ΠP
i
) := p ∈ P i | ¬α | α1 ∨ α2 | 3α
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Let 2α = ¬3¬α and 2-α = ¬3-¬α. We can enrich Strati(P i) with the








Σ if ∃j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m such that ρ
sj
s0 , j |= ϕ
σ(s) otherwise
Note that until does not guarantee that ϕ will eventually hold. We can
extend the axiomatization quite easily to handle the new construct. Firstly
we need to add the following axiom and the derivation rule for the future
modality.
2α ≡ (α ∧ [N ]2α) (Ax-box)
α ⊃ [N ]α
α ⊃ 2α
(Ind)
Using the above axiom and inference rule one can easily show the ana-
logue of Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 6.3 for the future modality. For the until
operator we have the following axiom.
(σUϕ)i : c ≡ ¬3-ϕ ⊃ (σ)i : c (Ax-Until)
We can show that Lemma 6.4 holds once again, for the extended syntax:
Lemma 7.1. For all i, for all σ ∈ Strati(P i), for all c ∈ Σ, for all s ∈ S,
(σ)i : c ∈ s iff c ∈ σ(s).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of σ as seen before. The
interesting case is when σ ≡ σ′Uϕ:
(⇒) Suppose (σ′Uϕ)i : c ∈ s. It suffices to show that ∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ k,
ρ
sj
s0 , j 6|= ϕ implies c ∈ σ
′(s). From axiom (Ax-Until), we have ¬3-ϕ ⊃ (σ′)i :
c ∈ s. Rewriting this, we get 3-ϕ ∈ s or (σ′)i : c ∈ s.
• if 3-ϕ ∈ s, then by Lemma 6.2, ∃j : 0 ≤ j ≤ k such that ϕ ∈ sj .
Therefore we have ρ
sj
s0 |= ϕ.
• if (σ)i : c ∈ s, then by induction hypothesis we have c ∈ σ(s).
(⇐) To show (σ′Uϕ)i : c /∈ s implies c /∈ (σ′Uϕ)(s). It suffices to show that
∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m, ρ
sj
s0 , j 6|= ϕ and c /∈ σ
′(s). From axiom (Ax-Until), we have
¬3-ϕ ∧ ¬((σ′)i : c) ∈ s. Rewriting this we get 2-¬ϕ ∈ s and ¬((σ)i : c) ∈ s.
• 2-¬ϕ ∈ s implies ∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m, ¬ϕ ∈ sj(by Lemma 6.2). Since sj is
an MCS, α /∈ sj . Therefore we have ∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m, ρ
sj
s0 , j 6|= ϕ.
• ¬((σ)i : c) ∈ s implies (σ)i : c /∈ s(Since s is an MCS). By induction
hypothesis we have c /∈ σ(s).
q.e.d.
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Nested strategy specification
Instead of considering simple past time formulas as conditions to be verified
before deciding on a move, we can enrich the structure to assert the oppo-
nents conformance to some strategy specification in the history of the play.
This can be achieved by allowing nesting of strategy specification. We can
extend the strategy specification syntax to include nesting as follows.
Γi := ψ | σ | γ1 ∧ γ2
Stratirec(P
i) := [γ 7→ a]i | σ1 + σ2 | σ1 · σ2
where ψ ∈ Past(P i), σ ∈ Stratirec(P
i) and γ ∈ Γı. Below we give the
semantics for the part that requires change. For the game tree T and a
node s in it, let ρss0 : s0
a1=⇒ s1 · · ·
am=⇒ sm = s denote the unique path from
s0 to s
• [γ 7→ a]i(s) =
{
a if s ∈W i and ρss0 ,m |= γ
Σ otherwise
• ρss0 ,m |= σ iff ∀j : 0 ≤ j < m, ai ∈ σ(si).
• ρss0 ,m |= γ1 ∧ γ2 iff ρ
s
s0




For a past formula ψ, the notion of ρss0 ,m |= ψ is already defined in
Section 3. Let L denote the logic introduced in Section 3 and Lrec be
the same as L except that σ ∈ Stratirec(P
i). We show that L and Lrec
have equivalent expressive power. Therefore one can stick to the relatively
simple strategy specification syntax given in Section 3 rather than taking
into account explicit nesting.
It is easy to see that any formula γ ∈ Γi, can be rewritten in the form
σ′∧ψ where σ′ ∈ Stratirec(P
i) and ψ ∈ Past(P i). This is due to the fact that
if ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Past(P
i) then ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Past(P
i) and σ1 ∧ σ2 ≡ σ1 · σ2(formally
∀s, ρss0 ,m |= σ1 ∧ σ2 iff ρ
s
s0
,m |= σ1 · σ2).
Given σrec ∈ Strat
i
rec(P
i) the equivalent formula σ ∈ Strati(P i) is con-
structed inductively as follows.
[[[ψ 7→ a]]] = [ψ 7→ a]
[[σ1 + σ2]] = [[σ1]] + [[σ2]]
[[σ1 · σ2]] = [[σ1]] · [[σ2]]
[[[σ 7→ a]]] = [[σ]] ⇒ [True 7→ a]
[[[σ ∧ ψ 7→ a]]] = [[σ]] ⇒ [ψ 7→ a]
Lemma 7.2. For all i, for all s ∈ S, for all σ ∈ Strati(P i), σ(s) = [[σ]](s).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of σ. Let s ∈ S and
ρss0 : s0
a1=⇒ s1 · · ·
am=⇒ sm = s be the unique path from root to s.
σ ≡ [ψ 7→ a]: Follows from the definition.
σ ≡ σ1 ·σ2 and σ ≡ σ1 +σ2 follows easily by applying induction hypothesis.
σ ≡ [π 7→ a]: We need to show that for all s, [π 7→ a](s) = ([[π]] ⇒ [True 7→
a])(s). We have the following two cases:
• ρss0 ,m |= π: In this case, we have [π 7→ a](s) = a. ρ
s
s0
,m |= π implies
∀j : 0 ≤ j < m, aj ∈ π(sj). From induction hypothesis, aj ∈ [[π]](sj),
which implies ρss0 conforms to [[π]]. From the semantics, we get ([[π]] ⇒
[True 7→ a])(s) = ([True 7→ a])(s) = a.
• ρss0 ,m 6|= π: In this case, we have [π 7→ a](s) = Σ and ∃j : 0 ≤ j < m
such that aj /∈ π(sj). By induction hypothesis, we have aj /∈ [[π]](sj)
which implies that ρss0 does not conform to [[π]]. From semantics we
get that ([[π]] ⇒ [True 7→ a])(s) = Σ.
σ ≡ [π ∧ ψ 7→ a]: The following two cases arise:
• ρss0 ,m |= π ∧ ψ: We have [π ∧ ψ 7→ a](s) = a. ρ
s
s0
,m |= π ∧ ψ implies
ρss0 ,m |= π and ρ
s
s0
,m |= ψ. ρss0 ,m |= π implies ∀j : 0 ≤ j < m,
aj ∈ π(sj). By induction hypothesis, aj ∈ [[π]](sj) and as before we
get ([[π]] ⇒ [ψ 7→ a])(s) = ([ψ 7→ a])(s) = a.
• ρss0 ,m 6|= π ∧ ψ: We have the following two cases:
– ρss0 ,m 6|= ψ: It is easy to see that
π ∧ ψ 7→ a](s) = ([[π]] ⇒ [ψ 7→ a])(s) = Σ.
– ρss0 ,m 6|= π: In this case, ∃j : 0 ≤ j < m such that aj /∈ π(sj).
By induction hypothesis, we have aj /∈ [[π]](sj). By an argument
similar to the one above we get [[π]] ⇒ [ψ 7→ a])(s) = Σ.
q.e.d.
For the converse, given a σ ∈ Strati(P i), we can construct an equiva-
lent formula σrec ∈ Strat
i
rec(P
i). The crucial observation is the following
equivalences in Strati(P i).
• π ⇒ σ1 + σ2 ≡ (π ⇒ σ1) + (π ⇒ σ2)
• π ⇒ σ1 · σ2 ≡ (π ⇒ σ1) · (π ⇒ σ2)
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• π1 ⇒ (π2 ⇒ σ) ≡ (π1 · π2) ⇒ σ
Using the above equivalences, we can write the strategy specification σ
in a normal form where all the implications are of the form π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a].
Then σrec is constructed inductively as follows:
[[[ψ 7→ a]]] = [ψ 7→ a]
[[σ1 + σ2]] = [[σ1]] + [[σ2]]
[[σ1 · σ2]] = [[σ1]] · [[σ2]]
[[π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a]]] = [[[π]] ∧ ψ 7→ a]
Lemma 7.3. For all i, for all s ∈ S, for all σ ∈ Strati(P i), σ(s) = [[σ]](s).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of formula. Let ρss0 :
s0
a1=⇒ s1 · · ·
am=⇒ sm = s. The interesting case is when σ ≡ π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a].
We need to show that for all s, π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a](s) = [π ∧ ψ 7→ a](s). We have
the following two cases:
• ρss0 conform to π: We have π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a](s) = [ψ 7→ a](s) and ∀j :
0 ≤ j < m, aj ∈ π(si). By induction hypothesis, aj ∈ [[π]](si) which
implies that ρss0 ,m |= π. Therefore [[[π]] ∧ ψ 7→ a](s) = [ψ 7→ a](s).
• ρss0 does not conform to π: By an argument similar to the above, we
can show that π ⇒ [ψ 7→ a](s) = [π ∧ ψ 7→ a](s) = Σ.
q.e.d.
Theorem 7.4. Logics L and Lrec have equivalent expressive power. I.e.,
• For every α ∈ Π, there exists αrec ∈ Πrec such that M, s |= α iff
M, s |= αrec.
• For every αrec ∈ Πrec there exists α ∈ Π such that M, s |= αrec iff
M, s |= α.
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3 by a routine
inductive argument. q.e.d.
8 Discussion
We have defined a logic for reasoning about composite strategies in games.
We have presented an axiomatization for the logic and shown its complete-
ness.
We again remark that the presentation has been given for two-player
games only for easy readability. It can be checked that all the definitions
and arguments given here can be appropriately generalized for n-player
games.
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While our emphasis in the paper has been on advocating syntactically
constructed strategies, we make no claims to having the “right” set of con-
nectives for building them. This will have to be decided by experience,
gained by specifying several kinds of strategies which turn out to be of use
in reasoning about games.
We believe that a framework of this sort will prove useful in reasoning
about multi-stage and repeated games, where strategy revision based on
learning other players’ strategies (perhaps partially) plays an important
role.
Appendix
Lemma A.1. For atoms t1 and t2, the following statements are equivalent.
1. ̂t1 ∧ 〈a〉̂t2 is consistent.
2. 〈a〉̂t1 ∧ ̂t2 is consistent.
Proof. Suppose 〈a〉̂t1∧ ̂t2 is consistent, from (A3b) we have 〈a〉̂t1∧[a]〈a〉̂t2 is
consistent. Therefore, 〈a〉(̂t1∧〈a〉̂t2) is consistent, which implies 6⊢ [a]¬(̂t1∧
〈a〉̂t2). From (NG-), 6⊢ ¬(̂t1∧〈a〉̂t2), thus we have that ̂t1∧〈a〉̂t2 is consistent.
Suppose ̂t1∧〈a〉̂t2 is consistent, from (A3a) we have [a]〈a〉̂t1∧〈a〉̂t2 is con-
sistent. Therefore, 〈a〉(〈a〉̂t1 ∧ ̂t2) is consistent, which implies 6⊢ [a]¬(〈a〉̂t1 ∧
̂t2). From (NG-), 6⊢ ¬(〈a〉̂t1 ∧ ̂t2), thus we get that 〈a〉̂t1 ∧ ̂t2 is consis-
tent. q.e.d.
Lemma A.2. Consider the path tk
ak−→ tk−1 . . .
a1−→ t0 where tk is a root
atom.
1. For all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, if [a]α ∈ tj and tj+1
a
−→ tj then α ∈ tj+1.
2. For all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, if 〈a〉α ∈ tj and tj+1
b
−→ tj then b = a and
α ∈ tj+1.
3. For all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, if 3-α ∈ tj then there exists i : j ≤ i ≤ k




−→ tj , we have ̂tj+1∧〈a〉̂tj is consistent, By Lemma A.1, ̂tj∧
〈a〉̂tj+1 is consistent, which implies [a]α∧ 〈a〉̂tj+1 is consistent (by omitting
some conjuncts). Therefore 〈a〉(α ∧ ̂tj+1) is consistent. Using (NG-) we get
α ∧ ̂tj+1 is consistent and since tj+1 is an atom, we have α ∈ tj+1.
(2) Suppose tj+1
b
−→ tj , we first show that b = a. Suppose this is not true,
since tj+1
b
−→ tj , we have ̂tj∧〈b〉̂tj+1 is consistent. And therefore ̂tj∧〈b〉True
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is consistent. From axiom (A2c) ̂tj∧ [a]False is consistent. If 〈a〉α ∈ tj , then
we get 〈a〉α ∧ [a]False is consistent. Therefore 〈a〉(α ∧ False) is consistent.
From (NG-) we have α ∧ False is consistent, which is a contradiction.
To show α ∈ tj+1 observe that 〈a〉α ∈ tj implies [a]α ∈ tj (by axiom
(A2b) and closure condition). By previous argument we get α ∈ tj+1.
(3) Suppose 3-α ∈ tj and tj+1
a
−→ tj . If α ∈ tj then we are done. Else by
axiom (A4b) and the previous argument, we have 〈a〉3-α ∈ tj . From (2) we
have 3-α ∈ tj+1. Continuing in this manner, we either get an i where α ∈ ti
or we get 3-α ∈ tk. Since tk is the root, this will give us α ∈ tk. q.e.d.
Lemma A.3. For all t ∈ AT , σ ;i β 6∈ t implies there exists a path
ρtkt : t = t1
a1−→AT t2 . . .
ak−1
−→AT tk which conforms to σ such that one of
the following conditions holds:
• β 6∈ tk.
• tk is a non-leaf node and moves(tk) ∩ σ(tk) = ϕ.
Proof. Consider the least set R containing t and closed under the following
condition:
• if t1 ∈ R then for every transition t1
a
−→ t2 such that a ∈ σ(t1) we
have t2 ∈ R.
If there exists an atom t′ ∈ R such that β 6∈ t′ or if t′ is a non-leaf node
and moves(t′) ∩ σ(t′) = ϕ, then we are done. Suppose not, then we have
⊢ ˜R ⊃ β and ⊢ ( ˜R ∧ ¬leaf) ⊃
∨
a∈Σ(〈a〉True ∧ (σ)i : a).
Claim A.4. The following are derivable.
1. ⊢ ( ˜R ∧ τi ∧ (σ)i : a) ⊃ [a] ˜R.
2. ⊢ (τı ∧ ˜R) ⊃ [N ] ˜R.
Assume claim A.4 holds, then applying (IND) rule we get ⊢ ˜R ⊃ σ ;i β.
But t ∈ R and therefore ⊢ ̂t ⊃ σ ;i β, contradicting the assumption that
σ ;i β 6∈ t. q.e.d.
Proof. To prove 1, suppose the claim does not hold. We have that ( ˜R∧ τi∧
(σ)i : a) ∧ 〈a〉¬ ˜R is consistent. Let R
′ = AT − R. If R′ = ϕ then R = AT
in which case its easy to see that the claim holds. If R′ 6= ϕ, then we have
( ˜R ∧ τi ∧ (σ)i : a) ∧ 〈a〉˜R′ is consistent. Hence for some t1 ∈ R and t2 ∈ R
′,
we have (̂t1 ∧ τi ∧ (σ)i : a))∧ 〈a〉̂t2 is consistent. Which implies t1
a
−→AT t2
and this transition conforms to σ. By closure condition on R, t2 ∈ R which
gives us the required contradiction.
Proof of 2 is similar. q.e.d. (Claim A.4)
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Abstract
Several formal models of awareness have been introduced in both
computer science and economics literature as a solution to the prob-
lem of logical omniscience. In this chapter, I provide a philosophical
discussion of awareness logic, showing that its underlying intuition
appears already in the seminal work of Hintikka. Furthermore, I
show that the same intuition is pivotal in Newell’s account of agency,
and that it can be accommodated in Levi’s distinction between epis-
temic commitment and performance. In the second part of the chap-
ter, I propose and investigate a first-order extension of Fagin and
Halpern’s Logic of General Awareness, tackling the problem of repre-
senting “awareness of unawareness”. The language is interpreted over
neighborhood structures, following the work of Arló-Costa and Pacuit
on First-Order Classical Modal Logic. Adapting existing techniques,
I furthermore prove that there exist useful decidable fragments of
quantified logic of awareness.
1 Introduction
Since its first formulations (cf. [21]), epistemic logic has been confronted
with the problem of logical omniscience. Although Kripkean semantics ap-
peared to be the natural interpretation of logics meant to represent knowl-
edge or belief, it implies that agents are reasoners that know (or at least are
committed to knowing) every valid formula. Furthermore, agents’ knowl-
edge is closed under logical consequence, so that if an agent knows ϕ and ψ
is a logical consequence of ϕ, then the agent knows ψ as well. If we focus on
representing pure knowledge attributions, rather than attributions of epis-
temic commitment, such a notion of knowledge (or belief) is too strong to
be an adequate representation of human epistemic reasoning. It is possible
to attack the problem by building into the semantics a distinction between
implicit and explicit knowledge (or belief). The intuition behind such a
distinction is that an agent is not always aware of all propositions. In par-
ticular, if ϕ is a valid formula, but the agent is not aware of it, the agent is
Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (eds.). Logic and the Founda-
tions of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7). Texts in Logic and Games 3, Amsterdam
University Press 2008, pp. 209–240.
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said to know ϕ implicitly, while she fails to know it explicitly. The agent ex-
plicitly knows ϕ, on the other hand, when she both implicitly knows ϕ and
she is aware of ϕ. In their fundamental article [9], Fagin and Halpern for-
mally introduced the concept of awareness in the context of epistemic logic,
providing semantic grounds for the distinction between implicit and explicit
belief. The technical concept of “awareness” they introduce is amenable to
different discursive interpretations that can be captured by specific axioms.
In the last decade, recognizing the importance of modeling asymmetric
information and unforeseen consequences, economists have turned their at-
tention to epistemic formalizations supplemented with (un)awareness (cf.
[32, 33]), and noticed that partitional structures as introduced by Aumann
cannot represent awareness [8]. The model in [33] defines awareness ex-
plicitly in terms of knowledge. An agent is said to be aware of ϕ iff she
knows ϕ or she both does not know that ϕ and knows that she does not
know ϕ. Halpern ([13]) shows that such a model is a particular case of
the logic of awareness introduced in [9]. Heifetz et al. ([20]) present a set-
theoretical model that generalizes traditional information structures à la
Aumann. Its axiomatization in a 3-valued epistemic logic is provided by by
Halpern and Rêgo in [14]. A further, purely set-theoretical model of aware-
ness is given by Li ([30]). Awareness, or lack thereof, plays an important
role in game-theoretic modeling. Recently, a significant amount of litera-
ture has appeared in which the issue of awareness in games is taken into
account. Feinberg ([11]) incorporates unawareness into games and shows
that unawareness can lead to cooperative outcomes in the finitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. A preliminary investigation on the role of awareness
in the context of game-theoretical definitions of convention is performed by
Sillari ([37]). Haleprn and Rêgo ([15]) define extensive-form games with
possibly unaware players in which the usual assumption of common knowl-
edge of the structure of the game may fail. Heifetz et al. ([19]) take into
account Bayesian games with unawareness. In [29] the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium is extended to games with unawareness.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on aware-
ness. On the one hand, I provide philosophical underpinnings for the idea
of awareness structures. On the other, I propose a new system of first-order
epistemic logic with awareness that offers certain advantages over existing
systems. As for the first contribution, I build on epistemological analyses of
the problem of logical omniscience. Although the authors I consider need
not align themselves with advocates of the awareness structures solution,
I argue in the following that their analyses are not only compatible with
formal models of awareness, but also compelling grounds for choosing them
as the appropriate solution to the logical omniscience problem. I consider,
for example, Levi’s idea of epistemic commitment. In a nutshell, ideally
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situated agents possess, in their incorrigible core of knowledge, all logical
truths, and the agents’ bodies of knowledge are closed under implication.
Although agents are committed by (ideal) standards of rationality to hold-
ing such propositions as items of knowledge, actual agents are aware only
of a subset of them (cf. [25, pp. 9–13]). Furthermore, I consider Newell’s
theory of agency (as advanced in [35]) and show that it contains a fore-
shadowing of the notion that awareness allows us to discriminate between
an agent’s explicit and implicit knowledge. Although Newell’s analysis is
conducted at a fairly abstract level, it is arguable that he is endorsing a rep-
resentation model in which knowledge explicitly held by a system is given
by its (implicit) knowledge plus some kind of access function (cf. in partic-
ular [35, p. 114]). It is not hard to see that this intuition corresponds to the
intuition behind awareness structures. Finally, I argue that the intuition
behind Hintikka’s own treatment of logical omniscience in [21] can also be
considered as related to awareness structures in a precise sense that will be
elucidated in the following.
As for the second contribution, I identify two main motivations for the
introduction of a new formal system of awareness logic. First and foremost,
it addresses the problem of limited expressivity of existing (propositional)
logics of awareness. Indeed, [16] notice that both standard epistemic logic
augmented with awareness and the awareness models set forth in the eco-
nomics literature cannot express the fact that an agent may (explicitly)
know that she is unaware of some proposition without there being an ex-
plicit proposition that she is unaware of. This limitation of the existing
models needs to be overcome, since examples of “knowledge of unawareness”
are often observed in actual situations. Consider Levi’s idea of commit-
ment mentioned above: we are committed to knowing (in fact, we explicitly
know) that there exists a prime number greater than the largest known
prime number, although we know that we do not know what number that
is. Or, consider David Lewis’s theory of convention1 as a regularity in the
solution of a recurrent coordination game: when trying to learn what the
conventional behavior in a certain environment might be, an agent might
know (or, perhaps more interestingly, deem highly probable) that there is a
conventional regularity, without having yet figured out what such a regular-
ity actually is. Or, in the context of a two-person game with unawareness,
a player might explicitly know that the other player has some strategy at
her disposal, yet not know what such a strategy might be. Halpern and
Rêgo propose in [16] a sound and complete second-order propositional epis-
temic logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness. However, the
validity problem for their logic turns out to be no better than recursively
1 Cf. [28] and the reconstruction offered in [37], in which awareness structures find a
concrete application.
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enumerable, even in the case of S5, which was proven to be decidable in
[12]. Halpern and Rêgo conjecture that there are three causes for undecid-
ability, each one sufficient: (i) the presence of the awareness operators, (ii)
the presence of more than one modality, (iii) the absence of Euclidean rela-
tions. Undecidability of second-order, multi-modal S5 should not come as
a surprise. For example, [1] shows that adding a second modality to second-
order S5 makes it equivalent to full second-order predicate logic. My aim
is to present a decidable logic for reasoning about knowledge of unaware-
ness. The strategy I adopt consists in extending predicate modal logic with
awareness operators and showing that it allows to represent knowledge of
unawareness. Using the techniques introduced in [40] and [39], I can then
isolate useful decidable fragments of it.
There is a further reason for the introduction of predicate epistemic
logic with awareness. The extension from propositional to predicate logic
takes place in the context of classical systems interpreted over neighbor-
hood structures (cf. [6]), rather than in the traditional framework of normal
systems interpreted over Kripke structures. In so doing, I aim at bringing
together the recent literature (cf. [2], [3]) on first-order classical systems for
epistemic logic and the literature on awareness structures. The rationale
for this choice lies in the fact that I intend to formulate a system in which
Kyburg’s ‘risky knowledge’ or Jeffrey’s ‘probable knowledge’ is expressible
as high probability (or even as probability one belief, as Aumann does in
the game-theoretical context). High probability operators give rise to Ky-
burg’s lottery paradox, which, in the context of first-order epistemic logic
(cf. [3]) can be seen as an instance of the Barcan formulas. Thus, first-order
Kripke structures with constant domains, in which the Barcan formula is
validated, cease to be adequate models. The use of neighborhood structures
allows us to work with constant domains without committing to the validity
of the Barcan formulas (cf. [2]), hence presents itself as a natural candidate
for modeling high probability operators. The second-order logic of Halpern
and Rêgo also requires the Barcan formulas to be validated, and hence does
not lend itself to the modeling of knowledge as high-probability operators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the Section 2, I review
and discuss the philosophical accounts of logical omniscience offered by Hin-
tikka, Newell and Levi, stress their structural similarities, and show how
these accounts compare with the intuition underlying Fagin and Halpern’s
logic of awareness. In Section 3, I build on Arló-Costa and Pacuit’s version
of first-order classical systems of epistemic logic, augmenting them with
awareness structures. I then show that such a quantified logic of aware-
ness is expressive enough to represent knowledge of unawareness and that
Wolter and Zakharyashev’s proof of the decidability of various fragments
of first-order multi-modal logic (cf. [40]) can be modified to carry over to
quantified logic of awareness.
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2 Logical Omniscience
In this section, I consider accounts of the problem of logical omniscience
provided in Hintikka’s presentation of epistemic logic, Newell’s theory of
agency and Levi’s epistemology. I show through my analysis that all such
approaches to logical omniscience share a common structure, and that Fagin
and Halpern’s logic of awareness has reference to such a structure.
2.1 Hintikka: Information and justification
Hintikka’s essay Knowledge and Belief is commonly regarded as the seminal
contribution to the development of epistemic logic. Logical omniscience is
an essential philosophical element in Hintikka’s conceptual analysis, as well
as in the formal construction stemming from it. Consider, for instance, the
following quote:
It is true, in some sense, that if I utter (10) ‘I don’t know whether
p’ then I am not altogether consistent unless it really is possible,
for all that I know, that p fails to be the case. But this notion of
consistency is a rather unusual one, for it makes it inconsistent for
me to say (10) whenever p is a logical consequence of what I know.
Now if this consequence-relation is a distant one, I may fail to know,
in a perfectly good sense, that p is the case, for I may fail to see that
p follows from what I know2.
Hintikka notices in [21, p. 23] that we need to distinguish two senses of
“knowing”. A first, weak, kind of knowledge (or belief) is simply concerned
with the truth of a proposition p. In natural language, this is the sense
of “knowing p” related to “being conscious3 that p”, or “being informed
that p” or “being under the impression that p”, etc. The second, stronger,
sense of knowing is not only concerned with the truth of p, but also with the
justification of the agent’s knowledge. According to different epistemological
accounts, “knowing” in this latter sense may mean that the agent has “all
the evidence needed to assert p”, or has “the right to be sure that p”, or has
“adequate evidence for p”, etc. Whichever of these epistemological stances
one chooses, the strong sense of knowing incorporates both the element
of bare “availability” of the truth of p (information) and the element of
the epistemological justification for p. Such a distinction is essential in
Hintikka’s analysis of the notion of consistency relative to knowledge and
belief, which in turn is crucial for the design of his formal system.
2 Cf. [21], or p. 25 of the 2005 edition of the book, from which the page references are
drawn hereafter.
3 Referring to the weak sense of “knowing”, Hintikka mentions a natural language ex-
pression as “the agent is aware of p”. In order to avoid confusion with the different,
technical use of “awareness”, in this context I avoid the term “awareness” altogether.
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Syntactically, Hintikka’s system does not essentially differ from the epis-
temic systems that have come to prevail in the literature, the only notable
difference being the explicit mention of the “dual” of the knowledge opera-
tor, Pi, to be read as “it is compatible with all i knows that. . . ”. The pursuit
of consistency criteria for the notions of knowledge and belief moves from
the analysis of sets of formulas in which both knowledge and “possibility”
operators are present. The main idea is that if the set {Kip1, . . . ,Kipn, Piq}
is consistent, then the set {Kip1, . . . ,Kipn, q} is also consistent. The dis-
tinction between the two senses of “knowing” above is crucial to the justi-
fication of this idea. If “knowing p” is taken in the weak sense of “being
conscious of p”, then a weaker notion of consistency is appropriate, accord-
ing to which if {Kip1, . . . ,Kipn, Piq} is consistent, then {p1, . . . , pn, q} is
consistent as well. Such a weaker notion, however, is no longer sufficient
once we interpret Kip as “i is justified in knowing p”, according to the
stronger sense of knowing. In this case, q has to be compatible not just
with the truth of all statements p1, . . . , pn, but also with the fact that i is
in the position to justify (strongly know) each of the p1, . . . , pn, that is to
say, q has to be consistent with each one of the Kip1, . . . ,Kipn.
Other criteria of consistency are those relative to the knowledge operator
(if λ is a consistent set and contains Kip, then λ ∪ p is consistent), to the
boolean connectives (for instance, if λ is consistent and contains p∧ q, then
λ ∪ {p, q} is consistent), and to the duality conditions (if λ is consistent
and ¬Kip ∈ λ, then λ ∪ Pi¬p is consistent; while if ¬Pip ∈ λ, then λ ∪
Ki¬p is consistent). The duality conditions trigger the problem of logical
omniscience. Consider again the quote at the onset of this subsection: if
Kiq holds, and p is a logical consequence of q, then ¬Kip is inconsistent.
Thus, at this juncture, a modeling decision has to be made. If we want
to admit those cases in which an agent fails to know a logical consequence
of what she knows, either (i) we may tweak the notion of knowledge in
a way that makes such a predicament consistent, or (ii) we may dispense
with the notion of consistency, weakening it in a way that makes such a
predicament admissible. The two routes, of course, lead to different formal
models. Hintikka chooses the latter strategy, while epistemic systems with
awareness à la Fagin and Halpern choose the former. However, the two
routes are two faces of the same coin. Hintikka’s concept of defensibility,
intended as “immunity from certain standards of criticism” ([21, p. 27]),
replacing the notion of consistency, allows us to consider knowledge (of
the kind that allows for logical omniscience to fail) as the intersection of
both the weak and the strong sense of “knowing” above, in a way that,
at least structurally, is not far from considering explicit knowledge as the
intersection of implicit knowledge and awareness in [9].
Models of Awareness 215
To make more precise the notion of defensibility as “immunity from cer-
tain standards of criticism”, and to see more clearly the similarity with
awareness logic, let me briefly summarize Hintikka’s formal system. Hin-
tikka’s semantics is kindred in spirit to possible worlds structures. There
are, however, proceeding from the notion of defensibility, important differ-
ences with standard possible worlds semantics. First, define a model set,
with respect to boolean connectives, as a set µ of formulas such that
p ∈ µ→ ¬p 6∈ µ (¬)
(p ∧ q) ∈ µ→ p ∈ µ and q ∈ µ (∧)
(p ∨ q) ∈ µ→ p ∈ µ or q ∈ µ (∨)
¬¬p ∈ µ→ p ∈ µ (¬¬)
¬(p ∧ q) ∈ µ→ ¬p ∈ µ or ¬q ∈ µ (¬∧)
¬(p ∨ q) → ¬p ∈ µ and ¬q ∈ µ (¬∨)
In order to add epistemic operators to model sets, Hintikka postulates
the existence of a set of model sets (called the model system Ω) and of an
alternativeness relation for each agent, and adds the clauses
If Pip ∈ µ, then there exists at least a µ
∗ such that µ∗
is an alternative to µ for i, and p ∈ µ∗
(P )
If Kip ∈ µ, then, if µ
∗ is an alternative to µ for i, then Kip ∈ µ
∗ (KK)
If Kip ∈ µ, then p ∈ µ (K)
Thus, we have consistent sets of formulas constituting a model system,
an accessibility relation between model sets in the system for each agent,
and a semantic account of knowledge close to the standard Kripkean one
(to see that, notice that KK and K taken together imply that if Kip ∈ µ
then p ∈ µ∗ for all µ∗ alternative to µ in Ω). The fundamental difference
with Kripke models lies in the elements of the domain: model sets (i.e.,
consistent sets of formulas) in Hintikka’s semantics, possible worlds (i.e.,
maximally consistent sets of formulas) in Kripke’s. Thus, Hintikka’s model
sets are partial descriptions of possible worlds.4
4 Hintikka has made this claim unexceptionable in later writings: “The only viable
interpretation of logicians’ “possible worlds” is the one that I initially assumed was
intended by everyone. That is to understand “possible worlds” as scenarios, that is,
applications of our logic, language or some other theory to some part of the universe
that can be actually or at least conceptually isolated sufficiently from the rest”, cf. [23,
p. 22]. But cf. also [21, pp. 33–34]: “For our present purposes, the gist of their [model
sets] formal properties may be expressed in an intuitive form by saying that they
constitute [. . . ] a very good formal counterpart to the informal idea of a (partial)
description of a possible state of affairs” (emphasis added).
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The notion of defensibility is now definable as follows: a set of formulas
is defensible iff it can be embedded in a model set of a model system. As
the notion of consistency is replaced with that of defensibility, the notion of
validity is replaced with that of self-sustenance. It follows easily from the
definitions that p → q is self-sustaining iff the set p,¬q is not defensible5.
This is key for overcoming logical omniscience: although an agent knows q
if she knows p and p→ q is self-sustaining, it need not be the case that she
knows q if she knows p and p→ q is valid, since, in this case, p→ q need not
be self-sustaining6. This may occur if q does not appear in the model sets
of Ω, so that p,¬q is embeddable in them, making ¬Kiq defensible (since,
by the duality rule, Pi¬q ∈ µ and, by rule [K], there exists a µ
∗ such that
¬q ∈ µ∗). Thus, ¬Kiq is defensible as long as q can be kept out of some
model set µ, provided that i does not incur in criticism according to certain
epistemic standards. That is, for an agent to be required to know q it is
not enough, say, that q logically follows from the agent’s knowledge, but it
also needs to be the case that q belongs to a model set µ. Similarly7, in [9],
for an agent to know ϕ explicitly, it is not sufficient that ϕ logically follows
from the agent’s knowledge, but it also needs to be the case that ϕ belongs
to the agent’s awareness set. In this sense, a formula not appearing in a
model set and a formula not belonging to an awareness set may be regarded
as cognate notions.
2.2 Newell: Knowledge and access
The interest of the AI community in the logic of knowledge and its rep-
resentation does not need to be stressed here. Intelligent agents must be
endowed with the capability of reasoning about the current state of the
world, about what other agents believe the current state of the world is,
etc. Planning, language processing, distributed architectures are only some
of the many fields of computer science in which reasoning about knowledge
plays a central role. It is not surprising, then, that computer scientists paid
attention to the epistemic interpretation of modal logics and, hence, that
they had to confront the problem of logical omniscience. It is difficult (and
probably not particularly relevant) to adjudicate issues of precedence, but
5 If the set {p,¬q} is not defensible, then it cannot be embedded in any model set µ,
meaning that either ¬p or q (or both) must belong to µ, making p→ q self-sustaining,
and vice versa.
6 Notice however [21, p. 46] that other aspects of logical omniscience are present: the
valid formula (Kip ∧Kiq) → Ki(p ∧ q) is also self-sustaining.
7 A formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper, and the interested reader can find it
in [38]. To see the gist of the argument, consider that model sets are partial description
of possible worlds. While one can (as it is the case, e.g., in [24]) model the distinction
between explicit and implicit knowledge by resorting to partial descriptions of possible
worlds, one can, equivalently, do so by “sieving” the description of a possible world
through awareness sets.
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the idea of using some conceptualization of awareness to cope with the prob-
lem of logical omniscience appeared in the early 80s, possibly on a cue by
Alan Newell. In 1980, Newell delivered the first presidential address of the
American Association for Artificial Intelligence. The title was The knowl-
edge level, and the presidential address is reproduced in [35]. The article
focuses on the distinction between knowledge and its representation, both
understood as functional components of an intelligent system.
An intelligent system, in the functional view of agency endorsed by
Newell, is embedded in an action-oriented environment. The system’s ac-
tivity consists in the process from a perceptual component (that inputs
task statements and information), through a representation module (that
represents tasks and information as data structures), to a goal structure
(the solution to the given task statement). In this picture, knowledge is
perceived from the external world, and stored as it is represented in data
structures. Newell claims that there is a distinction between knowledge and
its representation, much like there is a one between the symbolic level of a
computer system and the level of the actual physical processes supporting
the symbolic manipulations. A level in a computer system consists of a
medium (which is to be processed), components together with laws of com-
position, a system, and laws that determine the behavior of the system. For
example, at the symbolic level the system is the computer, its components
are symbols and their syntax, the medium consists of memories, while the
laws of behavior are given by the interpretation of logical operations. Be-
low the symbolic level, there is the physical level of circuits and devices.
Among the properties of levels, we notice that each level is reducible to the
next lower level (e.g., logical operations in terms of switches), but also that
a level need not have a description at higher levels. Newell takes it that
knowledge constitutes a computer system level located immediately above
the symbolic level.
At the knowledge level, the system is the agent; the components are
goals, actions and bodies (of knowledge); the medium is knowledge and the
behavioral rule is rationality. Notice that the symbolic level constitutes the
level of representation. Hence, since every level is reducible to the next lower
level, knowledge can be represented through symbolic systems. But can we
provide a description of the knowledge level without resorting to the level
of representation? It turns out that we can, although we can only insofar
as we do not decouple knowledge and action. In particular, says Newell, “it
is unclear in what sense [systems lacking rationality] can be said to have
knowledge8”, where “rationality” stands for “principles of action”. Indeed
an agent, at the knowledge level, is but a set of actions, bodies of knowl-
edge and a set of goals, rather independently of whether the agent has any
8 Cf. [35, p. 100].
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physical implementation. What, then, is knowledge? Knowledge, according
to Newell, is whatever can be ascribed to an agent, such that the observed
behavior of the agent can be explained (that is, computed) according to the
laws of behavior encoded in the principle of rationality. The principle of
rationality appears to be unqualified: “If an agent has knowledge that one
of its actions will lead to one of his goals, then the agent will select that
action9”. Thus, the definition of knowledge is a procedural one: an observer
notices the action undertaken by the agent; given that the observer is famil-
iar with the agent’s goals and its rationality, the observer can therefore infer
what knowledge the agent must possess. Knowledge is not defined struc-
turally, for example as physical objects, symbols standing for them and their
specific properties and relations. Knowledge is rather defined functionally
as what mediates the behavior of the agent and the principle of rationality
governing the agent’s actions. Can we not sever the bond between knowl-
edge and action by providing, for example, a characterization of knowledge
in terms of a physical structure corresponding to it? As Newell explains,
“the answer in a nutshell is that knowledge of the world cannot be captured
in a finite structure. [. . . ] Knowledge as a structure must contain at least as
much variety as the set of all truths (i.e., propositions) that the agent can
respond to10”. Hence, knowledge cannot be captured in a finite physical
structure, and can only be considered in its functional relation with action.
Thus (a version of) the problem of logical omniscience presents itself
when it comes to describing the epistemic aspect of an intelligent system.
Ideally (at the knowledge level), the body of knowledge an agent is equipped
with is unbounded, hence knowledge cannot be represented in a physical
system. However, recall from above how a level of interpretation of the
intelligent system is reducible to the next lower level. Knowledge should
therefore be reducible to the level of symbols. This implies that the sym-
bolic level necessarily encompasses only a portion of the unbounded body of
knowledge that the agent possesses. It should begin to be apparent, at this
point, that what Newell calls “knowledge” is akin to what in awareness epis-
temic logic is called “implicit knowledge,” whereas what Newell refers to as
“representation” corresponds to what in awareness logic is called “explicit
knowledge”. Newell’s analysis endorses the view that explicit knowledge
corresponds to implicit knowledge and awareness as witnessed by the “slo-
gan equation11”
Representation = Knowledge + Access.
The interesting question is then: in which way does an agent extract rep-
9 Cf. [35, p. 102]. Although Newell, in the following, refines it, his principle of rationality
does not seem to be explicitly concerned with utility.
10 Cf. [35, p. 107].
11 Cf. [35, p. 114].
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resentation from knowledge? Or, in other terms: Given the definition of
representation above, what can its theory be? Building a theory of rep-
resentation involves building a theory of access (that is, of awareness), to
explain how agents manage to extract limited, explicit knowledge (working
knowledge, representation) from their unbounded implicit knowledge. The
suggestive idea is that agents do so “intelligently”, i.e., by judging what is
relevant to the task at hand. Such a judgment, in turn, depends on the
principle of rationality. Hence, knowledge and action cannot be decoupled
and knowledge cannot be entirely represented at the symbolic level, since
it involves both structures and processes12. Given the “slogan equation”
above, it seems that one could identify such processes with explicit and ef-
fective rules governing the role of awareness. Logics, as they are “one class
of representations [. . . ] uniquely fitted to the analysis of knowledge and
representation13”, seem to be suitable for such an endeavor. In particular,
epistemic logics enriched with awareness operators are natural candidates
to axiomatize theories of explicit knowledge representation.
2.3 Levi: Commitment and performance
Levi illustrates (in [25]) the concept of epistemic commitment through the
following example: an agent is considering what integer stands in the bil-
lionth decimal place in the decimal expansion of π. She is considering ten
hypotheses of the form “the integer in the billionth decimal place in the dec-
imal expansion of π is j”, where j designates one of the first ten integers.
Exactly one of those hypotheses is consistent with the logical and mathe-
matical truths that, according to Levi, are part of the incorrigible core of
the agent’s body of knowledge. However, it is reasonable to think that, if
the agent has not performed (or has no way to perform) the needed calcu-
lations14, “there is an important sense in which [the agent] does not know
which of these hypotheses is entailed by [logical and mathematical truths]
and, hence, does not know what the integer in the billionth place in the
decimal expansion of π is15”. Levi stresses that the agent is committed to
believing the right hypothesis, but she may at the same time be unaware of
what the right hypothesis is. While the body of knowledge of an ideally sit-
12 The idea is taken up again in [5], where a broader, partly taxonomical analysis of
(artificial) agency is carried out. Moving along a discrete series of models of agents
increasingly limited in their processing capabilities, we find, at the “fully idealized”
end of the spectrum, the omnipotent, logically omniscient agent. Next to it, we find
the rational agent, which, as described above, uses the principle of rationality to sieve
its knowledge and to obtain a working approximation of it.
13 Cf. [35, p. 100]
14 It should be clear to the reader that Levi’s argument carries over also to those cases
in which the lack of (explicit) knowledge follows from reasons other than lack of com-
putational resources.
15 Cf. [25, pp. 9–10].
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uated and rational agent contains all logical truths and their consequences,
the body of knowledge of real persons or institutions does not. Epistemic
(or, as Levi prefers, doxastic) commitments are necessary constituents of
knowledge, which, although ideally sufficient to achieve knowledge, must in
practice be supplemented with a further element. As Levi puts it: “I do
assume, however, that to be aware of one’s commitment is to know what
they are”16.
The normative aspect of the principle of rationality regulating epistemic
commitments and, hence, their relative performances, is further explored
in [27]. Levi maintains that the principle of rationality in inquiry and de-
liberation is twofold. On the one hand, it imposes necessary, but weak,
coherence conditions on the agent’s state of full belief, credal probability,
and preferences. On the other, it provides minimal conditions for the jus-
tification of changes in the agent’s state of full belief, credal probability,
and preferences. As weak as the coherence constraints might be, they are
demanding well beyond the capability of any actual agent. For instance,
full beliefs should be closed under logical consequence; credal probabilities
should respect the laws of probability; and preferences should be transitive
and satisfy independence conditions. Hence, such principles of rationality
are not to be thought of as descriptive (or predictive) or, for that matter,
normative (since it is not sensible to impose conditions that cannot possi-
bly be fulfilled). They are, says Levi, prescriptive, in the sense that they do
not require compliance tout court, but rather demand that we enhance our
ability to follow them.
Agents fail to comply with the principle of rationality requiring the de-
ductive closure of their belief set, and they do so for multiple reasons. An
agent might fail to entertain a belief logically implied by other beliefs of hers
because she is lacking in attention. Or, being ignorant of the relevant de-
ductive rules, she may draw an incorrect conclusion or even refuse to draw a
conclusion altogether. The former case, according to Levi, can be accommo-
dated by understanding belief as a disposition to assent upon interrogation.
In the latter, the agent needs to improve her logical abilities—by “seeking
therapy”. In both cases, however, what is observed is a discrepancy between
the agent’s commitment to hold an epistemic disposition, and her epistemic
performance, which fails to display the disposition she is committed to hav-
ing. The prescriptive character of the principle of rationality gives the agent
an (epistemic) obligation to fulfill the commitment to full belief. The agent
is thus committed17 to holding such a belief. The notion of full belief ap-
16 Cf. [25, p. 12].
17 She is committed in the sense (see [27]) in which one is committed to keep a religious
vow to sanctity: occasional sinning is tolerated, and the vow is to be considered upheld
as long as the pious agent strives to fulfill the commitments the vow implies. However,
going back to the principle of rationality, one should notice that “epistemic therapy”
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pears both as an epistemic disposition (commitment) of the agent, as well
as the actual performance of her disposition.
The discussion of Levi’s idea of epistemic commitment provides us with
three related, yet distinct concepts involved in the description of the epis-
temic state of an agent. On the one hand, we have epistemic commitments
(which we could think of as implicit beliefs). On the other, we have com-
mitments that the agent fulfills, that is to say, in the terminology of [25],
commitments of which the agent is aware (we could think of those as explicit
beliefs). The latter, though, calls for a third element, the agent’s awareness
of the commitment she is going to fulfill.
2.4 Logical omniscience and awareness logic
The three examinations of the problem of logical omniscience described here
do not deal directly with the logic of awareness, and actually all of them
pre-date even the earliest systems of awareness logic (for instance, [24]). In
fact, Hintikka’s position on the issue has shifted over the years. Since the
introduction of Rantala’s “urn models” (cf. [36]), the author of Knowledge
and Belief has endorsed the “impossible worlds” solution to the problem
of logical omniscience (cf. [22]). In the case of Isaac Levi’s approach, it is
at best doubtful that Fagin and Halpern understand the notions of implicit
and explicit knowledge in the same way Levi elaborates those of epistemic
commitment and epistemic performance. However, the three accounts ana-
lyzed above do share a common structure, whose form is captured by Fagin
and Halpern’s logic of awareness. In the case of Allen Newell’s analysis
of agency at the knowledge level, there is a marked conceptual proximity
between Newell’s notions of knowledge, representation and access, on the
one hand, and Fagin and Halpern’s notions of implicit knowledge, explicit
knowledge and awareness, on the other. But consider also Hintikka’s dis-
tinction between a weak and a strong sense of knowing, the former roughly
related to the meaning of “having information that”, the latter to the one of
“being justified in having information that”. If we interpret “awareness” as
meaning “having a justification”, then strong knowledge is yielded by weak
knowledge and justification, just as explicit knowledge is yielded by im-
plicit knowledge and awareness. Also Levi’s distinction between epistemic
commitment and epistemic performance can be operationalized by stipu-
lating that epistemic performance stems from the simultaneous presence of
both the agent’s epistemic commitment and the agent’s recognition of her
own commitment, just as explicit knowledge is yielded by the simultaneous
comes at a cost (of time, resources, effort etc.) and that, moreover, not all our doxastic
commitments (actually only a few of them) are epistemically useful (think of the belief
that p, which implies the belief that p ∨ p, that p ∨ p ∨ p, and so on). Hence the idea
of “seeking therapy” or of using “prosthetic devices” to comply with the principle of
rationality leaves space for further qualification.
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presence of implicit knowledge and awareness.
Fagin and Halpern’s logic of awareness was meant to be a versatile for-
mal tool in the first place18, in such a way that its purely formal account
of “awareness” could be substantiated with a particular (concrete) inter-
pretation of “awareness”. Such an interpretation could be epistemological
justification, as in the case of Hintikka’s account; or it could be physical
access, as in case of Newell’s artificial agent; or it could be psychological
awareness, as in the case of Levi’s flesh-and-blood agents. All three interpre-
tations fit the general structure of Fagin and Halpern’s awareness logic. It is,
however, much less clear whether it is possible to capture axiomatically the
different properties that “awareness” enjoys in the philosophical accounts
delineated in the previous subsections. From a normative standpoint, one
would need to answer the question: given that the agents capabilities are
bounded, which are the items of knowledge that (bounded) rationality re-
quires that the agent explicitly hold? This line of inquiry is pursued by
Harman (cf. [18]) and by Cherniak (cf. [7]). Levi notices that the “therapy”
to be undertaken in order to better our epistemic performance comes at a
cost, triggering a difficult prescriptive question as to how and how much an
agent should invest to try and better approximate her epistemic commit-
ment. Levi does not seem to think that such a question can be answered
in full generality19. It seems to me that there is an important dynamic
component to the question (if one’s goal is such-and-such, then she should
perform epistemically up to such-and-such portion of her epistemic commit-
ment) that is well captured in Newell’s intuition that knowledge representa-
tion and action cannot be decoupled in a physical system. The formidable
task of providing an axiomatic answer to the normative question about the
relation between implicit and explicit knowledge lies beyond the scope of
this contribution, and in the formal system advanced in the next section, I
will consider only those properties of awareness that are now standard in
the literature.
18 Cf, [9, p. 41]: “Different notions of knowledge and belief will be appropriate for different
applications. We believe that one of the contributions of this paper is providing tools
for constructing reasonable semantic models of notions of knowledge with a variety of
properties.” Also, “once we have a concrete interpretation [of awareness] in mind, we
may well add some restrictions to the awareness functions to capture certain properties
of ‘awareness’,” ibidem, p. 54.
19 “A lazy inquirer may regard the effort to fulfill his commitments as too costly where
a more energetic inquirer suffering from the same disabilities does not. Is the lazy
inquirer failing to do what he ought to do to fulfill his commitments, in contrast to
the more energetic inquirer? I have no firm answer to this question [. . . ] We can
recognize the question as a prescriptive one without pretending that we are always in
the position to answer it in advance.”, [26, p. 168, n. 14].
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3 First-Order Logic of Awareness
In this section, I extend Fagin and Halpern’s logic of general awareness
(cf. [9]) to a first-order logic of awareness, show that awareness of unaware-
ness can be expressed in the system, and prove that there exist decidable
fragments of the system. For a general introduction to propositional epis-
temic logic, cf. [31] and [10]. For detailed treatments of the first-order epis-
temic systems, cf. [6] and the work of Arló-Costa and Pacuit ([2] and [3]).
3.1 First-order classical models
The language Ln of multi-agent first-order epistemic logic consists of the
connectives ∧ and ¬, the quantifier ∀, parentheses and n modal operators
K1, . . . ,Kn, one for each agent considered in the system. Furthermore, we
need a countable collection of individual variables V and a countable set
of n-place predicate symbols for each n ≥ 1. The expression ϕ(x) denotes
that x occurs free in ϕ, while ϕ[x/y] stands for the formula ϕ in which the
free variable x is replaced with the free variable y. An atomic formula has
the form P (x1, . . . , xn), where ϕ is a predicate symbol of arity n. If S is a
classical propositional modal logic, QS is given by the following axioms:
All axioms from S (S)
∀xϕ(x) → ϕ[y/x] (∀)
From ϕ→ ψ infer ϕ→ ∀xψ, where x is not free in ϕ. (Gen)
In particular, if S contains the only modal axiom E (from ϕ↔ ψ, infer
Kiϕ ↔ Kiψ) we have the weakest classical system E; if S validates also
axiom M (Ki(ϕ ∧ ψ) → (Kiϕ ∧Kiψ)), we have system (E)M, etc. (see [6]
for an exhaustive treatment of classical systems of modal logic).
As to the semantics, a constant domain neighborhood frame is a tuple
F = (W,N1, . . . ,Nn, D), where W is a set of possible worlds, D is a non-
empty set called the domain, and each Ni is a neighborhood function from
W to 22
W
. If we define the intension (or truth set) of a formula ϕ to be
the set of all worlds in which ϕ is true, then we can say, intuitively, that
an agent at a possible world knows all formulas whose intension belongs to
the neighborhood of that world. A model based of a frame F is a tuple
(W,N1, . . . ,Nn, D, I), where I is a classical first-order interpretation func-
tion. A substitution is a function σ : V → D. If a substitution σ′ agrees
with σ on every variable except x, it is called an x-variant of σ, and such
a fact is denoted by the expression σ ∼x σ
′. The satisfiability relation is
defined at each state relative to a substitution σ:
(M,w) |=σ P (x1, . . . , xn) iff 〈σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)〉 ∈ I(P,w) for each n-
ary predicate symbol P .
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(M,w) |=σ ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 6|=σ ϕ
(M,w) |=σ ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w) |=σ ϕ and (M,w) |=σ ψ
(M,w) |=σ Kiϕ iff {v : (M, v) |=σ ϕ} ∈ Ni(w)
(M,w) |=σ ∀xϕ(x) iff for each σ
′ ∼x σ, (M,w) |=σ′ ϕ(x)
As usual, we say that a formula ϕ is valid in M if (M,w) |= ϕ for all
worlds w in the model, while we say that ϕ is satisfiable in M if (M,w) |= ϕ
for some worlds w in the model. Notice that QE axiomatizes first-order min-
imal20 models (in which no restrictions are placed on the neighborhoods);
QEM axiomatizes first-order monotonic models (in which neighborhoods
are closed under supersets); etc.
3.2 Adding awareness
Following [9], awareness is introduced on the syntactic level by adding to the
language further modal operators Ai and Xi (with i = 1, . . . , n), standing
for awareness and explicit knowledge, respectively21. The operator Xi can
be defined in terms of Ki and Ai, according to the intuition that explicit
knowledge stems from the simultaneous presence of both implicit knowledge
and awareness, by the axiom
Xiϕ↔ Kiϕ ∧Aiϕ. (A0)
Semantically, we define n functions Ai from W to the set of all formu-
las. Their values specify, for each agent and each possible world, the set
of formulas of which the agent is aware at that particular world. Hence
the straightforward semantic clauses for the awareness and explicit belief
operators:
(M,w) |=σ Aiϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ai(w)
(M,w) |=σ Xiϕ iff (M,w) |= Aiϕ and (M,w) |= Kiϕ
In propositional awareness systems of the kind introduced in [9], different
interpretations of awareness are captured by imposing restrictions on the
construction of the awareness sets. For example, one can require that if
the agent is aware of ϕ ∧ ψ, then she is aware of ψ and ϕ as well. Or, one
could require that the agent’s awareness be closed under subformulas, etc.
20 For the terminology, see [6].
21 The use of neighborhood structures eliminates, of course, many aspects of the agents’
logical omniscience. However, axiom E is valid in all neighborhood structures. Thus,
the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge remains relevant, since agents
may fail to recognize the logical equivalence of formulas ϕ and ψ and, say, explicitly
know the former without explicitly knowing the latter.
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One of those interpretations (which, mutatis mutandis, is favored in the
economics literature when taken together with the assumption that agents
know what they are aware of) is that awareness is generated by primitive
propositions. In this case, there is a set of primitive propositions Φ of which
agent i is aware at w, and the awareness set of i at w contains exactly
those formulas that mention only atoms belonging to Φ. Similarly, we can
interpret awareness in a first-order system as being generated by atomic
formulas, in the sense that i is aware of ϕ at w iff i is aware of all atomic
subformulas in ϕ. Thus, for each i and w, there is a set (call it atomic
awareness set and denote it Φi(w)) such that ϕ ∈ Ai(w) iff ϕ mentions
only atoms appearing in Φi(w). Such an interpretation of awareness can
be captured axiomatically. The axioms relative to the boolean and modal
connectives are the usual ones (cf., e.g., [9]):
Ai¬ϕ↔ Aiϕ (A1)




Before discussing the axioms relative to the quantifiers, it is worth stress-
ing that the first-order setup allows the modeler to specify some details
about the construction of atomic awareness sets. In the propositional case,
the generating set of primitive propositions is a list of atoms, necessarily
unstructured. In the predicate case, we can have the atomic awareness set
built in the semantic structure. Notice that there can be two sources of
unawareness. An agent could be unaware of certain individuals in the do-
main or she could be unaware of certain predicates. Consider the following
examples: in a game of chess, (i) a player could move her knight to reach
a position x in which the opponent’s king is checkmated; however, she can-
not “see” the knight move and is, as a result, unaware that x is a mating
position; or (ii) a player could move her knight, resulting in a position x
in which the opponent’s queen is pinned; however, she is a beginner and
is not familiar with the notion of “pinning”; she is thus unaware that x is
a pinning position. Hence, in order for an agent to be aware of an atomic
formula she must be aware of the individuals occurring in the interpretation
of the formula as well as of the predicate occurring in it. It is possible to
capture these intuitions formally: for each i and w, define a “subjective
domain” Di(w) ⊂ D and a “subjective interpretation” Ii that agrees with
I except that for some w and P of arity n, I(P,w) 6= Ii(P,w) = ∅. We can
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then define the atomic awareness set for i at w by stipulating that
P (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Φi(w) iff
{
(i) σ(xk) ∈ Di(w), ∀xk, k = 1, . . . , n
(ii) 〈σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)〉 ∈ Ii(P,w)
Notice that this is consistent with the notion that one should interpret
a formula like Aiϕ(x), where x is free in ϕ, as saying that, under a valua-
tion σ, the agent is aware of ϕ(x). Similarly, the truth of Kiϕ(x) depends
on the individual assigned to x by the valuation σ. Finally, we need to
introduce a family of special n-ary predicates22 A!i whose intuitive meaning
is “i is aware of objects σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)”. Semantically, we impose that
(M,w) |=σ A!i(x) iff σ(x) ∈ Di(x).
3.3 Expressivity
Let us now turn our attention to the issue of representing knowledge of




The former says that agent i (explicitly) knows that there exists an
individual enjoying property P , without her being aware of which particular
individual enjoys P . The formula, intuitively, should be satisfiable, since
P (x) 6∈ Ai(w) need not entail ∃xP (x) 6∈ Ai(w). On the other hand, the
latter says that i is aware, of a specific x, that x has property P . If this
is the case, it is unreasonable to admit that i can be unaware of P (x).
By adopting appropriate restrictions on the construction of the awareness
sets, we can design a system in which formulas like (i) are satisfiable, while
formulas like (ii) are not.
In particular, we need to weaken the condition that awareness is gen-
erated by atomic formulas, since we want to allow for the case in which
P (x) 6∈ Ai(w), yet ∃xP (x) ∈ Ai(w). I argue that such an interpretation of
awareness is sensible. In fact, we may interpret P (x) not belonging to i’s
awareness set as meaning that i is not aware of a specific instance of x that
enjoys property P , while we may interpret ∃xP (x) belonging to i’s aware-
ness set as meaning that i is aware that at least one specific instance of x
(which one she ignores) enjoys property P . The versatility of the awareness
approach is again helpful, since the blend of syntax and semantics charac-
terizing the concept of awareness makes such an interpretation possible.
22 Such predicates are akin to the existence predicate in free logic. However, the awareness
system considered here is not based on free logic: the special awareness predicates will
only be used to limit the range of possible substitutions for universal quantifiers within
the scope of awareness operators. The behavior of quantifiers is otherwise standard.
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Let us see in more detail what restrictions on the construction of the
awareness sets correspond to the interpretation above. In particular, we
want
(i) Xi∃x¬AiP (x) to be satisfiable, while
(ii) ∃xXi¬AiP (x) should not be satisfiable.
Semantically, thus, if P (x) 6∈ Ai(w), then (against (ii)), ¬AiP (x) 6∈
Ai(w). Yet the possibility that (i) ∃x¬AiP (x) ∈ Ai(w) is left open. The
following condition, along with the usual conditions for awareness being
generated by atomic formulas in the case of quantifier-free formulas, does
the job23 (weak ∃-closure):
If ϕ[x/y] ∈ Ai(w), then ∃xϕ(x) ∈ Ai(w). (*)
It is easy to see that, if P (x) 6∈ Ai(w), then (ii) is not satisfiable,
since there should exist an interpretation σ′ ∼x σ such that (M,w) |=σ′
Ai¬AiP (x). But that is impossible, since, for quantifier-free propositions,
awareness is generated by atomic formulas. On the other hand, (i) entails
that ∃x¬AiP (x) ∈ Ai(w), which remains satisfiable, since the weak condi-
tion (*) does not require that ¬AiP (x) ∈ Ai(w).
Let me illustrate the reason why we are considering a weak closure of
awareness under existential quantification by means of an example: in the
current position of a chess game, White knows (or: deems highly prob-
able) that sacrificing the bishop triggers a mating combination, although
she cannot see what the combination itself precisely is. Take the variable
x to range over a domain of possible continuations of the game, and the
predicate P to be interpreted as “is a mating combination”. Thus, at w,
White is aware that there exists an x such that P (x). However she is not
aware of what individual σ(x) actually is (¬AiP (x)), hence Ai∃x¬AiP (x)
holds. Now, had (*) been a biconditional, since ∃x¬AiP (x) ∈ Ai(w) holds,
it would have been the case that ¬AiP [x/y] ∈ Ai(w), that is Ai¬AiP (y).
In the example, White would have been aware that she is not aware that the
specific combination σ(y) led to checkmate, which is counterintuitive. The
fact that, limited to sentences, awareness is generated by atomic formulas
and that awareness is only weakly closed under existential quantification
rules out such undesirable cases.
Notice that the weak ∃-closure (*) can be expressed axiomatically as
follows:
Aiϕ[x/y] → Ai∃xϕ(x). (A6)
What is the interplay between universal quantification and awareness?
Consider, in the example above, the situation in which White is aware that
23 Cf. [16], in which a similar requirement of weak existential closure is used.
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any continuation leads to checkmate. It is then reasonable to conclude that
she is aware, of any specific continuation she might have in mind, that it
leads to checkmate. Thus, if, for any x, P (x) ∈ Ai(w), then P [x/y] ∈ Ai(w)
for all y such that σ(y) ∈ Di(w). Hence the axiom
Ai∀xϕ(x) → (A!i(y) → Aiϕ[x/y]). (A7)
This concludes the presentation of the syntax and the semantics of the
first-order system of awareness. Various first-order modal logics are proven
to be complete with respect to neighborhood structures in [3]. Extending
the proof to deal with awareness is also straightforward once we add to the
canonical model the canonical awareness sets Ai(w) = {ϕ(x) : Aiϕ(x) ∈ w},
where w stands for a canonical world. For example, consider, in the proof
of the truth lemma, the case in which the inductive formula has the form
Aiψ: if Aiψ ∈ w, then, by definition of the canonical Ai(w), ψ ∈ Ai(w)
or (M,w) |=σ Aiψ, and vice versa. Note that axioms A1–A7 ensure that
awareness is weakly generated by atomic formulas.
3.4 Decidability
This section is based on Wolter and Zakharyashev’s decidability proof for
the monodic fragment of first-order multi-modal logics interpreted over
Kripke structures. The proof is here generalized to neighborhood models
with awareness. The monodic fragment of first-order modal logic is based on
the restricted language in which formulas in the scope of a modal operator
have at most one free variable. The idea of the proof is the following:
We can decide whether the monodic formula ϕ is valid, provided that
we can decide whether a certain classical first-order formula α is valid. This
is because, by answering the satisfiability problem for α, we can construct
a so-called “quasi-model” for ϕ. A “quasi-model” satisfying ϕ, as it will be
clear in the following, exists if and only if a neighborhood model satisfying
ϕ exists. Furthermore, if a model satisfying ϕ exists, then it is possible to
effectively build a “quasi-model” for ϕ. Hence the validity problem in the
monodic fragment of first-order modal logic can be reduced to the validity
problem in classical first-order logic. It follows that the intersection of the
monodic fragment and (several) decidable fragments of first-order classical
logic is decidable24.
In carrying the proof over to neighborhood structures with awareness, a
few adjustments of the original argument are necessary. First, the overall
proof makes use of special functions called runs. Such functions serve the
24 The mosaic technique on which the proof of the existence of an effective criterion for
the validity problem is based was introduced by Németi (cf. for example [34]). The
proof on which this subsection is based can be found in [40]. The same technique is
used in [39] to show that first-order common knowledge logics are complete. For a
more compact textbook exposition of the proof, cf. [4].
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purpose of encoding the modal content of the structure. Since the modal
operators are now interpreted through neighborhoods rather than through
accessibility relations, the definitions of runs and of related notions have to
be modified accordingly. Second, the proof of Theorem 3.1 accounts for the
cases of the modal operators introduced in the present setup (i.e., awareness
and explicit knowledge operators). Third, a suitable notion of “unwinding”
a neighborhoods structure has to be found in order to prove Lemma 3.2.
Fourth, the use of neighborhood structures slightly modifies the argument
of the left to right direction in Theorem 3.3. In the rest of this subsection,
I shall offer the main argument and definitions, relegating the more formal
proofs to the Appendix.
Fix a monodic formula ϕ. For any subformula iψ(x) of ϕ, let Piψ(x)
be a predicate symbol not occurring in ψ, where i = {Ki, Ai, Xi}. Piψ(x)
has arity 1 if ψ(x) has a free variable, 0 otherwise, and it is called the
surrogate of ψ(x). For any subformula ψ of ϕ, define ψ to be the formula
obtained by replacing the modal subformulas of ψ not in the scope of another
modal operator with their surrogates, and call ψ the reduct of ψ.
Define subx ϕ = {ψ[x/y] : ψ(y) ∈ subϕ}, where subϕ is the closure
under negation of the set of subformulas of ϕ. Define a type t for ϕ as any
boolean saturated subset of subx ϕ
25, i.e., such that, (i) for all ψ ∈ subx ϕ,
¬ψ ∈ t iff ψ 6∈ t; and (ii) for all ψ ∧ χ ∈ subx ϕ, ψ ∧ χ ∈ t iff ψ and χ belong
to t26. Types t and t′ are said to agree on sub0 ϕ (the set of subsentences
of ϕ) if t ∩ sub0 ϕ = t
′ ∩ sub0 ϕ.
The goal is to encode a neighborhood model satisfying ϕ into a quasi-
model for ϕ. The first step consists in coding the worlds of the neighborhood
model. Define a world candidate to be the set T of ϕ-types that agree on
sub0 ϕ. Consider now a first-order structure D = (D,P
D
0 , . . .), let a ∈ D and
define tD(a) = {ψ ∈ subx ϕ : D |= ψ[a]}, where |= stands for the classical
satisfiability relation. It easily follows from the semantics of ¬ and ∧ that tD
is a type for ϕ. A realizable world candidate is the set T = {tD(a) : a ∈ D}.
Notice that T is a realizable world candidate iff a formula αT is satisfiable







in which t(x) :=
∧
ψ(x)∈t ψ(x).
25 Or, equivalently, as “any subset of subx ϕ such that {ψ : ψ ∈ t} is maximal consistent”,
where ψ is any subformula of ϕ: cf. [4].
26 For example, consider ϕ := KiP (y) ∧Xi∃zR(y, z). Then subx ϕ is the set {KiP (x) ∧
Xi∃zR(x, z),KiP (x), P (x), Xi∃zR(x, z), ∃zR(x, z)}, along with the negation of such
formulas. Some of the types for ϕ are Φ ∪ {∃zR(x, z), P (x)},Φ ∪ {¬∃zR(x, z), P (x)},
etc.; ¬Φ ∪ {∃zR(x, z), P (x)}, ¬Φ ∪ {∃zR(x, z),¬P (x)} etc., where Φ = {KiP (x) ∧
Xi∃zR(x, z),KiP (x),Xi∃zR(x, z)} and ¬Φ = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ Φ}.
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Intuitively, the formula says that all the reducts of the formulas in every
type t ∈ T are realized through some assignment in the first-order structure,
while all assignments in the structure realize the reducts of the formulas in
some type t ∈ T . The existence of the satisfiability criterion for ϕ will
ultimately be given modulo the decidability of αT for each realizable world
candidate in the model, hence the restriction to the monodic fragment based
on a decidable fragment of predicate logic.
Set a neighborhood frame with awareness F = (W,N1, . . . ,Nn,A1, . . . ,
An). We can associate each world w in W to a corresponding realizable
world-candidate by taking the set of types for ϕ that are realized in w.
Let f be a map from each w ∈ W to the corresponding realizable world
candidates Tw. Define a run as a function form W to the set of all types of
ϕ such that
(i) r(w) ∈ Tw,
(ii) if Kiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then, Kiψ ∈ r(w) iff {v : ψ ∈ r(v)} ∈ N (w),
(iii) if Aiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then Aiψ ∈ r(w) iff ψ ∈ Ai(w),
(iv) if Xiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then Xiψ ∈ r(w) iff {v : ψ ∈ r(v)} ∈ N (w) and
ψ ∈ Ai(w).
Runs are the functions that encode the “modal content” of the neighbor-
hood structure satisfying ϕ that was lost in the reducts ψ, so that it can be
restored when constructing a neighborhood model based on the quasi-model
for ϕ.
Finally, define a quasi-model for ϕ as the pair 〈F , f〉, where f is a map
from each w ∈W to the set of realizable world candidates for w, such that,
for all w ∈ W and t ∈ T , there exists a run on F whose value for w is t.
We say that a quasi-model satisfies ϕ iff there exists a w such that ϕ ∈ t for
some t ∈ Tw. We can now prove the following
Theorem 3.1. The monodic sentence ϕ is satisfiable in a neighborhood
structure M based on F iff ϕ is satisfiable in a quasi-model for ϕ based
on F .
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.1. q.e.d.
It is now possible to show that an effective satisfiability criterion for ϕ
exists by representing quasi-models through (possibly infinite) mosaics of
repeating finite patterns called blocks27.
27 For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, from now on attention will be
restricted to models with a single agent.
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Recall that quasi-models are based on neighborhood frames. We restrict
now our attention to monotonic frames28 and say that a quasi-model for
ϕ is a tree quasi-model if it is based on a tree-like neighborhood frame.
Section A.2 of the Appendix, drawing from [17], describes how a monotonic
neighborhood model can be unravelled in a tree-like model. Hence,
Lemma 3.2. A (monodic) formula ϕ is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a
tree quasi-model for ϕ at its root.
Proof. The lemma stems obviously from the unravelling procedure described
in the Appendix, Section A.2. q.e.d.
We now need to define the notion of a block for ϕ. We shall then be
able to represent quasi-models as structures repeating a finite set of blocks.
Consider a finite tree-like structure (called a bouquet) 〈Fn, f〉, based on
Wn = {w0, . . . , wn}, rooted in w0, such that no world in the structure but
w0 has a nonempty neighborhood.
A root-saturated weak run is a function r from Wn to the set of types
for ϕ such that
(i) r(wn) ∈ Twn ,
(ii) if Kiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then, Kiψ ∈ r(w0) iff {v : ψ ∈ r(v)} ∈ N (w),
(iii) if Aiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then Aiψ ∈ r(w0) iff ψ ∈ Ai(w),
(iv) if Xiψ ∈ subx ϕ, then Xiψ ∈ r(w0) iff {v : ψ ∈ r(v)} ∈ N (w) and
ψ ∈ Ai(w).
A block is a bouquet 〈Fn, fn〉, where fn is a map from each w ∈ Wn to
the set of realizable world candidates for w such that, for each w ∈Wn and
t ∈ T , there exists a root-saturated weak run whose value for w is t. We
say that ϕ is satisfied in a block 〈Fn, fn〉 iff there exists a w such that ϕ ∈ t
for some t ∈ Tw.
Finally, a satisfying set for ϕ is a set S of blocks such that (i) it contains
a block with root w0 such that ϕ ∈ t for all t ∈ Tw0 (that is, w0 satisfies
ϕ), and (ii) for every realizable world candidate in every block of S, there
exists a block in S rooted in such a realizable world candidate.
It is now possible to prove the following
Theorem 3.3. A monodic sentence ϕ is satisfiable iff there exists a satis-
fying set for ϕ, whose blocks contain a finite number of elements.
28 This restriction yields a less general proof, since it implies that the decidability result
does not hold for non-monotonic systems. Given the intended interpretation of the
modalities (high-probability operators, cf. Section 1), the restriction is not problematic.
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Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3. q.e.d.
The effective satisfiability criterion now follows:
Corollary 3.4. Let Lm be the monodic fragment and L
′
m ⊆ Lm. Suppose
that for ϕ ∈ L′m there is an algorithm deciding whether a world-candidate
for ϕ is realizable (that is, whether the classical first-order formula αT is
satisfiable.) Then the fragment L′m∩ QEM is decidable.
In particular, the monodic fragment is decidable if it is based on the
two- (one-) variable fragment, on the monadic fragment, and on the guarded
fragment of classical predicate logic (cf. [40]).
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. [⇒] Let M be a neighborhood structure satisfying ϕ. Construct a
quasi-model as follows: Define the map f by stipulating that
twa = {ψ ∈ subx ϕ : (M,w) |=σ ψ}, where a ∈ D and σ(x) = a,
Tw = {t
w
a : a ∈ D},
and let, for all a ∈ D and w ∈ W , r(w) = twa . We need to show that
r is a run in 〈F , f〉. For (i), r(w) = twa ∈ Tw by construction. For (ii),
Kiψ(x) ∈ r(w) iff (M,w) |=σ Kiψ(x) iff {v : (M, v) |=σ ψ(x)} ∈ Ni(w)
but, for all a ∈ D, tva = {ψ ∈ subx ϕ : (M, v) |=σ ψ(x)} and r(v) = t
v
a by
definition, thus {v : (M, v) |=σ ψ(x)} = {v : ψ(x) ∈ r(v)}, as desired. For
(iii), (M,w) |=σ Aiψ iff ψ ∈ Ai(w), hence Aiψ ∈ r(w) iff ψ ∈ Ai(w). The
case for (iv) follows immediately from (ii) and (iii).
[⇐] Fix a cardinal κ ≥ ℵ0 that exceeds the cardinality of the set Ω of all
runs in the quasi-model. Set D = {〈r, ξ〉 : r ∈ Ω, ξ < κ}. Recall that a world
candidate T is realizable iff the first-order formula αT is satisfiable in a first-
order structure and notice that, since the language we are using does not
comprehend equality, it follows from standard classical model theory that we
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can consider the first-order structure D to be of arbitrary infinite cardinality
κ ≥ ℵ0. Hence, for every w ∈ W , there exists a first-order structure I(w)
with domain D that realizes the world candidate f(w). Notice that the
elements in the domain of such structures are specific runs indexed by the
cardinal ξ. Let29 r(w) = {ψ ∈ subx ϕ : I(w) |= ψ[〈r, ξ〉]} for all r ∈ Ω and
ξ < κ.
Let the neighborhood structure be M = (W,N1, . . . ,Nn,A1, . . . ,An,
D, I) and let σ be an arbitrary assignment in D. For all ψ ∈ subϕ and
w ∈W , we show by induction that
I(w) |=σ ψ iff (M,w) |=σ ψ.
The basis is straightforward, since ψ = ψ when ψ is an atom. The
inductive step for the nonmodal connectives follows from the observation
that ψ ∧ ψ′ = ψ ∧ ψ′, ¬ψ = ¬ψ, ∀xψ = ∀xψ, and the induction hypothesis.
Consider now the modal cases. Fix σ(y) = 〈r, ξ〉 First, let ψ := Kiχ(y).
The reduct of ψ is the first-order formula PKiχ(y). We have that
I(w) |=σ PKiχ(y) iff (construction of quasi-model)
Kiχ(y) ∈ r(w) iff (definition of run)
{v : χ(y) ∈ r(v)} ∈ Ni(w) iff (definition of r(v))
{v : I(v) |= χ(y)} ∈ Ni(w) iff (induction hypothesis)
{v : (M, v) |=σ χ(y)} ∈ Ni(w) iff (semantics)
(M,w) |=σ Kiχ(y).
Second, let ψ := Aiχ(y). The reduct of ψ is the first-order formula
PAiχ(y). Then,
I(w) |=σ PAiχ(y) iff (construction of quasi-model)
Aiχ(y) ∈ r(w) iff (definition of run and of r(w))
χ(y) ∈ Ai(w) iff (semantics)
(M,w) |=σ Aiχ.
Finally, let ψ := Xiχ(y). We have that I(w) |=σ PXiχ(y) iff I(w) |=σ
PKiχ(y) ∧ PAiχ(y), which follows from the two cases just shown. q.e.d.
A.2 Unravelling a neighborhood structure
In this subsection I describe the procedure defined in [17] to unravel a
core-complete, monotonic model M into a monotonic model whose core
neighborhoods give rise to a tree-like structure that is bisimilar to M .
Definition A.1. (Core-complete models) Let the core N c of N be defined
by X ∈ N c(w) iff X ∈ N (w) and for all X0 ⊂ X,X0 6∈ N
c(w). Let M be a
neighborhood model. M is core-complete if, for all w ∈ W and X ⊆ W , If
X ∈ N (w), then there exists a C ∈ N c(w) such that C ⊆ X .
29 For a proof that this assumption is legitimate, cf. [39].
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The idea is that we can unravel a core-complete, monotonic neighbor-
hood structure (with awareness) into a core-complete neighborhood which
is rooted and whose core, in a sense that will be made precise below, con-
tains no cycles and has unique, disjoint neighborhoods. The unravelling
procedure described above is given in [17].
Define the following objects:
Definition A.2. Let M be a core-complete monotonic model. For any
X ⊆W , define N cω(X) and Sω(X) as the union, for all n ≥ 0, of the objects
defined by double recursion as:















In words, we start with a neighborhood X , and take N c0 (X) to be the
core neighborhoods of the worlds in X . We add all worlds in such core
neighborhoods to the space set of the following stage in the inductive con-
struction, and then consider all core neighborhoods of all such worlds, etc.
If the set of all worlds in a model M is yielded by Sω({ω}), then M is said
to be a rooted model.
We can now define a tree-like neighborhood model as follows:
Definition A.3. LetM be a core-complete monotonic neighborhood model
with awareness, and let w0 ∈ W . Then Mw0 is a tree-like model if:
(i) W = Sω({w0});
(ii) For all w ∈W , w 6∈
⋃
n>0 Sn({w});
(iii) For all w,w′, v ∈ W and all X0, X1 ⊆ W : If v ∈ X0 ∈ N
c(w) and
v ∈ X1 ∈ N
c(w′), then X0 = X1 and w0 = w1.
That is to say, (i) M is rooted in w0; (ii) w does not occur in any
core neighborhood “below” w, thus there are no cycles; and (iii) all core
neighborhoods are unique and disjoint.
The neighborhood model M = (W,N ,A, π) can now be unravelled into
the model Mw0 = (Ww0 ,Nw0 ,Aw0 , πw0) as follows:
(1) Define its universe Ww0 as
Ww0 = {(w0X1w1 . . . Xnwn) : n ≥ 0
and for each l = 1, . . . , n : Xl ∈ N (wl−1), wl ∈ Xl}
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In English, Ww0 contains all sequences of worlds and neighborhoods
obtained by beginning with w0 and appending to each state wi the sets be-
longing to its neighborhood, and by further appending the worlds contained
in the element of the neighborhood under consideration. For example, if the
model contains a world w whose neighborhood contains the set {x, y} the
space of the unravelled model rooted on w contains also worlds w{x, y}x
and w{x, y}y.
In order to define the neighborhoods of the unravelled model, we need
to define two maps pre and last as:
pre : (w0X1w1 . . . Xnwn) → (w0X1w1 . . .Xn)
last : (w0X1w1 . . . Xnwn) → wn.
(2) Define now a neighborhood function N cw0 : Ww0 → P(P(Ww0)) as
follows, with −→s ∈ Ww0 and Y ⊆Ww0 :
Y ∈ N cw0(
−→s ) iff for all −→y ∈ Y and some X ∈ P(W ),
pre(−→y ) = −→s X and
⋃
−→y ∈Y
last(−→y ) = X ∈ N (last(−→s ))
Thus, every neighborhood in the original model N (last(−→s )) originates
exactly one neighborhood Y in N cw0(
−→s ) and all sets Y are disjoint. Closing
the core neighborhoods under supersets yields now the neighborhoods of
the monotonic model.
(3) Define an awareness function Aw0 such that ϕ ∈ Aw0(
−→w ) iff ϕ ∈
A(last(−→w )).
(4) Finally, we take πw0(
−→s ) to agree with π(last(−→s )).
It follows that (M, (w0)) |= ϕ iff (Mw0 ,
−→w0) |= ϕ, since we can root
the unravelled model on the world w satisfying ϕ in the original model.
Moreover, if, as we are assuming, the original model M is core-complete,
the core neighborhoods of the unravelled tree-like model still give rise to a
model that is bisimilar to M .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. [⇒] If ϕ is satisfiable, by the lemma above there exists a tree quasi-
model satisfying ϕ at its root. For all X ∈ N (w), with w ∈W , either there
are sufficiently many sets Y , called twins of X such that Y ∈ P(W ), the
submodel generated by Y is isomorphic to the one generated by X and, for
all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y , f(x) = f(y), or we can make sure that such is the
case by duplicating, as many time as needed, the worlds in the neighborhood
X in a way that the resulting structure is equivalent to the given one, and
thus still a quasi-model for ϕ.
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For every w ∈ W , now, construct a finite block Bw = (Fw, fw) with
Fw = (Ww,Nw) as follows:
For every t ∈ Tw, fix a run in the quasi-model such that r(w) = t. For
every Kψ ∈ subx ϕ such that Kψ 6∈ r(w), we select an X ∈ P(W ) such that
X ∈ N (w) and there exists v ∈ X such that ψ(x) 6∈ r(v) and put it in an
auxiliary set Sel(w) along with one of its twins Y . Take Ww to be w along
with all selected worlds, Nw to be the restriction of N to Ww, and fw to
be the restriction of f to Ww. The resulting structure Bw is a block for ϕ
since it is based on a bouquet (of depth 1) and it is a subquasi-model of the
original quasi-model for ϕ30.
We now illustrate precisely the construction sketched above, and show
that for all w ∈ W and tw ∈ Tw there exists a root-saturated weak run
coming through tw. For this purpose, let u ∈ Ww, t ∈ Tu and r be a weak
run such that r(u) = t. Consider the type r(w) and the set C = {χ :=
Kψ ∈ subx ϕ : χ 6∈ r(w)}. For any such χ, there exists a weak run rχ such
that: (i) rχ(w) = r(w), (ii) ψ 6∈ r(wχ) for some world wχ ∈ Ww in some
selected X ∈ N (w) and (iii) u 6= w,wχ. Define now, for any w
′ ∈ Ww, the
root-saturated weak run r′ such that (a) r(w′) if w′ 6= w,wχ for all χ ∈ C,
and (b) rχ(w
′) otherwise.
The satisfying set for ϕ is now obtained by taking the blocks Bw for each
w ∈W , each block containing at most 2 · | subx ϕ| · 2
| subx ϕ| neighborhoods.
[⇐] If S is a satisfying set for ϕ, we can inductively construct a quasi-
model for ϕ as the limit of a sequence of (weak) quasi-models (Fn, fn) with
n = 1, 2, . . . and Fn = (Wn,Nn,An). The basis of the inductive definition is
the quasi-model m1, which is a block in S satisfying ϕ at its root. Assuming
we have defined the quasi-model mk, let mk+1 be defined as follows: For
each w ∈ Wm − Wm−1 (where W0 is the root of F1) select a block B
′
w
such that fn(w) = fw′w
′ and append the selected blocks to the appropriate
worlds in mk. We can then take the desired quasi-model to be the limit of
30 To see this, consider, for instance, the case that Kψ ∈ t = r(w). Then, for all
v ∈ Nw(w), ψ ∈ r(v). Now, if there does not exist any type t′ such that Kψ 6∈ t′, we
are done. If there is such a type, however, there exists a run r′ such that Kψ 6∈ r′(w)
and we select sets X, Y ∈ P(W ) such that they belong to N (w), {v : (M, v) |= ψ} = X
and, for all x, y in X, Y respectively, ψ belongs to both r(x) and r(y). The idea of
the construction, now, is to define a further run, which goes through the types of,
say, x that does not contain ψ, making sure that it is ‘root-saturated.’ Notice that
blocks constructed this way are always quasi-models, since they are root-saturated
weak quasi-models of depth one. However, if we consider also, as it is done in [40],
the transitive and reflexive closure of the neighborhood functions (a sort of “common
knowledge” operator), then resulting bouquets have depth larger than 1, and blocks
are indeed based on weak quasi-models.
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Clearly, the resulting structure is based on an awareness neighborhood
frame, and f is a map from worlds in W to their corresponding sets of world
candidates. It remains to show that, for each world and type, there exists
a run in the quasi-model coming through that type. We define such runs
inductively, taking r1 to be an arbitrary (weak) run in m1. Suppose r
k has
already been defined: Consider, for each w ∈ Wk −Wk−1, runs rw(w) and
such that rk(w) = rw(w). Now, for each w
′ ∈Wk+1−Wk take r
k+1 to be (i)
rk(w′) iff w′ ∈ Wk and (ii) rw(w




The constructed function r is a run in the limit quasi-model since, at each
stage k of the construction, it has been “added” to r a root-saturated run
rk hence, in the limit, r is saturated at each w ∈ W . q.e.d.
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[2] H. Arló-Costa. First order extensions of classical systems of modal
logic; the role of the barcan schemas. Studia Logica, 71(1):87–118,
2002.
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